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with Schoolkey's regards.

THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.

THE

GORGIAS

OF

PLATO,

CHIEFLY ACCORDING TO STALLBAUM'S TEXT;

WITH

NOTES,

BY

THEODORE D. WOOLSEY.

Athenis diligentius legi Gorgiam: quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur.

CIC. DE ORATORE, I. 11.

NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.

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47-26

TO

PROFESSOR FELTON

OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

THIS EDITION OF GORGIAS

IS INSCRIBED,

AS A MEMORIAL OF LONG FRIENDSHIP,

BY

THE EDITOR

PREFACE.

1. The text of this edition principally follows Stallbaum's, published at Gotha in 1840. After examining the various readings, as Ast has given them, the editor was led to make about forty changes in the text of Stallbaum's first Gotha edition of 1828. On receiving, not very long since, the same critic's second edition of 1840, mentioned above, the editor was pleased to find a large part of these alterations, and nearly all the more important ones, made by Stallbaum himself. A number of others have since been made, in reliance upon Stallbaum's long study of Plato and ability; and the text now differs from his last revision chiefly in the following places.

450, D, my ed. inserts ἡ before ἀριθμητική. — 451, A, I have given οὖν for νῦν. — 459, A, τοι νῦν δὴ for τοίνυν δή. — 460, C, Stallb. has no brackets. — ibid. D, omits the words in brackets. — 461, B, vid. not. — 462, E, Stallb. has ἄρ' for δ'. — 465, B, gives ἐσθῆσιν. — 466, A, omits the words in brackets. — 472, A, has ταὐτὰ for ταῦτα. — ibid. B, has Πυθοῖ. Vid. not. — ibid. ἐνθάδε. Vid. not. — 480, D, has τοῦτο for τούτῳ. — 481, A, omits αὖ before θανάτου. — 483, E, puts a colon after πλάττοντες. — 491, D, vid. not. — 492, B, omits

the words in brackets. — 494, E, omits *το*. — 496, A, reads ἄνθρωπος. — 497, A, gives καὶ . . . νουθετεῖς to Callicles. Vid. not. — 500, B, brackets κατὰ τὸ σῶμα after μαγειρικήν, which I have omitted. — 505, E, joins οὕτως to the next sentence. — 508, B, inserts *ἄθλιοι*. — 514, C, I have bracketed ὑφ'. — 522, C, have given οὕτως. Vid. not. — 525, D, have omitted τοὺς before τούτων. — 527, C, Stallb. gives ὁ σὸς λόγος. Vid. not.

In the text, like other editors of Plato, I have allowed οὐκοῦν, *nonne igitur*, to be thus accented, and, as I think, for good reasons. In the notes, I have followed what is, I believe, Hermann's practice, in treating a single Greek oxytoned word in an English sentence just as it would be treated in a Greek one. If, for example, ἄν occurs in the middle of a clause, it is not written ἄν.

2. I have had access to the following editions of Gorgias, which include all the modern ones of much value. 1. Routh's, Oxford, 1784. 2. Findeisen's, — an edition of indifferent judgment. Gotha and Amsterdam, 1796. 3. Heindorf's second, edited by Buttmann, Berlin, 1829, — excellent, especially for the Commentary. 4. Bekker's. 5. Stallbaum's Leipzig ed. These are concerned only with the text. Bekker's has some Scholia. 6. Coray's, Paris, 1825, together with Xenophon's Memorab. 7. Ast's, in his Plato. The bulky Commentary on Gorgias is in Vol. XI., Leipzig, 1832; valuable, but ill-arranged and tedious, and not always judicious. 8. Stallbaum's, in his Gotha ed. of Plato, 1828 and 1840. Both text and interpretation owe much to him, and he has collected most of what is useful in other editions.

From these editions, above all from the last, I have derived great assistance, which is often acknowledged and often not. In a work like this, it would be plainly impossible to trace every thing up to its source, but nothing has been adopted without examination; much, also, is original; but I fear that if any one should pass the severe judgment upon the edition, that much of what is faulty is original, he would not be very far out of the way.

Besides these editions, I have consulted several of those works relating to Plato, to which an editor of his dialogues would naturally think of turning for aid. Of this description are Ast's Lexicon Platonicum (the first three vols.), which is of no great use after all, Ast's, Socher's, and the first vol. of C. F. Hermann's Introduction to Plato, Schleiermacher's and Cousin's translations, and Dobson's translation of Schleiermacher's Prefaces.

3. An introduction is prefixed to the text of the dialogue, with a view to give an explanation and critique of the argument. To this are added, in notes, rather literal translations of a few illustrative passages out of very many from Plato's other writings, most of which I have read with reference to the present edition during its preparation. I had intended to add an index, in which some things omitted in the notes were to find their place, and had made some progress in it, but was tempted by the overpowering tediousness of the task to lay it aside until too late.

4. I have said nothing, thus far, as to the propriety of laying the Gorgias before American students of Greek, rather than some other dialogue of the same great author. To persons familiar with the Platonic

dialogues, perhaps nothing need be said on this point. Let me say, however, that while many of the dialogues would not have suited my design, on account of their abstruseness or their length, the Gorgias deserved to be preferred to others equally finished in style, on account of its positive inculcation of truth and its high moral tone. Something better is to be found in it than the miserable doctrine of instruction, and the duty of the politician to obey the popular will.

Yale College, New Haven,
July, 1842.

A SECOND edition of the Gorgias being called for, the editor has done what he could, amid the pressing cares of a new office, to render it, by the necessary changes and additions, less imperfect than the former. In doing this, he has received kind aid from several friends, and takes this opportunity of making his acknowledgments to Professor Crosby of Dartmouth College, Mr. Sophocles of Harvard University, Mr. Hadley of Yale College, and C. A. Bristed, Esq., of New York.

Yale College, June 1, 1848.

INTRODUCTION.

The times in Greece which just preceded the age of Socrates gave birth to a class of men denominated the Sophists. This title, which before was honorably applied to such as excelled in wisdom or ingenuity, was then chiefly confined to those who, with mercenary views, professed a vain and shallow kind of wisdom. Such is in substance Aristotle's definition of a Sophist. In the successive sketches of Plato's Sophistes, he is hit off as a mercenary hunter after rich young men; a dealer and huckster in intellectual wares, especially of his own production; a logomachist; one who, by his power of taking the opposite on all subjects, gets a reputation for wisdom; one who is employed about that which is false, or merely appearing, instead of the invariable objects of true science, and who conceals his ignorance of true science by artificial and crafty turns of words. This last characteristic is one which gives the relation of the Sophist to philosophy. He denied all objective truth, and stood only on the fluctuating, uncertain ground of subjective opinion. Hence, as to truth, he was an unbeliever. He could accommodate himself to one side or its opposite, contending for or against any point, as interest might dictate. Finding nothing in philosophy to employ himself with, he withdrew from the study of it to the arts of practical life, and aimed, by attract-

ing admiration and educating the young, to gain wealth and honor. Gratification or pleasure was the immediate object in his view, and he could have no higher; for to instruct in virtue would imply the existence of unalterable moral differences, which he denied. Or, if he professed to teach virtue and justice, it was only in accommodation to a vague opinion of those who employed him; and it was necessary for him to pervert these notions, in order to make his instructions consistent with the rule of gratification by which he was governed.

It would carry us far beyond our bounds, were we to attempt to exhibit at any length the causes to which this class of men owed their origin and their prominence. These causes lay partly in the unsatisfactory results to which the prevailing systems of Greek philosophy had arrived, and partly in the circumstances of the times. On the one hand, many of the philosophers either wholly denied the existence of truth within the reach of man, or so contracted its dimensions as to make it not worth pursuing. Hence arose skepticism, despair, and the fading away of a serious regard for truth, which were succeeded by frivolity and by the purpose to gain immediate selfish ends through pretensions to superior knowledge. On the other hand, the decay of religious belief which attends upon increasing civilization in heathen countries, and the disregard of political morality so prevalent in Greece, threw uncertainty into the opinions of men upon the most important subjects. Thus the same disease attacked the roots of philosophy, religion, and morals.

In the schools of the philosophers, the art of reasoning and its instrument had received by degrees some attention. Thus logic had been cultivated by the Eleatic sect, but was turned, in the hands of the Sophists, into an art of disputing, applied to puzzle the unpractised and display their

own dexterity. The right and elegant use of words was employed by other Sophists to procure for themselves admiration and pupils. Many of this class of men exhibited their knowledge in public by answering any question that might be proposed to them, or gave lectures prepared with great care; while in private they imparted such instructions to young men as would give them polish and ability in civil and political life. All of them took money for their instructions, — a practice not regarded as entirely honorable at that time in Greece.

The sophistical principles of the time were brought into closer connection with public affairs by means of the art of rhetoric, which arose at about the same era. Rhetoric began to be taught as a means of gaining a cause in the courts at Syracuse after the year 466, when a popular government, succeeding to the sway of Hiero's family, greatly multiplied judicial proceedings. An art like this was calculated to be popular in free states, and especially in Athens, where the judicial function of the people was the most important one; where the crowds of ignorant judges were easily deceived by sophistry; and where there was an uncommon fondness for displays of skill in the use of words.

The sophistical tendency, which we have represented as one in its origin, affected all branches of truth and every art which can be referred to scientific principles. In metaphysics it may be exemplified by the tenets of Protagoras, that all knowledge consists in sensation, and that whatever appears true to any man is true to him; and by the doctrine of Gorgias, that there is no truth which men can ascertain or communicate to one another. In morals and politics, it appeared in the opinions, that there is no natural justice, or that justice is the interest of the stronger; and that pleasure is the chief good. In the use of rhetoric, it showed its nature when Protagoras offered to teach how to prevail

by the worse argument (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν), and when Tisias and Gorgias said that the probable must be held in higher esteem than the true.

The Sophists could not fail to disgust a man like Socrates, who hated show and pretension, and who had a deep veneration for truth. Hence he was sometimes brought into collision with them, and in a degree his doctrines, as well as those of Plato, were shaped by opposition to theirs. And in accordance with this, Plato, especially in his first works, represents Socrates arguing against some false opinion or other maintained by a person imbued with this spirit.

One of the more prominent Sophists, with whom Socrates was contemporary, was Gorgias, after whom this dialogue is named. Gorgias was a Sicilian Greek of Leontini, a Chalcidian town, which lay some twenty miles to the north of Syracuse, and suffered much from its nearness to that powerful Doric state. The birth of Gorgias is assigned by Foss * to the first year of the 71st Olympiad, or 496 B. C. But there is good reason, I think, for putting it several years later. For the art of rhetoric began to flourish at Syracuse after 466 B. C., and Gorgias learned this art from Tisias, a scholar of Corax, the first preceptor.† And with this it accords, that Gorgias heard Empedocles in philosophy, whose birth even Foss places no earlier than the 71st Olympiad, while the ancients say that he flourished from forty to sixty years afterward.

From this time we know nothing of Gorgias until he was

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* De Gorgia Leontino Commentatio. Halle. 1828.

† This is asserted by the author of the Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of Hermogenes (in Walz's Collection, Vol. IV. p. 14). The passage is inserted by Spengel into his valuable book entitled Artium Scriptores. Stuttgardt. 1828. Foss denies it without authority, "tum propter alius testimonii inopiam, tum propter Tisiæ ætatem."

sixty years old or upwards. In the interval he may have taught rhetoric in Sicily, for Polus of Agrigentum appears at Athens as his disciple, and he probably stood high in his native state. In the second year of the 88th Olympiad, he came to Athens on the following occasion. "The Leontines (Diodor. 12. 53), who were emigrants from Chalcis, and of the same stock with the Athenians, were invaded by the people of Syracuse. As they were pressed by the war, and in danger of being reduced by the superior might of Syracuse, they sent ambassadors to Athens, begging the people to help them as speedily as possible, and rescue their state from its dangers. The principal ambassador among those who were sent was Gorgias, the orator, a man who excelled all of his time in eloquence, and first invented the artifices of rhetoric* (τέχνας ῥητορικάς). — On his arrival at Athens he was introduced into the Assembly, and discoursed before the people concerning the alliance. The Athenians, who were fond of displays of genius and skill in the use of words, were struck with wonder by the novelty of his style, by his various antitheses, his clauses of equal length, his words of similar forms and endings, and the like artifices; which then, being new, met with favor, but now seem to be a waste of labor, and are ridiculous if repeated so often as to produce satiety. At last, having persuaded the Athenians to form an alliance with the Leontines, and gained admiration at Athens for his rhetorical art, he returned to his native town." The sensation which his rhetoric produced at Athens is spoken of by others also. The days on which he made his exhibitions were called festivals, and his discourses themselves torches.† "He won great praise," says

* See Spengel, u. s., p. 81.

† This is said by the commentator on Hermog. u. s., p. 15, by Olympiodor. apud Routh, p. 562, and other late writers.

Socrates in Plato's Hippias Maj. (282, B), "by his speeches in the Assembly, and by his private displays of his eloquence. By the instructions he imparted to the young (συνὼν τοῖς νέοις) he gained a large amount of money, and carried it with him from Athens." If Plato, who is sometimes careless about precise facts and dates, may here be relied upon, he must have stayed long enough at Athens to act the part of a teacher before he went elsewhere. It is probable that, after discharging his mission, he soon returned to Greece, where the rest of his life seems to have been spent. Thessaly was his principal residence, and that he passed no very long time in Athens may be argued from the fact, that Isocrates, an Athenian, received his instructions in that country. There, also, he taught Meno, and Aristippus, one of the nobles of Larissa, and there, or in Bœotia, Proxenus, the comrade of Xenophon. The wealthy families of Thessaly had that rude taste which would make them fond of the glitter and ostentation of Gorgias, and were able to pay him well. He lived in splendor, affecting in his dress the same show and parade which marked his eloquence. (Ælian, Var. Hist. 12. 32.) Owing to his habits of temperance, he attained to a very great age, to six or eight years over a century, and acted the rhetorician to the last, by saying, according to Ælian (u. s. 2. 35), when invaded by a lethargic sleep, premonitory of his end, — "Sleep is now beginning to lay me in the hands of his brother." His works, in his capacity as a rhetorician, were, — 1. One on the art, or on one branch of it, the art of speaking suitably to the occasion. 2. A number of orations, declamatory and laudatory. One of these was delivered at the Olympic festival, in which, like Isocrates afterwards, he tried to unite the Greeks against the Persians. Another was a funeral discourse in honor of Athenians slain in battle, a fragment of which, preserved by a Scholiast on Hermogenes,

supplies us with the longest extant specimen of his style. These works exhibited a stately, uncommon, and poetical diction, together with frequent rhetorical figures, which must have been tedious and frigid in the extreme.* Two declamations still extant, bearing his name, are unlike his fragments in style, and ought probably to be regarded as spurious.

Gorgias was, as we have said, at bottom a Sophist,† but he avoided the title, which was not very popular, "and laughed at the Sophists, who professed to know how to make men better, confining himself to instructions concerning the art of speaking." (Plat. Meno, 95, C.) His literary labors in the more appropriate sphere of the Sophist were confined, so far as we know, to a work entitled *περὶ φύσεως ἢ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, which may have been unknown to Plato, but is analyzed in a little treatise among the works of Aristotle. In this work, with such an ominous title, he attempted to prove, first, that nothing exists, then, if any thing exists, that it cannot be known, and, finally, that if known, it cannot be made known to others. Olympiodorus (in Routh's ed. of Gorgias, p. 567) says, that this work was written in the 84th Olympiad, that is, sixteen years or thereabouts before his embassy to Athens. For the sophis-

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* The fragments, which are few, are collected by Foss, but not completely. Thus, Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 11, § 51, cites some words of Gorgias, apparently from his Olympian oration. The following words are a good sample of the style of Gorgias, and show some just thought. They are cited by Foss from Plutarch. *Γοργίας τὴν τραγῳδίαν εἶναι ἀπάτην ἔφη ὃ τε ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος.*

† And so the men of that time regarded those who displayed their talents after the manner of Gorgias. Thucyd. 3. 38, *ἀκοῇ ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἰδιώτεις καθημένοις.* For the estimation in which the Sophists were held, comp. Protag. 316, seq.

tries out of which, with the help of the principles of the Eleatic Sect, he built up this triple wall against truth, I must refer to the treatise of Aristotle,* and to Ritter's history of philosophy.

Such was Gorgias. Of Polus, another speaker in the dialogue, little is known. He was a Sicilian of Agrigentum, a scholar of Gorgias in rhetoric, and perhaps of Empedocles in philosophy. He wrote, together with other works, a treatise, probably on rhetoric, to which Plato refers in the Gorgias. As we learn from the Phædrus and other sources, he gave great prominence to the figures of that artificial rhetoric of which his master was so fond; such as equality of periods and correspondence of adjoining words in sound; and taught the mode of using maxims and similes under separate heads, to which he gave pedantic names.

Callicles is an unknown Athenian, not a Sophist, as some have regarded him, but rather a contemner of the Sophists; although he carried out in practical life those principles which they laid down. He is a specimen of a considerable number of Athenians of his time, who, while they courted the people, despised it; who would have grasped at tyrannical power, without scruple as to the means; who looked down upon the pursuits of philosophy, when compared with the honors of political life; who had no faith in the distinction between right and wrong, and held pleasure to be the supreme good.

Besides these and Socrates, Chærephon bears a small part at the opening of the dialogue. He was an early friend and a follower of the philosopher, ardent in whatever he undertook, whose variance with his brother is mentioned in Xen. Memorab. 2. 3, and who obtained a response from

* It is edited by Foss, in his Commentatio before mentioned, and by Mullach (Berlin, 1845).

the Pythia commendatory of Socrates, according to the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. He went into exile in the time of the thirty tyrants, and died soon afterwards, before his friend's condemnation. He injured his health and complexion through his studies, and received the nicknames of *νυκτερίς*, *νυκτὸς παῖς* (Aristoph. Birds, 1564, and Horarum frag.), for never coming abroad during the day, and of *πύξινος Θάψινος*, for his sallow hue (Eupolis *Πόλεων* frag., Aristoph. Wasps, 1413), as well as other ridicule from the comic poets.* When, according to the Scholiast on Plato's Apology, these reckless jesters proceeded further to call him a sycophant, a parasite, and a thief, we may put by the side of these aspersions the testimony of Xenophon, who classes him among those friends of Socrates who sought his company to improve themselves in household and civil relations, and who, at no time of their lives, either did, or were charged with doing, any wrong.

The persons of this dialogue are represented as having met in the year after the sea-fight at Arginusæ. Gorgias, being then on a visit at Athens, was lodging at the house of Callicles, and there, it is generally supposed, the dialogue was spoken. There is, however, good reason, I think, to accede to the opinion of Schleiermacher, who lays the scene in some public place, like the Lyceum, where the parties in several other dialogues convened.† At the opening of the

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* In the procemium to Philostrat. Vitæ Sophist., another Chærephon, as we are there expressly told, is brought into connection with Gorgias. He asked the Sophist a foolish question, *Διὰ τί οἱ νόμοι τὴν μὲν γαστέρα φυσῶσι τὸ δὲ πῦρ οὐ φυσῶσι*; To which the other replied, *Τοῦτο σοὶ καταλείπω σκοπεῖν· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκεῖνο οἶδα ὅτι ἡ γῆ τοὺς νάρθηκας ἐπὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φύει.* I have seen the opinion somewhere expressed, that the story was first told of this Chærephon, the declaration of Philostrat. notwithstanding.

† For some observations on the time and place of the dialogue, see Appendix, No. I.

work, Socrates and his friend find that they have reached the place where Gorgias and others were assembled, too late to witness his exhibitions of rhetorical skill. In the hope, however, of drawing from him his views concerning his art, they approach and begin the conversation. Gorgias being fatigued, the younger rhetorician, Polus, volunteers to take his place, and answer to the inquiries concerning the nature of rhetoric; but as it is soon apparent that he is unwilling or unable to observe a logical method, Socrates transfers the discourse to Gorgias, from whom he professes to think that more brevity and accuracy of definition may be expected. (447–449.) By a series of questions in his peculiar manner, he gathers from Gorgias that he is a rhetorician, and able to make others such; and that his art is employed about words as instruments of thought. Socrates asks whether the definition is not too general, since several arts called by other names are also employed about words. To this Gorgias replies, that other arts ask principally, "What is to be done?" and use words as a secondary thing; but that rhetoric inquires, "What is to be said?" (–450, B.) Socrates objects that there are other arts, such as those of calculation and astronomy, which mainly depend on words, and demands to what the words relate which rhetoric employs. The most important of human affairs, says Gorgias. (–451, B.) But what are the most important? asks Socrates; for other arts might make a similar claim. The good, replies Gorgias, to which rhetoric opens the way, is freedom for the orator and the power of controlling other men, and this it effects by the power of persuading public assemblies. By this power it brings every other art under its control. (–453.) Socrates still is not satisfied. For although Gorgias has defined rhetoric to be the art of persuasion, he inquires whether other arts, which have to do with words, do not aim at persuasion also. What, then, is

the province and the nature of rhetorical persuasion? Gorgias is brought to admit that its province is to persuade judicial and other popular assemblies concerning things right and wrong; and that it attains its end rather by plausible arguments than by proofs drawn from absolute truth. (–455.) But Socrates still finds it hard to comprehend what is the peculiar sphere of rhetoric. In all public deliberations, the artificer, the general, or other person acquainted with the point in question, can give the best counsel. Where, then, is the orator's place? In reply, Gorgias refers to matters of fact. It was the advice of the political leaders which led to the building of the Athenian walls and docks, and not that of the artificers. He himself had often persuaded sick persons to comply with the directions of physicians, who had exhausted their arguments in vain. There was no occasion when an orator was opposed to an artificer, without gaining an easy victory. Such was the power of rhetoric, but, like other arts, it might be abused by those who learned it. Yet that abuse was no good cause of complaint against the teacher. (–457, C.) Socrates, after offering an apology for his seemingly contentious spirit, now forces Gorgias to allow that the orator may be ignorant of the subject-matter of other arts; all his study being concerned with finding the means of appearing to "those who do not know to know more than those who do." This Gorgias regards as an advantage, since it furnishes the orator with power acquired by small pains.* Socrates, without stopping to examine into the extent of this advantage, inquires whether the case is the same with justice and injustice, good and evil, and the like; whether, without know-

* Philebus. 58, A. "I heard Gorgias say, on a variety of occasions, that the art of persuasion far surpassed all the other arts, since it brought all things under its sway, not by force, but by their own will."

ing what these are in themselves, the orator can gain a reputation for such knowledge; and whether, as a master in rhetoric, Gorgias would teach a scholar justice, who should come to him unacquainted with its nature. Gorgias has here to reply, either that there is no need of knowing any thing about right and wrong in order to be an orator, and that, too, when he is perpetually employed upon questions involving right and wrong; or that he will teach his students their nature. He chooses the latter alternative, although the previous conversation shows that, to be consistent, he should have taken the former. Socrates now forces him to admit that he who knows justice is just. The rhetorician, then, under his training, must be a just man. But he had before said, that the art might be used for a good or a bad purpose, — to favor justice or injustice. Socrates brings forward this inconsistency as needing explanation, when this, the first part of the dialogue, is broken off by the impatience of Polus. (–461, B.)

There are two remarks which this portion of the discussion seems to demand. The first is, that, while it ends with an *argumentum ad hominem*, and with fastening upon Gorgias an inconsistency of no importance in itself to philosophical truth, it is not without its use. It shows how little the Sophists had reflected upon the nature of their arts, and how little they cared for truth or justice.* The

* Several passages of Phædrus, a work which treats of the worthlessness of rhetoric when not dependent on philosophy, may be adduced in illustration of what is here said. On 260, A, Phædrus tells Socrates that he hears the remark made, "that one who wishes to be an orator has no need to learn true justice, but only what may seem to be such to the multitude, who will exercise the office of jurymen; nor the truly good or beautiful, but only the seeming; for from these sources, and not from the truth, persuasion is derived." And, again, 272, D, — "They say that there is no need of making so much of this, or of taking such a long, round-about

art itself, having in its own nature no reference to truth, but merely to the force of arguments upon the minds of others, and, at the same time, being employed in discussions concerning what is good and just, could in its best estate be as easily used against truth as in its behalf. But, as it then was, it was based on sophistical principles and opposed to sound philosophy, its aim being something else than the greatest good. It was an art of acting on the ignorant, and of acting on them by pretending to knowledge. It must use such arguments as were suited to persuade the masses, who are not capable of taking the true philosophical view of things. What arguments could a person ignorant of justice use before an audience also ignorant, when the question related to justice, but such as almost necessarily mislead?

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course to reach it. For the orator, who would be well versed in his art, (they maintain,) has no occasion to possess true views in regard to just or true actions, or in regard to men that are such either by nature or education. In fact, they assert that no one in the courts cares for the truth about these things, but only for that which is adapted to persuade. And this is the probable," etc. Plato goes on to illustrate this by an example drawn from Tisias, one of the rhetoricians. If a brave man of weak body should have beaten and stripped of his garment a strong but cowardly man, and the case be brought before a court, neither ought to tell the truth; the coward ought to deny that the weak but courageous man was alone in beating him; while the other should ask, "how he, being so deficient in bodily strength, could have attempted it." He then shows how weak, at its very foundation, that unphilosophical rhetoric is which is built on merely empiric rules; since he who knows what is true must know, also, what is like truth, and he who studies the classes of human minds with philosophy for his guide will know by what arguments each class of minds is most influenced. "But," he adds, very nobly, "the virtuous man will not study this art of rhetoric for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak in a manner acceptable to the divinities, and to act so as to please them to the extent of his power."

Plato's opinion of advocates, which was none of the highest, may be found in Book XI. of the Laws, at the end.

But in the second place, if the art taught or presupposed the teaching of justice, its scholars would be a very different sort of persons from what even Gorgias allows that they were. For he who has learned justice is just. This looks to us like sophistry on the part of Socrates himself, as if the knowledge and practice of virtue could not exist apart. But whatever of untruth there is in the proposition, it was not meant for sophistry; it is a part of the system of Socrates and Plato. In the view of Socrates, and in that of Plato at first, all virtue could be resolved into science; all vice into ignorance.* Nor was the reason voluntarily ignorant, but merely deceived by the conceit of knowledge, and false opinion. When this was removed, and knowledge took possession of the mind, there was no cause why he who knew should not act in conformity with his knowledge.

In the second part of the dialogue, Polus takes his master's place. He begins by complaining that Socrates had unfairly involved Gorgias in inconsistency. Gorgias had said that he would teach justice to a scholar ignorant of it, only in accommodation to the prejudices of mankind, who regarded instruction upon that point as of high importance. A discussion now arises, in which Socrates explains in part his views of rhetoric. It is not an art, but a knack, or practical observation of rules aiming to produce pleasure. It belongs to a nature which is adroit, courageous, and skilled in mingling with mankind. It is reducible to flattery; like the arts of cookery, cosmetics, and sophistry, being mere routine or practice, not guided by the laws of absolute truth, and

* Comp. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. 1. 5, ἐπιστήμας (Σωκράτης) φὴσ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τι τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. See, also, Xen. Memorab. 3. 9. 5. Plato appears at first to have entertained the same opinion, but afterwards made virtue to consist in this: that the faculties of the soul respectively perform their parts, and are all obedient to the reason.

aiming at gratification. The real arts relating to the soul and body are two, with a twofold division each; of which the one, — the political art, or that which conserves the public good, — when it seeks to *secure* that good, is called the *legislative* art, when to *restore* it, is called *justice*. To these two arts, two touching the body correspond: gymnastics, aiming to *preserve* bodily good or health, and medicine, to *bring it back*. To these four arts four arts of flattery answer, and, acting adroitly without settled principles, slip into their places. These are sophistry, answering to legislation, rhetoric to justice, cosmetics to gymnastics, and cookery to medicine. Aiming at pleasure, and not at the highest good, these false arts attract and deceive the ignorant and thoughtless. And, being incapable of exact limits from their want of a scientific basis, they run into one another. (– 466.) Polus is displeased at this brand of flattery put upon rhetoric, and asks if good orators are so regarded in the states where they live. *Socr.* "They are not regarded at all." *Pol.* "How not regarded? Have they not the greatest power in their countries?" To this Socrates replies by admitting that they do what seems good to them, but denies that they do what they wish. In explaining this, he shows that what men wish is not what they do, but that for the sake of which they do it. It is a good in prospect which moves to action. Unless, then, the great power which enables orators to dispose, as Polus says, of the lives and fortunes of others is a good, it is not what they wish. And if to have great power is a good, orators cannot have it, seeing they use that which they call such as an evil. They may do, then, what seems good to them, without either really having great power, or doing what they wish. (– 469.) Polus sneers at these views expressed by Socrates. "Just as though you would not choose the liberty of doing what seemed good to you in the state, and would feel no envy if you saw one killing

whom he liked, or stripping him of his goods, or binding him." Socrates earnestly declares that he regards such a one, if doing this unjustly, as most wretched, and to do wrong as the greatest of evils. Polus is surprised that he should think so, and affirms, that to be wronged is a greater evil than to wrong; and that the possession of supreme power in the state — which is won by the orator — is to be desired as enabling him to do what he thinks fit, — to wrong, if he pleases, and to keep others from wronging him. Upon this, Socrates makes his opponent own that uncontrolled power in the state, if it is a good, may also be an evil. It cannot, therefore, be a good in itself, and something beyond it must determine when it is good and when the contrary. This criterion is, that it shall be justly or unjustly exercised. (– 470, C.) Polus responds in a superior tone to this, as going against the common sense of men, and appeals rhetorically to the prosperity of Archelaus, king of Macedon, which was begun by atrocious crimes. If you wish, says Socrates, to support yourself by examples and by testimony, you will have no want of them. But I shall not consider the matter settled until I force you, with whom I hold the argument, to acknowledge that the unjust man is unhappy, or you compel me to the contrary admission. (– 472, D.)

The discussion during the rest of this part of the dialogue embraces two points, arising out of the proposition, that it is better to wrong than to be wronged: — 1. That the unjust man is, in every event, miserable; and, 2. That if he escapes punishment for his crimes, he is more miserable than if he suffers. And hence no man can prefer doing wrong to being wronged, which Polus says is the choice of all men.

1. Polus acknowledges that it is baser (*αἴσχιον*, more ugly) to wrong, but denies that it is more evil (*κάκιον*). This leads to an analysis of the ideas of the beautiful and the base (*τὸ καλόν, τὸ αἰσχρόν*), in which Socrates shows that

a thing is beautiful owing to its utility or pleasure, or both; and base, owing to its evil or pain. But to wrong — which has been owned to be baser than to be wronged — is not more painful; therefore it must be more evil. Neither Polus, then, nor any other man, as desirous of the highest good, can prefer the more evil and base to the less. (– 476.)

2. Polus admits, that to be the object of justice (*διδόναι δίκην*) and to be justly punished for wrong-doing are the same; that a just punisher supposes one who suffers what is just, and that every thing just is *καλὸν* as far as it is just. If, then, what is suffered is just, it is *καλόν*, and if so, either useful or pleasant. But suffering for doing wrong is not pleasant; therefore, it is useful or good. This goodness consists in removing pravity of soul, which, of all kinds of badness, is the greatest. Justice, the medicine of the soul, effects this removal: hence, to escape from punishment is more miserable than to be punished. It is better to go unhealed of a disease, than not cured of this inward severer malady. And not to seek this cure from justice is like fearing the pain necessary for attaining to health. (– 480.)

If these things are so, of what use is rhetoric? For if it place a man in a situation where he can wrong more easily than be wronged, it does him so much the more harm; and if he be enabled by it to escape the punishment of his misdeeds, again it does him so much the more harm. If it help him to punish an enemy, it benefits that enemy, — an object at which he is far from aiming. He cannot even defend himself against an enemy without doing the enemy this good.* (– 481, C.)

The end reached in this second division of the Gorgias is to set forth in a clear light that a pretended art, like the rhetoric of Gorgias and Polus, which has the gratification

* See Buttmann's view, in the note on 480, E.

of others, as well as one's own, in view, fails, by running against the law of right, to attain to any thing good or useful, defeats its own objects, and falls into inconsistency with itself. It will not be doubted by the reader, that the moral tone of this discussion is worthy of the highest praise, and the conclusion most gratifying, considering it is formed by a heathen. But there are several places in the stream of the argument, where we may fancy that we see shallows, or touch upon the ground. In the first place, we may question the accuracy of the comparison of the legislative art and justice with the self-styled arts of sophistry and rhetoric. What is the truth of the distinction, and what sphere must we suppose that Plato assigns to rhetoric? In reply, it must be owned, I think, that Plato fluctuates a little,* owing to his analogy between rhetoric and medicine, on the one hand, and between rhetoric and justice, on the other. If we press the resemblance to medicine, rhetoric must be confined to the reparation of injustice, and restoration of the public health. If we follow the parallel with justice, rhetoric must embrace within its limits every case where the question of conformity to the rule of right is involved; the rule of true right being laid down at the outset by the legislative art, and that of seeming right or gratification, in the place of justice, by sophistry. In this part of the dialogue, the narrower notion of rhetoric, determined by comparing it with medicine, seems to prevail in Plato's mind: the art has to do with the courts. And in this Plato was fully justified by the practice of writers on this art, who all, as Aristotle affirms (Rhet. 1. 1. 10), said nothing about the popular assembly, and confined their rules of art to the judicial

* Comp. Aristides (2. 377, Dindorf.), *τοτὲ μέν γέ, φησι, ταυτόν ἐστιν, ὦ μακάριε, ῥήτωρ καὶ σοφιστής, τοτὲ δ' αὖ τὴν σοφιστικὴν πρεῖττον εἶναι τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ διαφέρειν.* See 517, A, note.

(περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντας πειρῶντας τἀγαθολογεῖν). But in the latter division of this work, Plato treats the rhetorician and the political man as the same, which accords with the analogy between rhetoric and justice. This is the truer view of the subject, for otherwise the assembly of the people, where there lay open a wide field for false art, must be unoccupied.* We must recollect that Plato himself speaks of the boundaries of rhetoric as uncertain; and, also, that he is not opposing the bare "art of inventing and arranging arguments," but a sophistical art opposed to truth.†

In the second place, we may doubt whether the analysis of the beautiful into the pleasant and the good, that is, the useful, and of the opposite to the beautiful into the painful and the harmful, is correctly made out, and, consequently, whether the principles of the latter part of the discourse be-

* With more justice still, Socrates, in Phædr. 261, A, regards it "as the art of bending men's minds by words without respect to the occasion, not only in courts and other public assemblies, but also in private meetings; being the same in nature, whether small or great affairs are in question." To which, in reply, Phædrus says, that the rules of art are used in speaking and writing when suits at law are brought, and in speaking when addresses are made to the Assembly; but that he has not heard of a wider application of rhetorical precepts.

† Whately's definition. Aristotle's is, δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. It is worthy of remark how Aristotle alludes to this dialogue without naming it. He begins with saying, that rhetoric is ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ. In speaking of its abuse, he says, "It tries to put on the garb (ἐνδύσεται) of the political art"; and, soon afterwards, ἔστι γὰρ μόριόν τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς. Comp. 464, B, C. — This conduct of rhetoricians is ascribed to ignorance, or vanity, or other human reasons (1. 2. 7); and doubtless he joined with Plato in condemning the sophistical rhetoric of the preceding age. (Comp. 1. 1. 3.) But when he says that the judge himself ought to know whether a thing is *just* or not, and not learn it from the parties, whose only duty is to discuss the *fact*, he must be regarded not only as opposing Plato's views (454, B), but as condemning the Athenian and every other system where the judges were ignorant.

tween Socrates and Polus, true as we feel them to be, are not built upon the sand. If I am not deceived, Plato does not here intend to enter into a close dialectical exposition of what is meant by τὸ καλόν, the beautiful. But, still, his definition is exact enough for the argument and the purposes of the dialogue. The attempts of others to analyze this idea prove this. Whether the term *beautiful* is or is not applied on account of pleasure derived from contemplating the object so called, or on account of the perception of a certain fitness, implying a relation of the parts to the whole, and of the whole to some good or pleasant end ; — whatever we may decide to be the primary and essential characteristic of beautiful objects, it is sufficient, I think, for the argument to say, that pleasure or utility, or both, invariably attend on objects so called, and the author was not required to stop and subject this idea to a closer examination. It is also to be remarked, that the good and the useful are treated here as identical.* Upon this point we need only say, that it is assumed that whatever is good tends to promote the perfection or well-being of the person; in other words, is useful in reaching a good end.

Again, it may be thought that the last argument, concerning the good or utility of punishment, renders it necessary that punishment should reform the offender, whereas Plato, in this work and elsewhere, speaks of incorrigible criminals.†

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* Comp. Repub. 2. 379, B. "Is not God truly good, and ought he not to be spoken of as such? Certainly. But nothing good is harmful. Is it? I think not. Can what is not harmful, then, do harm? By no means. Does that which does no harm do any evil (κακόν τι)? No, no more this than the other. But whatever does no evil can be the cause of no evil. Is it so? Assuredly. But what? is the good useful (ὠφέλιμον)? Yes. Is it, then, the cause of well-being (εὐπραγίας)? Yes." Etc.

† On the design and efficacy of punishments in society, a number of

If to suffer δίκαια = to suffer καλά = to suffer ὠφέλιμα or ἀγαθά, can the criminal help being profited? and does not

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passages from the Laws give us Plato's views. One is found in Book XI. 934, A. "Not suffering for the sake of his crime, — for what he has done can never be undone, — but in order that for the future he and they who see him suffering justice (δικαιούμενον) may either altogether hate wrong-doing, or, at least, that a considerable part of so great an evil may cease." Another occurs in Book IX. 854, D. "For, perhaps, if he suffer this penalty, he may become better, by being rendered more sober-minded (σωφρονισθείς). For no penalty which is inflicted by law is inflicted for evil (γίγνεται ἐπὶ κακῷ), but has, for the most part, one of two effects: it improves him who is punished, or, at least, checks the growth of his depravity." He then goes on to speak of incurable offenders doing good as examples. On page 862, E, after remarking on the excellence of legal expedients by which transgressors shall be made "to hate wrong, and to love or not hate the nature of right," he continues thus: — "When a lawgiver finds men incurable, he will provide some law and penalty for them, being assured that, for such persons themselves, it is not the better part to live, and that, by withdrawing from life, they will confer a twofold benefit on others: they will serve as an example to others to deter from evil, and will rid the state of bad inhabitants. Thus [that is, on these principles], in the case of such persons must the lawgiver establish death as the penalty for crimes, and in no other way."

In Book V. 728, C, he speaks of becoming like the wicked, and being separated from the good, as the greatest penalties for wrong-doing. "Though this is not penalty (δίκη), — since justice and penalty are always beautiful, — but vengeance, which is suffering attendant on iniquity. And as well he who has suffered this vengeance is miserable, as he who avoids suffering it; the one, because there is no cure for him; the other, because he is lost, that many may be saved." In these passages, the end of punishment is to cure and deter, or, at least, such is its result. And with these may be compared such places as Repub. 1. 335, where it is said, that a just man cannot harm even an enemy and a bad man. It is true that the notion of *harm* is confined there to making such a man worse, but the reasoning appears to include pain if unproductive of good. Cousin, in his Preface to Gorgias, contends very brilliantly, and in some degree justly, that the right to punish in society is derived, not from the good effects of

the argument look like a dead algebraic formula, more than like living moral truth? This difficulty must attend the argument at the first view of it. Nor can it be removed, unless we allow δίκαια and καλὰ to be what they are, not only in themselves, but also in the apprehension of the sufferer, while ὠφέλιμα is simply objective. The argument now becomes tenable. Punishment can be a good to none who do not receive it as just; nor can it, in the arrangements of this world, fail of being more or less of a good to him who feelingly owns that it is rightly inflicted. But there may be some who do not own this, and they are the incorrigible.

Polus being reduced to silence, Callicles steps forth as the third champion of the arts of show. He begins with doubting whether Socrates is in earnest in maintaining these principles, which would throw human life and conduct off from their old foundations. To this Socrates answers, that he follows wherever philosophy shows the way, just as implicitly as Callicles obeys the popular will, and that, before he can change his tone, he must hear her strike a different key. In reply, Callicles says that it was not philosophical reasoning, but trick, by which Polus was beaten. He had made the incautious admission, that to do wrong is baser (αἴσχιον) than to be wronged. It is so, indeed, by law, but not by nature. This ambiguity it is between the naturally

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punishment upon the criminal or others, but from the duty of punishing, which is based on the instinctive feeling of desert of evil for doing wrong. He adds, "This theory is, without doubt, only indicated in Plato, but it occurs in a number of places, briefly but positively expressed." I could wish that the learned translator had proved this assertion, which his familiar acquaintance with Plato must have rendered easy. Doubtless Plato could not get rid of the conviction written on the heart, that the sinner *ought* to suffer, or of the tendency to view suffering as a debt owed to justice. But did not Plato try to go farther back than this conviction, and search into the reason of the right which it admits?

and the legally beautiful or right which enables crafty reasoners to gain their points. When Polus spoke of that which is legally base, Socrates shuffled the natural into its room. But by nature nothing is baser which is not more harmful. The natural feelings of men, which, when injured, instantly rise against the aggressor, show, that to be wronged is no property of a *man*. The legal definitions of base and wrong deeds are introduced by the many and the weak, in order to keep the strong in check. But herein law is opposed to nature, which teaches that the better ought to have more* than the worse, and the more powerful

* πλεονεκτεῖν. πλεονεξία is substantially selfishness, to which cause in a very striking passage Plato ascribes all the wrong actions of men. Leges, V. 731, D: πάντων δὲ μέγιστον, etc. "The greatest of all evils is inherent in the souls of the mass of men, for which they excuse themselves and seek no deliverance from it. This is what the vulgar saying implies, that every man by nature loves himself, and that it is right so to do. But in truth the cause of all errors in every case is to be ascribed to too great self-love. For the lover becomes blind in regard to the object beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the beautiful, the good, and the just, thinking that he ought to honor what pertains to himself before the truth. The man who will be truly great ought not to love himself or his own things, but what is just and right, whether pertaining to his own actions or another man's. From this fault it comes, that all think their own ignorance wisdom. Whence, though we know next to nothing, we think we know every thing; and, being unwilling to intrust to others that which we are not well skilled to do, we are forced to make mistakes in doing it. Therefore ought every man to avoid undue self-love, and to seek out some one better than himself, allowing no shame to prevent his taking such a course."

In another fine passage of the same work (IX. 875, B), the necessity of law is partly ascribed to the selfishness of man. δεύτερον δέ, etc. "In the second place, should any one in theory properly comprehend that this is so [that is, that the political art ought to care for the community more than for the individual, and that it is for the interests of both to have the community, rather than the individual, well arranged], and then rule a state with irresponsible and autocratical power, yet can he not adhere to this persuasion,

than the less powerful. The "good old plan, that they should get who have the power," is the law of nature — ay, and of right — in animals and man, as they show whenever they can seize the occasion. All this is very evident to the man of the world. But philosophy makes a man blind to these truths of common sense, and, if pursued beyond the requirements of education, is the ruin of a man. It unfits him for civil and political life; it is unbecoming for a full-grown man, who should be practical and mix with his fellows; it makes one slink away to a corner with two or three disciples; and, if attacked by foes in the courts, he cannot help himself, but falls into their hands, as defenceless prey, to be slain at their pleasure. (– 486, D.)

In this brilliant passage we see described the contempt felt by the vulgar politician for the true philosopher, and the sympathy of such a man with false and sophistical principles. He aims at pleasure rather than good, and the Sophists give their maxims for the prudential attainment of the same end. There is a plain allusion, also, to the behaviour of Socrates at his trial, and to the charges against Socrates and Plato, — especially the latter, — of neglecting the service of the state. The ground which Callicles takes is evidently the only one which can be taken against Socrates,*

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and through life keep the interests of the community foremost in the state, and his private interests subordinate; but his mortal nature will ever drive him into selfishness and the pursuit of his own ends (πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἰδιοπραγίαν), since it blindly shuns pain and seeks pleasure. Thus it will give a higher place to pleasure and pain than to the more just and good; and, by producing darkness in itself, will at length plunge the man himself and the state into all sorts of evils."

* The philosopher Archelaus, who was, perhaps, an Athenian and a scholar of Anaxagoras, taught (although he may not have meant by his words what the Sophists taught) τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. This principle is admirably ridiculed in the Clouds, 1421, seq. Pla-

but it is equally the foundation of an attack against all morality. If the idea of right is admitted, it must be supreme; and pleasure, if opposed to it, must bow before it. The only escape is to show that pleasure is never inconsistent with the right and the good. But right, as fixed by law, restrains the individual, and is therefore inconsistent with self-gratification. Hence the advocate for pleasure must yield, unless he can show that natural right — which is really such — is another thing from what the opinions of men, expressed in their laws, call such, and that it authorizes selfish indulgence. But if this be natural right, it contains no moral element, implies no relation of one man to others, and sanctions obedience to every desire which looks towards pleasure.

Socrates first answers with exquisite irony to the maxim of Callicles, that the better ought, by natural right, to have more than the worse. If his opponent means, as he admits that he does, by the better (*βελτίους*), the superior and stronger, then, since the many are stronger than the one, as is shown by their enforcing their laws, they have a natural right to make laws for the one. Now they say, in their laws, that to wrong is baser than to be wronged; and hence, according to Callicles, it must naturally be so. (–489, B.) 2. Callicles now shifts his ground, and makes the better the more intelligent. If so, replies Socrates, and if the more intelligent ought to have more than another of that to which his intelligence relates, then, in a mixed collection of men, a physician ought to have more food and drink than others, while yet the greater portion thus assigned to

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to refers to it in a striking passage, Leges, X. 890. The discussion with Thrasymachus, in the first part of the Republic, attacks a kindred principle, and may be read here to advantage. Hobbes went to the length of any of the ancient Sophists on this point. See Mr. Hallam's Critique, Hist. of Lit., Vol. III. 365–382, especially the close of the chapter.

him may do him extreme harm. In short, there is no end to the absurdities which will follow from the principle, that intelligence should move in an orbit around desire and not around good. (–491, B.) 3. Callicles forsakes this definition, and the better now become the more intelligent and courageous in politics, — such as are capable of governing.* Socrates here changes his point of attack, and takes a position nearer to the enemy's inner works. For whatever definition Callicles gives, to have more than others (*πλεονεκτεῖν*), or self-gratification, is the centre of the system, and must be laid bare in all its deformity. Do you mean, says he, by governing, governing one's self? At this the man of the world sneers, and pronounces a man's well-being to consist in having as large desires as possible, with the courage and intelligence to fulfil them. These qualities the many do not possess, whence, to hide their weakness, they praise self-restraint and blame incontinence. But it was not so from the beginning; the great and mighty of old acted by another rule; they regarded justice and self-restraint as base and evil, and got all they could from their enemies for themselves and their friends. Good and pleasure are the same. (–492, C.)

Socrates answers this in two ways. He first tries, by selecting some examples of low bodily pleasures, to awaken Callicles to the consciousness of the amazing baseness and evil which may attend a life of enjoyment.† The illustrations which form the long prologue of this part show that a most important topic is begun. (–495, B.) In the second place, he searches for some tests of the nature of pleasure,

* This may be regarded as the notion of the *ἀγαθοί*, the *optimates*, which was somewhat in vogue at the time, only a little altered.

† Comp. Philebus (an important dialogue, in which the nature of the good and the pleasant is closely examined), 46, A, B.

which shall show that it differs from good. To do this, he makes Callicles allow that courage, science, and pleasure are not the same; and that *εὖ πράττειν* and *κακῶς πράττειν* are opposites, so that one cannot be in both states at once, any more than he can be well and ill at once. The same may be said of weakness and strength, of swiftness and slowness, of good and bad, of happiness and misery. But pleasure and pain can coexist in the same person at the same time; as, for instance, thirst, a pain, exists, until drinking, which is pleasant, slakes it.* Thus pleasure wants an essential characteristic of good, and pain of evil. (–497, E.) Another test follows, grounded on the admission of Callicles, that the manly and intelligent are good. A foolish boy or man may be glad, and so may a wise one.† In war a coward is as glad, if not more so, when the enemy goes away, than the man of courage. Then the coward is as good as the courageous man, or even better, and yet bad by the concession of Callicles. (–499, B.) In other words, if good is relative to desire, as such, then its absolute nature ceases, it is in a perpetual flux, and alters with every change of desire or character.‡

Callicles now admits that some pleasures are evil and some good. He thus overthrows his argument, for if pleas-

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* Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 3. 9.

† Comp. Philebus, *55*, B, "And, besides, to be compelled to say that a man who feels grief is bad when he feels it, though he be the best of all men, and that one who is glad, the more he is so, at the time when he is so, is the more virtuous."

‡ In a fine passage, Leges, II. *663*, Plato teaches that the good and bad judge of pleasure subjectively, or relatively to their own character. He then inquires whose judgment is to be received, as accordant with the truth, and answers, that of the good. Neither the lawgiver, then, should ever separate the pleasant from the right, the good, and the beautiful, nor any one else engaged in educating the young.

ure is in itself a good, evil cannot be affirmed of it. Socrates seizes upon the acknowledgment, and carries him back to a point debated in the first part of the dialogue, — that the good being the end of all actions, the pleasant must be sought for its sake, and not *vice versâ*. (–500, A.) Now to know what pleasures are good and what evil needs an artist, — a man who has studied the invariable absolute principles of true good and right; — whilst the knowledge how to gratify, acquired by observation, and resting on no unchanging truth, has nothing of the nature of true art, and to apply that knowledge calls simply for an exercise of memory.

If this be so, we have a standard by which we may try the pursuits of men; and, according to this standard, must condemn the music which is in vogue at the public contests, dithyrambic poetry, and even tragedy itself, with all its lofty pretensions. But how is it with rhetoric and the orators or statesmen? Do they neglect their own or the public interests? Do they seek to benefit or gratify the community? To this Callicles responds, that the question admits of a double answer; the orators of the present day seek to please the people, and follow their will, but he thinks that Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles were good men, and aimed at the highest public good. (–503, D.) This Socrates denies, and, to make the matter clearer, goes at some length into the motives which should influence the good orator, — the true political artist. As the physician has health in view, so has he the health of the community, which consists in justice and temperance * (*σωφροσύνη*, self-

* For *σωφροσύνη*, comp. Repub. 4. 430, D. It is there compared to a concord and harmony, and called *κόσμος τις καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια*. This *κόσμος* consists in the subjugation of the worse part of the soul to the better. Ritter observes (2. 474) that the expression *σωφροσύνη*

restraint, soundness of mind in regard to all pleasures and excess). Instead of flattering them and following popular desires, such a politician will restrain and chastise the people. (–505, C.) This is further enforced in a most important and admirable passage, by pointing out that the ideas of true good, of virtue, of order, of self-restraint or orderliness, of justice and piety (or the observance of the laws of moral order), of courage, of the well-being of the individual and his happiness, are closely and necessarily connected; while the opposites of these are linked together with the pursuit of pleasure. Neither a man, then, nor a state, which would be happy, can have any end in view inconsistent with justice and temperance. If this be admitted, every thing will follow which Socrates had maintained, and his three adversaries had controverted. The orator ought to be just, and to know justice; otherwise he cannot practise or promote it. To be wronged is better than to wrong, for it involves no violation of justice; and to be punished for wrong-doing, than to go unpunished, for it reconciles the soul to justice. The wonder of Callicles, when Socrates defended these latter points, was misplaced. Furthermore, by acting on such principles, he should help himself and his friends, to do which Callicles pronounced him unable. For by living according to these principles, he would avoid the basest and the greatest evil. (–509, C.) But cannot a man, it may asked, gain the advantage arising from not being wronged, as well as that arising from not wronging others? For the latter, an art is needed. As no one does wrong because he prefers it, but because he thinks to gain some good by it, that art must inculcate

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is vaguely used by Plato, especially in his early dialogues; and that the definition in the passages of the Repub. which he cites (4. 430. u. s., and 3. 389, D) almost reduces its notion to that of δικαιοσύνη.

the nature of true good; for example, must distinguish it from self-gratification. Is there, also, an art to avoid being wronged? The only way of preventing injuries in all cases is, to have supreme power yourself, or to be a friend of the supreme power; — for instance, if the people is that power, to gain its friendship by catering for its desires and following all its whims. But if this is done, the other and greater good must slip out of your hands. Nor is it of any use to say, that if you do not thus conciliate the sovereign power in the state, you may lose your life. For it is not a man's business in this world to seek to save his life, nor ought the art of rhetoric to make higher pretensions because it saves life than the art of the pilot or the engineer, by each of which the life of those intrusted to its care is preserved, no matter whether it be better for such persons to live or to die. A man's part is to leave it to God how long he shall live, and to find out on what principles he shall pass the term of life given to him; whether on those of the flattering politician, which will involve the loss of the greatest good, or on those of the man who sacrifices pleasure to the really good and useful. (-514, A.) And the same will apply to the management of a state. Hence the apprenticeship of political life must be in philosophy, which reveals the good and just to those who search for them; and the true politician, contrary to what Callicles had maintained, must be a philosopher. A man who seeks to play the important part of a leader in the state must first ask himself whether, in his private capacity, he has cultivated justice and temperance, and made men better; for the aim in the public and in the private sphere is one and the same. With this in mind, we may return to the four great Athenians, and bring their characters to the touchstone. Did Pericles make the Athenians better? or did they not rather become idle, cowardly, talkative, and covetous through the measures of his admin-

istration? And did not those very Athenians, near the close of his long political life, show their degeneracy, by ungratefully bringing against him a charge of peculation?* The other three met with even worse treatment at the hands of those whom, if skilful politicians, they must have wished and known how to make better. Their ill-success is a proof that they understood not the true art of rhetoric, — that of persuading men to aim at the good, rather than the pleasant; and, indeed, that they were ignorant of the false art, also, if that enables its possessors, as is alleged, to sail in safety amid the storms of politics. (–517, A.)

In this remarkable attack on four of the greatest men of Athens, — men certainly not inferior, in any point, to hundreds of public characters who have been extolled by Christian historians, — we discover an exasperation of feeling in Plato, produced by the unjust fate of his master, and by the wide difference between his own political views and those of his native land. Nor can his character in general be freed from the charge of fault-finding. To this he was led by that uncommonly high standard which the nature of his mind compelled him to form; and, dwelling aloof, as he did, from the turmoil of politics, in contemplative retirement, he could not estimate all the practical difficulties which even a perfect statesman must encounter from a spoiled and self-willed people. But if we strike out what is due to these prejudices, we must find something of justice left in his blame of "the four." The very fact that he draws a broad line between them and Aristides (526, B) is presumptive proof of a real difference. They were high-minded leaders of parties, who humored the people in many of its wishes for the sake of keeping power, and sought the

* See Appendix, No. II.

greatness, but not the real well-being, of their country. Had they

> "to divinity aspired,
> Not on the breath of popular applause,
> But through dependence on the sacred laws,
> Framed in the schools where wisdom dwelt retired,
> Intent to trace the ideal path of right,"

had they been philosophical statesmen, aiming at justice and the highest good, the allies of Athens would have been less oppressed; the people would not have grown worse so fast; they themselves would have impressed something of their own virtue upon the state, and been less likely to suffer unjustly from those to whom they had done good.

But is it not strange that Plato should reproach these politicians with their ill-success, as a proof of their want of virtuous statesmanship? This is the point which Aristides, the Sophist, presses most effectively in his long and wearisome defence of "the four." If ill-success is to be the test, what is to be argued from the two reprobate companions of Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades (Aristid. de Quatuorviris, 2. 322, Dindorf., de Rhet. 2. 111)? What from Plato's abortive attempts to make a man out of Dionysius of Syracuse (302–304, 324)? Nor is Plato, the Sophist goes on to allege, consistent with himself, since he praises Pericles, in the Phædrus, for his rhetorical skill.* In the Apology (31, E), he makes Socrates affirm that no one can be safe who opposes any populace, or strives to prevent injustice in a state, unless he avoid public life and live as a private citizen. (343, 353, 366.) And, in our dialogue itself, he pronounces safety to arise from being like the sovereign power, or from having supreme power in one's own hands. Again, he says, — "I should be a fool not to know

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* Comp. Appendix, No. II.

that at Athens any man may suffer any thing." And yet the fact, that these statesmen were not safe from the effects of popular ingratitude, is his proof that they did not oppose the people, or strive to prevent injustice.

How the reasonableness or consistency of Plato, as to this point, can be defended, I do not see. Ill-success could have the force which he gives it only in case the influence of the four men outweighed the opposing influences of all other causes acting at their time upon the opposite side. In general, however, it may be said that politicians who complain of ingratitude are only reaping what they have sown. They have tickled the nice palate of the people until their cookery pleases no longer; and now, by a rotation in office, which was right in their eyes until they came into power, and wrong afterwards, they are driven from the kitchen by new hands, who pay a price for the situation, and have learned some newer arts of falsehood. It was, perhaps, the sight of such flatterers of the Athenian *demus* fallen into disgrace, that led Plato beyond the bounds of truth, in imputing all the ill-success of politicians to their want of correct principles, — to their aiming at pleasure rather than good. Being preoccupied by this partial view, and having also in his mind the pretensions of the Sophists, — the teachers of such politicians, — that they could make men good, he loses sight of the great truth, that, in a corrupt age, a good man must suffer ill from those whom he tries to benefit.

But to return to the dialogue: — When Socrates had expressed such an opinion of these four great statesmen, Callicles replied, that no one of his own contemporaries could compare with them in the works they had done for the state. In answer, Socrates admits that they had shown uncommon ability in gratifying the desires of the people. They had created the ships, walls, and docks of Athens, but they dif-

fered in no respect from the politicians of the day in the motives of their administration. If the highest good of the state should be the statesman's aim, they could no more claim this title, than a cook or a writer on cookery could claim to rank with the master of gymnastics in preserving the bodily health. And as such persons, if intrusted with the care of the body, would be blamed when the maladies arising from luxury should come on, so will the politician, who seeks to please rather than to profit, be punished for political evils which he or his predecessors have occasioned. The head of a state may not complain of ingratitude; for it is by his management that the character of those who compose it has grown worse. And the same holds good of the Sophists. They pretend that they can make their disciples better; and yet find fault with these very scholars for keeping back the price of tuition from them, and for other acts of unthankfulness. But what good, demands Callicles, can you say of such worthless men as the Sophists? They are the same with rhetoricians, answers Socrates, or nearly so; only somewhat above them, because they deal with principles which rhetoricians merely apply. If, now, their pretensions are well founded, they, as well as politicians, ought to fear no ingratitude; they should stipulate for no fees of instruction beforehand, trusting to the generosity of those pupils whom they had purged from vice.* (–521, A.)

Having thus compared the arts which aim at pleasure with those which aim at good, Socrates makes a personal

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* Schleiermacher thinks that this is aimed at Aristippus, who, by taking pay for his instructions, brought reproach upon the Socratic philosophers. The best account of the remunerations given to the Sophists which I have met with is contained in Welcker's Essay on Prodicus, his Life and Writings, in Welcker and Näke's Rheinisches Museum, 1. 22, seq., and since reprinted in his "Kleine Schriften," Part 2, p. 393, seq.

appeal to Callicles. "Which mode of serving the state do you now exhort me to follow; that of seeking its best interests, or that of catering for its desires?" Callicles persists in telling over the same story, that fidelity in doing good will make him suffer the loss of all things. Socrates acknowledges, with evident allusion to his trial and condemnation, that he is exposed to such dangers from bad men, and that he could say nothing in the court which would win him the favor of his judges. If he should urge, on his defence, that he had opposed the public will when it was basely clamorous for present gratification, that he had striven to make men good, and had their well-being in view, he would fare as a physician might fare before a jury of children with a cook for his accuser. What he called good, they called evil; what he called hurtful, they called pleasant. It was painful to be perplexed; and yet he must lead them through perplexity to truth. Would he not, then, before such judges, be himself perplexed, and at a loss for a defence? "And do you think, then," says Callicles again, "that it is well with a man who cannot help himself?" "Assuredly," replies Socrates, "it would be very ill with me, if I could not give myself that help which has been shown to be truly such, — if I could not observe the rule of right in all my relations. Let a man show me that I am not seeking to help myself thus, and I shall be ashamed of my character, and be grieved if I need punishment. But if I die for want of the flattering art of rhetoric, I shall not be sorry. For no one who is a man, and has reason, fears death in itself, but rather to do wrong. For to go into the other world with a soul full of all manner of iniquity is the worst of evils." (–523, A.)

Having thus brought the two principles of action to the confines of the two states of being, he closes very nobly, by presenting them in contrast beyond the grave. His views

are introduced as an explanation of the common *mythus* concerning a judgment after death; which, however, Plato scruples not to alter for his own purposes. The views are these:—The character formed by disregarding the good and right, and pursuing pleasure, must be lasting, while all the advantages it offers are temporary, being connected with the world and the wrong judgments of men. But, at death, men will come before a judge who will look at the bare soul, and give sentence according to its qualities. Among transgressors, there are some who are not gone too far in evil to be curable. For these, punishment, bitter as it must be, will prove a good. Others, having passed beyond the reach of a cure, will suffer eternally, as an example to all who shall behold them. Of this description, a large part will be tyrants and other men in power, who had on earth the greatest license to do evil. But if one of these, like Aristides, rises above the temptations of his station on earth, his reward will be so much the greater. The larger number, however, of those who receive rewards will be private persons; and, more especially, philosophers who had not mingled in public affairs. With this trial in view, Socrates asserts that he strives to bring his soul, in its most healthy condition, before the judge, and that he seeks to lead his fellow-men to do the same. And to this he now urges Callicles, warning him that the trial then will be more serious than all earthly ones, and that, without such a preparation, he will be unable to help himself, but, speechless and perplexed, must submit to worse than earthly indignities. Callicles, he continues, might despise such fables, and the truth they contain, if he could show any thing better. But this, neither he, Polus, nor Gorgias had been able to do. They should, therefore, agree with Socrates that to be, and not to seem to be, a good man is a good thing; that the next best thing is to become good by submitting to punishment;

that all flattery of one's self or others, of a few or a multitude, must be shunned; and that rhetoric, like every thing else, must be used to promote the right, and that only. "Let us, then," he says in closing, "join together to live virtuously on such principles; then can we best apply ourselves to politics, when we are no longer afloat on the most momentous subjects. This is the only way to live well and to die well."

With respect to the close of the Gorgias, which must be counted among the finest passages in Greek, it may be observed that Plato shows elsewhere the same inclination to clothe in a mythical dress those truths which lie beyond the bounds of reason. It seems as if he felt the need of the venerable authority and positive assurances of a revelation upon such points, and resorted to the old traditions of his country as the best substitute which he could find, as having for their foundation real, though distorted, truth.* The *mythus* is something more than mere drapery, something more than a poetical fiction, which, with a beautifully plastic hand, he shapes into a form and meaning corresponding to his awakened moral sense. And yet the freedom with which he treats the *mythus*, and the readiness with which he alters its form on several occasions, prove that he accepted it only in its leading outlines as true; it was to him a μῦθος, and yet a μάλα καλὸς λόγος. It is found, also, at the close of the Phædo and of the Republic. He who compares the three passages will perceive that they agree in affirming the rewards and punishments of another life,

* This remark does not include those *mythi* which are of Plato's own invention. He was led to use them by his poetical temperament, and felt, perhaps, that the view suggested by a beautiful fable was as true as any which could be given; more true, because more beautiful, than if put into abstract propositions.

which are used, with all seriousness, as motives for living well here below; and also in teaching that some criminals are healed by punishment, while others must suffer for ever without hope of a cure.* This Platonic view of the reme-

* Phædo, 113, E. "Those who are judged to be incurable on account of the enormity of their crimes, who have committed many and heinous sacrileges, or numerous unjust and lawless murders, or the like, these their appropriate destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth." He then speaks of the punishment of those who have committed curable sins, in a passage too long to be inserted here, and then adds, — "With respect to the *mythus*, to affirm positively that these things are as I have narrated them is not the part of a reasonable man"; and then uses the truth taught in the *mythus* as a motive for virtuous action. In the Republic, the narrator of the *mythus* is represented as near a chasm (see Gorg. 526, B, note) in the ground, by the side of a person who asked another where Ardiæus was. "Now this Ardiæus was a tyrant in a Pamphylian city a thousand years before, and had slain his aged father and his elder brother, besides doing, as was said, many other unhallowed deeds. The person so asked replied, said the informant, 'He is not come, nor can he hereafter come hither.' Among the frightful spectacles that we saw, this was one, continued he: — When we were near the mouth of the chasm, and were expecting to go upwards, after enduring all the other things appointed, on a sudden we saw this Ardiæus and others, nearly all of them tyrants; although some enormous transgressors among private persons were there also. When they thought that they should now go upwards (out of the chasm), the mouth would not let them pass, but uttered a bellowing sound whenever any such incurably wicked person, or any one who had not paid a sufficient penalty, endeavoured to ascend. Thereupon, wild men, said he, all fiery to look upon, who stood by, when they heard the bellow, picked out and carried off a part of the transgressors; but Ardiæus and others they bound hand and foot, and threw them down, and beat them hard, and dragged them along on one side of the road, scraping them upon thorns, while to the by-standers they told the reasons why these sinners suffered these things, and that they were drawn along to be plunged into Tartarus. There, said he, of all the fears many and various which fell upon us, this was the greatest, — lest, when each one was going upwards, the mouth should utter that bellow, and most gladly did each one bear no sound as he ascended." A conception worthy of the highest flights of Dante!

dial nature of punishment, in certain cases, even in another life, seems to have recommended the doctrine of purgatory to some of the Christian fathers.*

Having thus exhibited the argument of the Gorgias at some length, it will be in order for us to ask, What is the main subject of the dialogue? A question which it is almost as difficult to answer, in regard to some of the Platonic dialogues, as it would be to express the sum total of an evening's conversation among refined and intelligent persons: the delight you have felt, the instruction you have received, you are conscious of, and you carry away much in your memory; but it is hard to say what was the leading topic of the discourse, or whether there was any. The subject of the Gorgias is more easy to be perceived, and yet all have not been agreed concerning it. Olympiodorus (apud Routh) mentions three opinions besides his own: — Some say that it treats of rhetoric; others, of justice and injustice, considered especially in their relations to happiness; others still, absurdly enough, make it relate to the *demiurgus* or divine builder of the world, on account of the *mythus* at the close. "But we say," continues the Platonic commentator, "that the scope is, to treat of the principles which lead men to political happiness." With the first of these opinions, Cousin and Stallbaum agree. The latter says, however, that "though the principal point of the discussion is to blame the civil and rhetorical art at that day in vogue, and to show that it could not attain to excellence without the knowledge and practice of philosophy," yet several other topics are closely united with this, as the difference of the just and the pleasant, the end of human actions, and the constancy of a good man in bearing evils and injuries. Nearly the same is the view taken by Ast. The Gorgias,

* Comp. Muenscher, Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II. § 298.

says he, "has a decidedly political tendency; and all the philosophical inquiries which it contains are intended to show, not only the unmeaning nature, but also the perniciousness, and, in fact, the profligacy, of the political art, when built on sophistry, that is, of the rhetoric there opposed." Another writer on the higher criticism of Plato, Socher, gives this dialogue a wider range. "The whole presents an arena, rising in three gradations. The prize of the contest is the better, happier mode of life; the parties are philosophy and rhetoric; that contends for righteousness and virtue; this for the possession of political power; the champion of the former is Socrates; on behalf of the latter, three step forward, Gorgias, a rhetorician, Polus, a Sophist, and Callicles, an Athenian politician." Finally, Schleiermacher and C. F. Hermann, in the words of the latter, regard "the kernel of the dialogue to be, that the good alone is truly useful, and that men harm themselves by wrong-doing; that, accordingly, the rule of pleasure must give way to the higher rule of the good." *

* All these opinions may be found in the works of their respective advocates, viz. Cousin's in his transl. 3. 130, seq., Stallbaum's in Vol. 2, sec. 1, p. 38, of his second ed., Ast's in his work on Plato's life and writings, p. 133, Socher's in his similar work, (Munich, 1820,) p. 237, in which he is polemical towards Ast. C. F. Hermann's is contained in his Introd. to Plato, (Heidelberg, 1838 – 39, the second vol. has not appeared,) p. 476, and Schleiermacher's — the critic to whom the thorough understanding of Plato owes most — in Dobson's translation of his prefaces. While I am upon this subject, let me say, that Schleiermacher hardly receives justice from the hands of this translator. His style, indeed, offers serious difficulties, for his mind was not, "though deep, yet clear." It may be forgiven, therefore, to a translator, that sometimes he constructs, out of Schleiermacher's formidable German sentences, something not exactly English, as though he were only half conscious of the meaning. But when such things as the turning of André Dacier, the French translator of parts of

Most of these opinions have something of justice in them, but, with the exception of the last, appear to me to look at a part of the dialogue, rather than at the whole. If rhetoric is the subject, why have the researches into the nature of pleasure, the comparison between suffering injustice and committing it, and the discussion of the efficacy of punishment, so great prominence? Much is said about rhetoric, but it is the vehicle for conveying thought rather than the subject, the starting-point of the dialogue rather than its goal. I should entertain just the opposite opinion to that of Ast above quoted: that the scientific part of the dialogue is the main thing, and rhetoric only an example. Schleiermacher's view, so far as I understand it, or one very similar to it, appears to me to deserve the preference. The main subject is the worthless nature of pleasure, and of the pursuits founded on pleasure, as opposed to the right and the good. Rhetoric, including politics in its corrupt condition at that time, is selected as the most prominent and most esteemed of the arts which minister to pleasure. This exhibition of the subject being admitted, we see a propriety in the introduction of every topic. The right and the good are inseparably linked to each other, and, in fact, united with all that pertains to man's excellence and well-being. But to these, pleasure, pursued for its own sake, is opposed. It is opposed to true good, for it blindly seeks present gratification, however pernicious or debasing. It is opposed to right or justice, for it tries to avoid suffering wrong by inflicting wrong on others. It is opposed to both, because its impulse is to escape from de-

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Plato, into Madame Dacier occur, notwithstanding Schleiermacher's "dem Dacier," and "Seiner einleitung," it may be suspected that the translation was made before sufficient knowledge of German was acquired, — a suspicion from which only the plea of gross carelessness can free the translator.

served punishment, without regard to the good effects of punishment on virtue and happiness. The arts which minister to pleasure — one of which, and the chief in its pretensions, is false rhetoric — fall under the same condemnation. As truth is on the side of good, they have no communion with truth; they are arts of imposition or flattery, calculated to persuade the ignorant, and reared upon no basis of unchanging truth or scientific principles. In the end, as they sacrifice the highest good of those whom they please to their present gratification, they involve in ruin him who practises them, and those who are practised upon. Politics, especially, which, when genuine, aims at the public good, is, when based on these principles, a mischievous trade. And this supreme pursuit of pleasure affects the condition of man, not only in this life, but in the life to come.

Such appears to me to be the subject of the Gorgias. But it should be added, that Plato has so handled the subject that the dialogue answers, also, for a defence of himself and his master. The allusions to the trial of Socrates have been noticed already. He stands before us as the philosopher who suffers reproach and death for seeking men's good rather than their pleasure. But Plato defends himself, also, apparently against friends, who blamed him for not publicly serving the state, as well as against public men, who thought philosophy a useless pursuit. Politics, he asserts, must be founded on the theory and practice of philosophy. No man is a true politician until he becomes τεχνικός, — an artist, a philosopher able to distinguish useful from harmful pleasures, — and reduces his science to practice by making men better. That this is a fair defence I do not assert; for, with true good in view at the outset, the practice perfects a man in the science. He might have said, what he must have felt, that the corruption of the

times, the necessity of using flattering arts, to which he could not resort, would have altogether prevented his success. In such an age, — and such an age is a very long one, — the philosophical statesman, — let me add, the truly enlightened Christian statesman, — the sound pilot of the state, is thrust from the helm, and ignorant apprentices usurp his place. Plato's part, therefore, was to act on a few, and on future times.

I would gladly now draw the attention of my younger readers to the Gorgias, as a display of the mind and style of Plato; but the limits of an Introduction forbid me to enlarge upon this topic. I must, therefore, omit to speak of the exquisite style of Plato, and the dramatic form in which he clothes his works. I must only glance at the Platonic Socrates, the centre of Plato's writings; at his admirable irony, now playful and now severe, his unruffled good-nature, his hatred of show and pretence, his attitude as an inquirer rather than as already wise, his unaffected modesty, his propensity to illustrate the great by the small, philosophical truth by common life, his high estimate of moral truth above physical. There are, however, one or two points to be noticed, in which Gorgias differs from many of Plato's works. One is, the earnestness, almost amounting to bitterness, with which the argument is carried on. There is less here of playful irony than elsewhere. Another is, that Socrates expresses his opinion, and lays down his principles, more than in most of the dialogues of an earlier date. Another still is, that, compared with the Platonic works of the first period, it has less of the dramatic about it; we have no embellished preface, like that of Protagoras, but at the beginning, Socrates, without any delay on the part of the writer, enters into the discussion. All these characteristics may be explained by a predominance of moral feeling, which rises even into indignation, and deprives Plato of part

of his usual tranquillity. With all this, the form is admirable.* The argument grows in interest and importance, until it ends in a strain of highest mood. To mention but a single characteristic, nothing can be finer than the way in which Socrates deals with Callicles in the third part, where he retorts his language upon him, and shows that the indignities which he had described as the rewards of the just man on earth will be heaped upon the unjust in a higher degree hereafter.

The opinion of the greater number of critics assigns the composition of the Gorgias to one of the years not long after the death of Sócrates, while that event was still fresh in Plato's mind. Athenæus has a story (11. 505, D), that Gorgias read the work, and said, "How well Plato knows how to lampoon!" and another, that Gorgias declared that "he never heard or said such things as Plato reported." If Gorgias died soon after Socrates, as Foss maintains, these anecdotes, which may not be wholly unworthy of credence, would supply us with the latter term for the composition of the dialogue. But there is no certainty in regard to the dates of the birth of Gorgias, and of his age when he came to Athens as ambassador, on which the date of his death depends. A comparison of this dialogue with Plato's other works enables us to come somewhere near the time of its composition in another manner. It occupies a

* Stallbaum, in his Introd. to the Repub., says: — "Hoc monere juvat disserendi quoque elegantiam in Politia tantam regnare ut paucissimi sermones præter Gorgiam, Protagoram, Phædonem, Phædrum, et Symposium, hoc in genere ad eam comparandi sint." Ritter, 2. 192. "In regard to Plato's imitative art in dialogue (dialogisch-mimische kunst), we consider as his most finished works Protagoras, Gorgias, and Symposium, next to which, though at some distance, come Phædrus and Phædo." Here, however, style, rather than form, is spoken of. As a work of art, I should place Phædrus first among all the Platonic dialogues.

middle place, as Schleiermacher teaches us, between the elementary writings of Plato's first years, and the constructive ones of his maturer life. This critic conceives that it was written after Plato's first visit to Sicily, in 389, B. C., when he was forty years of age. Stallbaum brings it much nearer to the death of Socrates, in 399. To this conclusion he is led by a strong resemblance he discovers between the Gorgias and Meno, which latter dialogue he carries back even to a time before the death of Socrates, on account of Plato's mildness there in attacking Anytus, the accuser of his master. But neither of these considerations has much weight; Plato might and does resemble himself in works written at considerable intervals from one another; and the more gentle tone of Meno may be owing to a frame of its author's mind which is not to be accounted for. It is safer to say, that the date cannot be ascertained precisely.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΩΛΟΣ.

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447 ΚΑΡ. Ι. *ΚΑΛ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν; ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο. ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι,*
Β *ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι. ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἐσαῦθις. ΚΑΛ. Τί δαί, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου; ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε, παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας κατα-*
λύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν. *ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις,*
C *ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεταί τε καὶ διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ*

ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν ἐσαῦθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω. ΚΑΛ. Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἓν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν δὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. ΣΩ. Ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι; ΣΩ. D Ὅστις ἐστί. ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι, ὅτι σκυτοτόμος. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

ΚΑΡ. II. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. — Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ; ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ 448 νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω, ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν. ΧΑΙ. Ἦ που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρίνει, ὦ Γοργία. ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν. ΠΩΛ. Νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθε. ΧΑΙ. Τί δαί, ὦ Πῶλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς; ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ B σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα. ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν

ἆρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν; ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον, ὅτι ζωγράφον. ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστί, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν; ΠΩΛ. Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως εὑρημέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

Cap. III. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ. ΓΟΡ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Τί δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην, ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην, ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη; ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ

ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ 449
καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης. ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι. ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι B
ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, ἐσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ C
μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ ἐσαῦθις. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

CAP. IV. *ΣΩ. Φέρε δή·—ῥητορικῆς γὰρ*
D *φῂς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα·—ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων. ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπό-*
E *κριναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη; ΓΟΡ. Περὶ λόγους. ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἆρα οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν; ΓΟΡ. Οὔ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Ἆρ'*
450 *οὖν καὶ ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ λόγους ἐστί. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα; ΓΟΡ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ κακεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ*
B *μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους, οἳ*

τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἣ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους; ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστι τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστί. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν C ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

Cap. V. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστι καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφι- D κὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φῂς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι. ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἕτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν, αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις E

καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστί. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὗτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστι, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, Τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν
451 ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν. ΓΟΡ. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΚΑΡ. VI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι οὖν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν, Ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστιν ἡ
B ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· Τῶν περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν [γνῶσις], ὅσα ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο· Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἴποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων. καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο, Ἡ περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν
C ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει·

τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ᾖ περὶ λόγους; ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστι τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστί. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν C ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

Cap. V. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστι καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφι- D κὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φὴς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι. ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἑτέραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν, αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἧ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις E

Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ
ἐστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή. εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ
ἐροίμην· Σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἶποι ἂν
ἴσως, ὅτι Ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἦ τὸ τῆς σῆς
τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ
B οὔ, φαίη ἄν ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ'
ἐστὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγιείας; Εἰ δ'
αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἶποι, ὅτι Θαυ-
μάζοιμί γ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτός, εἴ σοι
ἔχει Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὑ-
τοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἶποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ
πρὸς τοῦτον· Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; καὶ
τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; Παιδοτρίβης, φαίη ἄν, τὸ δ'
ἔργον μού ἐστι καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν παι-
δοτρίβην εἶποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῷμαι,
C πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων, Σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγα-
θὸν ὂν ἢ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἢ παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν.
φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Τί δὲ δή; ἦ σὺ
τούτου δημιουργός; Φαίη ἄν. Τίς ὤν; Χρη-
ματιστής. Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. Πῶς
γὰρ οὔκ; ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γορ-
γίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ
αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον
D οὖν, ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἄν· Καὶ τί ἐστι
τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας. Ἴθι
οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκεί-

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΩΛΟΣ.

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447 ΚΑΡ. Ι. *ΚΑΛ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν; ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο. ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι,*
B *ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῖψαι. ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἐσαῦθις. ΚΑΛ. Τί δαί, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου; ΧΑΙ. Ἔπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε, παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας κα-*
C *ταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεταί τε καὶ διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ*

ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν ἐσαῦθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω. ΚΑΛ. Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἓν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν δὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. ΣΩ. Ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. Ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι; ΣΩ. D Ὅστις ἐστί. ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι, ὅτι σκυτοτόμος. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

CAP. II. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. — Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ; ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ 448 νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω, ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν. ΧΑΙ. Ἦ που ἄρα ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρίνει, ὦ Γοργία. ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν. ΠΩΛ. Νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθε. ΧΑΙ. Τί δαί, ὦ Πῶλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς; ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ B σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα. ΧΑΙ. Ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν

ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ, ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων ἐστὶ πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον ἐρήσο-
C μαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ οὖν ἕνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ, ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ, εἴ σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἶ μοι εἶπες, ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως
D σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἦ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ, πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη, ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.
E ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὥνπερ νῦν δή, ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ

ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ 449
καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης. ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρή σε καλεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὅ γε εὔχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι. ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι B
ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, ἐσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ C
μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ ἐσαῦθις. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

CAP. IV. *ΣΩ. Φέρε δή·—ῥητορικῆς γὰρ*
D *φῂς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα·—ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἢ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων. ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δή μοι ἀπό-*
E *κριναι οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη; ΓΟΡ. Περὶ λόγους. ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἆρα οἳ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν; ΓΟΡ. Οὔ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Ἆρ'*
450 *οὖν καὶ ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ λόγους ἐστί. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα; ΓΟΡ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ κακεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ*
B *μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους, οἳ*

τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἑκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δή ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ἧ περὶ λόγους; ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστι τοιοῦτον χειρούργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστί. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν C ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

Cap. V. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἵαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἐστι καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφι- D κὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φῂς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι. ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἕτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν, αἳ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἧ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις E

καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστί. τῶν τοιούτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικήν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστι, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, Τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικήν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν
451 ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν. ΓΟΡ. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.

CAP. VI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι οὖν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τίς με ἔροιτο ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν, Ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἐστιν ἡ
B ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἐχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο· Τῶν περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν [γνῶσις], ὅσα ἂν ἑκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο· Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἴποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων. καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο, Ἡ περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν
C ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἔχει·

περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, Οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἴποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα D τάχους ἔχει. ΓΟΡ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων τις. ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; *τί* ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται; ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

Cap. VII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. E οἶομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ᾀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ᾄδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως. ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὅτι σοι αὐτίκα ἂν παρα- 452 σταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰατρός, ὅτι,

Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ
ἐστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή. εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ
ἐροίμην· Σὺ δὲ τίς ὢν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἶποι ἄν
ἴσως, ὅτι Ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἦ τὸ τῆς σῆς
τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ
B οὔ, φαίη ἂν ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ'
ἐστὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγιείας; Εἰ δ'
αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι, ὅτι Θαυ-
μάζοιμί γ' ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτός, εἴ σοι
ἔχει Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὑ-
τοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἶποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ
πρὸς τοῦτον· Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; καὶ
τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; Παιδοτρίβης, φαίη ἄν, τὸ δ'
ἔργον μού ἐστι καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν παι-
δοτρίβην εἶποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῷμαι,
C πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων, Σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῇ τι μεῖζον ἀγα-
θὸν ὂν ἢ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἢ παρ' ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν.
φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Τί δὲ δή; ἦ σὺ
τούτου δημιουργός; Φαίη ἄν. Τίς ὤν; Χρη-
ματιστής. Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. Πῶς
γὰρ οὔκ; ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γορ-
γίας ὅδε τὴν παρ' αὐτῷ τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ
αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον
D οὖν, ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ' ἄν· Καὶ τί ἐστι
τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας. Ἴθι
οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκεί-

νων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. ΓΟΡ. Ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις; E ΓΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ξυλλόγῳ παντί, ὁστις ἂν πολιτικὸς ξύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

CAP. VIII. ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέ- 453
χνην ἡγεῖ εἶναι, καί, εἴ τι ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις, ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. ἢ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίζεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς. ΣΩ. Ἄκουσον δή, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν B πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστί, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἕνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ,

ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ, ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἣν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων ἐστὶ πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἣν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἧττον ἐρήσο-
C μαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ οὖν ἕνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προΐῃ, ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ, εἴ σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἶ μοι εἶπες, ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως
D σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἦ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ, πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθὼ ποιεῖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνη, ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὃ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.
E ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν ὥνπερ νῦν δή, ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ

πείθει ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ 454
τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστί. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἁπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὔσας καὶ ἡστινος καὶ περὶ ὅ τι. ἢ οὔ ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστι δημιουργός. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Cap. IX. *ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἔστι* B
τέχνη ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι ; ΓΟΡ. Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτω. ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἃ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὼ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, ἐὰν C
ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ· ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἑξῆς ἕνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα,

ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;
D ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι; ΓΟΡ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. Οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἴει· γνώσει δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε ἔροιτο Ἆρ' ἔστι τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής; φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ
E αὖ, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἴδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι; ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύ-
455 ειν. ΣΩ. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστι πιστευτικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶ δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε

πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι σὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὅ τι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως ᾖ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος, ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν, ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἱρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἱρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως, ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς, ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἱρέσεως πέρι, ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους, ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ᾖ, ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὔ. ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε φῂς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητής σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἄν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι, Τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου, ἢ καὶ περὶ ἂν νῦν δὴ

Σωκράτης ἔλεγε; πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω.
E οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου, ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονε, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν. ΣΩ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς
456 ἤκουον, ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ᾖ ὧν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς, ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμίς ἐστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

Cap. XI. ΓΟΡ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἁπάσας τὰς δυ-
B νάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὑτῇ ἔχει· μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὁπόι βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ

τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἱρεθῆναι, ῥήτορα C
ἢ ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλ'
αἱρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο.
καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὁντιναοῦν
ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἑλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορι-
κὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ
ὅτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ
ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. Ἡ
μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶ καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς
τέχνης. δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ
χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ D
γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς
ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθε πυκτεύ-
ειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχε-
σθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν·
οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ
κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία
ἐάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τὸ
σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα
τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων
ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδο- E
τρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μά-
χεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆ-
σθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδι-
κοῦντας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· οἱ δὲ 457
μετασκευάσαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ
οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὔκουν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ
ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἕνεκά
ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἶμαι, ὀρθῶς. ὁ

αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐμβραχὺ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται·
B ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δέ, οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κατὰ ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ
C χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

Cap. XII. ΣΩ. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥᾳδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες
D ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσι καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονεικοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἴσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν

ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. Τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; E
ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν
οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με
ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονεικοῦντα λέ-
γειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ.
ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὥνπερ 458
καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἄν σε διερωτῴην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾷην
ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγ-
χθέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγ-
ξάντων, εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέ-
στερον μέντ' ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖ-
ζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον
ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ με-
γίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι το-
σοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς B
περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὤν. εἰ μὲν
οὖν καὶ σὺ φῂς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ
δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐᾶν, ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν
καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημὶ
μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶ-
ναι, οἷον σὺ ὑφηγεῖ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν
καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ
ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξά- C
μην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόῤῥω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἢν δια-
λεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή
τινας αὐτῶν κατέχωμεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο
πράττειν.

Cap. XIII. ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γορ-
γία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν

ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων ἀκούειν, ἐάν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων
D ἀφεμένῳ προὐργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν. ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὕτως, ὥσπερ νυνί, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἂν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας. ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, καὶ
E ταῦτα αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι τις βούλεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅ τι βούλει. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δή, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῂς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι, ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;
ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ'
459 ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα, ἀλλὰ πείθοντα; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἔλεγες τοι νῦν δὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ. ΓΟΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώ-
B τερος γίγνεται; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ

ἰατρός γε ὤν· ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων. ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι. ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ἢ ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἁπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ C τινα πειθοῦς εὑρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

CAP. XIV. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥᾳστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν; ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδι- D κον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακόν ἐστιν, ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχρόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὥστε δο- κεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ E εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς

ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον·—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον·—ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσει αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ
460 Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθ' ἡ δύναμίς ἐστιν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μέν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται. ΣΩ. Ἔχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἤτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ. ΓΟΡ.
B Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός; καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος; ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. Ὁ
C δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι], τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον δίκαια βούλεσθαι πράττειν; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεταί γε. ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ

τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν. ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεταί γε.

ΚΑΡ. XV. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ [μὴ καλῶς] χρῆταί τε καὶ ἀδικῇ; ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ῥητορικῇ; ἐῤῥήθη ταῦτα, ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Ἐῤῥήθη. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὔ; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου. ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα, ὅ γ' ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες, ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ κἂν ἀδίκως χρῷτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνᾴδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἦγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαίρειν. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων, ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτός, ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπη ποτὲ

B ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστίν, ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

Cap. XVI. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις, ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἢ οἴει, ὅτι Γοργίας ἠσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογῆσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν,
C αὐτὸς διδάξειν — ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα. ἐπεὶ τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους. ΣΩ. Ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἑταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπα-
D νορθοῖτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου· δίκαιος δ' εἶ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμολογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅ τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἓν μόνον φυλάττῃς. ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθείρξῃς, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; οὐκ ἐξέ-
E σται μοι λέγειν ὁπόσα ἂν βούλωμαι; ΣΩ. Δεινὰ μέντ' ἂν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξου-

σία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· "Σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου;" ἀλλ' εἴ 462
τι κήδει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅ τι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῂς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας. ἢ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἑκάστοτε ὅ τι ἄν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. B
ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει· ἐρώτα, ἢ ἀποκρίνου.

Cap. XVII. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῂς εἶναι; ΣΩ. Ἆρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. Πρᾶγμα, ὃ φῂς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων. ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἐμ- C
πειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα. ΠΩΛ. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; ΣΩ. Ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία; ΣΩ. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις; ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅ τι
D φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι, ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῂς εἶναι; ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία; ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι. ΣΩ. Φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις.
E ΠΩΛ. Τίνος; φάθι. ΣΩ. Φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. Ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική; ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον. ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἕνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῳδεῖν
463 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει οὐκ οἶδα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται· ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν. ΓΟΡ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς.

Cap. XVIII. ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς
B προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ

τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἓν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τήν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικήν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσι πρά- C γμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται ὁποῖόν φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ, εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν, πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅ τι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὁποῖον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν. ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι, D ὁποῖον μόριον. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον. ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι; ΣΩ. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ· ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω. ΓΟΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅ τι λέγεις. ΣΩ. Εἰκό- E τως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν. ΣΩ.

Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὅ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο,
464 Πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχήν; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἴει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν; ΓΟΡ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὖσαν δ' οὔ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αἴσθοιτό τις, ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν, ἄλλος ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις. ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὅ τι ποιεῖ δοκεῖν μὲν
B εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Cap. XIX. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. Δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν. τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιο-
C σύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἑκάτεραι τούτων, ἥ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσί τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν, τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ

στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶ- D
ναι τοῦτο, ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου
οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν
ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία
εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποικὴ
ὑποδέδυκε, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία
τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ', εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ δια-
γωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν
οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαΐει
περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς
ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν. E
κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι
εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Πῶλε, — τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ 465
λέγω, — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελ-
τίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὔ φημι εἶναι, ἀλλ'
ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἃ προσ-
φέρει ὁποῖ' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰ-
τίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην
οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα. τούτων δὲ
περὶ εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

Cap. XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω,
ἡ ὀψοποικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμνα- B
στικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμω-
τικὴ, κακοῦργός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεν-
νὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ
λειότησι καὶ ἐσθήσει ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλό-
τριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ
τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν' οὖν μὴ μακρολο-
γῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι — ἤδη

γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθήσαις — ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ
C πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν. μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι ὃ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ὀψοποιικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει· ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις.
D καὶ γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἥ τε ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὦ φίλε Πῶλε· — σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος· — ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποιικῶν. ὃ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποι-
E ίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι. Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἣν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν
466 a οἷός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, μὴ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω,

ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

Cap. XXI. *ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν φῄς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥητορική; ΣΩ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις [πρεσβύτης γενόμενος]; ΠΩΛ. Ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες; ΣΩ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς, ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις; ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε. ΣΩ. Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες. ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτιννύασί τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; ΣΩ. Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἑκάστου ὧν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ. ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δύο; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἀποκτιννύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.*

Cap. XXII. *ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι*
E *μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι; ΣΩ. Οὔχ, ὡς γέ φησι Πῶλος. ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν — οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. ΠΩΛ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἴει εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα, ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς μέγα δύνασθαι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην*
467 *τὴν ῥητορικήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται, εἰ δὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι. ἢ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώ-*
B *λου, ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται; ΠΩΛ. Οὗτος ἀνήρ — ΣΩ. Οὔ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλά μ' ἔλεγχε. ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι,*

τούτου πρόσθεν; ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ. ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται. ΣΩ. Οὔ φημι. ΠΩΛ. Ποιοῦντες δὲ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς; ΣΩ. Φημί. ΠΩΛ. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Μὴ κατηγόρει, ὦ λῷστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν C ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον, ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅ τι λέγεις.

Cap. XXIII. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἑκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσι τοῦθ', ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιοῦσι, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον D καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσι; ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον, ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἑκάστοτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἕνεκα πλέουσι, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέουσι. ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἕνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν E ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν; ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά; ΠΩΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ; ΠΩΛ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἆρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν, ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτίννυμεν, εἴ τιν' ἀποκτίννυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἕνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες. ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

Cap. XXIV. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν; ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ

ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει; D
ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἦ γάρ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει; ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύ- E
τῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων, ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. ΠΩΛ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅ τι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς, ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα. ΣΩ. Δικαίως, λέγεις, ἢ ἀδίκως; ΠΩΛ. Ὁπότερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; 469
ΣΩ. Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. Τί δή; ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων; ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. Ὅστις

οὖν ἀποκτίννυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτιννύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεεινός; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός. ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι; ΣΩ. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον. ΠΩΛ. Ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ ἀθλιός ἐστιν. ΣΩ. Ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτιννύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον; ΣΩ. Ἥκιστά γε. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν; ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο; ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτιννύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ δόξαν.

Cap. XXV. ΣΩ. Ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σέ, ὅτι Ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει

οὗτος, ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ E
πόλει· εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν, ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντιν' ἂν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐ 470
δῆτα οὕτω γε. ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, διότι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δή; λέγε. ΠΩΛ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστι. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ B
μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε. ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτιννύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζει. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ

σταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἄν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾖ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἕνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπί-
B σταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οὖν, εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι. ΠΩΛ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν; ΣΩ. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. ΠΩΛ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς.
C ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅ τι ποτ' ἐρεῖς. ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι, ἵν' εἰδῇς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ αἴσχιον; πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

Cap. XXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον. ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω·
D οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ

φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον. ΠΩΛ. Ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον; ΣΩ. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέν, ἣν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικός, ἣ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου, τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν· ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὑτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἅμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέ τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν γνήσιον, τὸν Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἔπαιζε, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος

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C ΚΑΡ. XXXI. *ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα· ἆρα λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ. ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κά-*
D *κιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε. ΣΩ. Δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; Μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε — οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσει —, ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ,*
E *ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ, παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων; ΠΩΛ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἂν σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ*

οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας κατ' ἐμοῦ πολλοὺς παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ C ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα, περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον, μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅστις μή. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ D σοῦ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστί, σὺ ἡγεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγεῖ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ. ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

Cap. XXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἆρ', ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας; ΠΩΛ. Ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγ- E

χάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται. ΠΩΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγ-
478 χάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. ΣΩ. Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταὐτὰ ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἃ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστί· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ. ΠΩΛ.
B Ναὶ μὰ Δία. ΣΩ. Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως. ΣΩ. Σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην. ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἧττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν; ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι. ΣΩ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγ-
C χεται. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς

αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδας τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα λέ- D
γεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγξειν;

Cap. XXIX. ΣΩ. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν· ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἶπες; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ δίκην διδούς· δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφυγὼν καὶ τυραννεύσας. Τί E
τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἴει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί. ΣΩ. Ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν 474
με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπί-

κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστι; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

Cap. XXXIV. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική; ΠΩΛ. 478 Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; Εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα; ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας; ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας; ΠΩΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες; ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον B δή. ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [ὧν λέγεις]; ΠΩΛ. Τίνων λέγεις; ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης. ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ, ἢ ὠφέλειαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστι; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστι, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὠφέλι- C μόν γε. ἢ γάρ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιεῖ εἶναι. ΠΩΛ.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν; ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον, ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων. ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις. ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτ' ἐν D σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ; ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας; ΠΩΛ. Ἦν γάρ. ΣΩ. Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων E κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δή. ΣΩ. Δεύτερος δήπου ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστῃ ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε 479 μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας; ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε.

CAP. XXXV. ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὦ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσί, ὅσπερ ἂν

εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φο-
B βούμενος, ὥσπερανεὶ παῖς, τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἦ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτως; ΠΩΛ. Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ
C συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ. ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ὡς ἂν ὦσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἆρ' αἰσθάνει τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά; ΠΩΛ. Εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεταί
D γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι; ΠΩΛ. Κινδυνεύει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν. ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ

μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐ- E
ναντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτ' Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀν-
θρώπων ὁστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ
προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων
ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμέ-
νου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην
τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμε-
να; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται,
ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

Cap. XXXVI. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦ- 480
τα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὡμολογη-
μένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν, ὅπως
μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἕξοντα. οὐ γάρ;
ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ
αὐτός, ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἑκόντα
ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ
τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδον-
τα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας B
ἄπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς
λέγομεν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν
ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω
μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή; ΠΩΛ. Τί γὰρ
δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα
τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὑτοῦ, ἢ
γονέων, ἢ ἑταίρων, ἢ παίδων, ἢ πατρίδος ἀδι-
κούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ
Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον, C
κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ

καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ ὑγιὴς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ
D ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν· ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.
E φῶμεν οὕτως, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε; ΠΩΛ. Ἄτοπα μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κἀκεῖνα λυτέον, ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν; ΠΩΛ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει. ΣΩ. Τοὐναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὁντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, — τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον· — ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ
481 ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάν τε χρυσίον ἥρπακὼς ᾖ πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκηται καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν

καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάν τε αὖ θανάτου ἄξια ἠδικηκὼς ᾖ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὤν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὤν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστι τις χρεία· ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα. B

Cap. XXXVII. *ΚΑΛ.* Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης, ἢ παίζει; *ΧΑΙ.* Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἷον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν. *ΚΑΛ.* Νὴ τοὺς θεούς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα, ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα, ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ; *ΣΩ.* Ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾴδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας, ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταὐτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυεῖν ἑκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἑκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ὁπόσ' ἂν φῇ σοῦ C D

τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου
E ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου·
ἔν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος
ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος
λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυρι-
λάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτε-
ρα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλεύ-
μασί τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι,
ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἑκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους
λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν
482 αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι, εἰ μή τις
παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ
σὺ παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ
παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ
μὴ θαύμαζε, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φι-
λοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγου-
σαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἀεὶ ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ
ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστι τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ
ἥττων ἔμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος
ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ
B τῶν αὐτῶν. λέγει δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις· πα-
ρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἦ οὖν ἐκείνην
ἐξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
ἐστι καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἁπάντων
ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον,
μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὐ σοι ὁμο-
λογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφω-
νήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ
βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἁρ-
C μοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην,

καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

Cap. XXXVIII. ΚΑΛ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὤν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταὐτὸν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξει αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἄν, εἴ τις μὴ φαίη· διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καί σου κατεγέλα, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, ὀρθῶς τότε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθε, καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν

τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νόμον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, * οἷον * τὸ ἀδι-
B κεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινός, ᾧ κρεῖττόν ἐστι τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τε ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὐδ' ἂν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ
C τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν· — ἐκφοβοῦντές τοὺς ἐξῳμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσι, λέγουσιν, ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες. Cap. XXXIX.
διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις
D αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γέ-

νεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω
τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ
δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστρά- E
τευσεν, ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα
μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι,
οὕτοι κατὰ φύσιν [τὴν τοῦ δικαίου] ταῦτα πράτ-
τουσι, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς
φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς
τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρω-
μενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες,
ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ χοητεύοντες 484
καταδουλούμεθα, λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν
καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν
δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ,
πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαῤῥήξας καὶ
διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα
καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς
παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπό-
της ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε τὸ B
τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος
ἅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι, ἐν ᾧ
λέγει, ὅτι Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνα-
τῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων· οὗτος δὲ δή, φησίν,
ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ
χερί· τεκμαίρομαι ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος,
ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας — λέγει οὕτω πως· τὸ γὰρ
ᾄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. λέγει δ', ὅτι οὔτε πριά-
μενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς
βοῦς, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ C
βοῦς καὶ τἆλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελ-

τίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων. Cap. XL. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἤδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἅψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίγνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἴς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσι καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσι. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου· λαμπρός τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ,

καὶπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνῃ βέλτιστος ὤν.

ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετα-

σχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μέν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς B ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾷ μου τὰ ὦτα, καί μοι δοκεῖ δουλο- C πρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὁρᾷ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ D οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ. ὃ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν

βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ
E τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ
ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. CAP. XLI. ἐγὼ
δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς.
κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος
πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται
πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν,
ὅτι ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν μειρα-
486 κιώδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ
σὺτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς
λόγον, οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάβοις,
οὔθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα
βουλεύσαιο. καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες — καί
μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῇς· εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ —
οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ
σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ
φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λα-
βόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ
δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν
B ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅ τι χρήσαιο
σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἐλιγγιῴης ἂν καὶ χασμῷο οὐκ ἔχων ὅ
τι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατη-
γόρου τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀπο-
θάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι.
καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ τις
εὐφυᾶ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χεί-
ρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ'
ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν

μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶ- C
σθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν
ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικό-
τερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ
διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ' ὦ 'γαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦ-
σαι δ' ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν
ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρή-
ματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν
κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις· ζηλῶν
οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' D
οἷς ἐστι καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ
ἀγαθά.

Cap. XLII. ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχα-
νον τὴν ψυχήν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἴει με
ἄσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων, ᾗ βα-
σανίζουσι τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα
ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν
ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἶ-
σεσθαι, ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης E
βασάνου; ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ
Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν. οἶμαι
ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἑρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκέ-
ναι. ΚΑΛ. Τί δή; ΣΩ. Εὖ οἶδ', ὅτι, ἂν
μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει,
ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ ταληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ, ὅτι 487
τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρ-
θῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἆρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἃ σὺ
πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ
παῤῥησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω, οἳ

ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τε εἰσὶ βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ
εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ
ἐθέλουσι δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ
κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γορ-
B γίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφὼ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστὸν
ἐμώ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παῤῥησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηρο-
τέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ὥ γε εἰς
τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰ-
σχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ
ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ
ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα
ἔχεις, ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσι· πεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ
ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ
C ἐμοί γ' εἰ εὖνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγώ
σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας
ὄντας, κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ
Τίσανδρον, τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον, καὶ Ἄνδρωνα, τὸν
Ἀνδροτίωνος, καὶ Ναυσικύδην, τὸν Χολαργέα.
καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων μέ-
χρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα, ὅτι
ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι
D εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι
παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέ-
οντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύ-
οντος, ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις, ἱκανόν
μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὖνους εἶ.
καὶ μὴν, ὅτι γε οἷος παῤῥησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰ-
σχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῂς καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃν ὀλίγον
πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὑτωσὶ

δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί· ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς E
λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ'
ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι
αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ
γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας
ἐνδείᾳ οὔτ' αἰσχύνης περιουσίᾳ· οὐδ' αὖ ἀπα-
τῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις ἄν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς
καὶ αὐτὸς φῄς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ σὴ ὁμολο-
γία τέλος ἤδη ἕξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ
καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τού-
των ἣν σὺ δή μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶ-
ναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, 488
καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ
τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ,
εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω, ἀλλ'
ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ. σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν
με, μὴ ἀποστῇς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι τί ἐστι
τοῦτο, ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτη-
σαίμην ἂν αὐτό. καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μέν σοι
ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα
πράττοντα, ἅπερ ὡμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλᾶ-
κα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσῃς ὕστερον, B
ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανά-
λαβε, πῶς φῂς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίν-
δαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ
τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων
καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή
τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέ-
μνημαι;

Cap. XLIII. *ΚΑΛ.* Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον

καὶ τότε, καὶ νῦν λέγω. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν
C αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; οὐδὲ γάρ
τοι τότε οἷός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγεις.
πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ
δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέ-
ρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ
μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει
δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶ καὶ ἰσχυρό-
τεραι, ὡς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον
ταὐτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἧττω δὲ καὶ
ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότε-
D ρον δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ
τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον,
ταὐτὸν, ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον
καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σα-
φῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ
πολλοὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ κατὰ φύσιν; οἳ
δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνί, ὥσπερ καὶ
σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες. ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ.
Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρειττόνων
E ἐστί. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν
βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ
κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐ-
κοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειττό-
νων γε ὄντων; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν
οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες,
489 δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν
τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ
ἀλώσει ἐνταῦθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ
οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλέον

δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὁμολογηκότος. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὥστε κινδυνεύεις B οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

Cap. XLIV. ΚΑΛ. Οὗτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνει, τηλικοῦτος ὤν, ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἕρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; C ἐμὲ γὰρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα; ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. D ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅ τι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγεῖ τοῦ

ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καί, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρωΐτερόν με
E προὐδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ. ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νῦν δὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με. ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς ἄρα, ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν. οὐκ ἐρεῖς τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις, ἢ ἄλλους τινάς; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἷς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούν-
490 των κρείττων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν — καὶ οὐ ῥήματα θηρεύω —, εἰ ὁ εἷς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων.

B ΚΑΡ. XLV. ΣΩ. Ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡμῖν ᾖ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ᾖ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα ἰατρὸς ὤν, ᾖ δέ, οἷον εἰκός,

τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἑκτέον C αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἐστίν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἑκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὤν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ ἄριστε; ΚΑΛ. Περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ φλυαρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω. ΣΩ. Πότερον D οὖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; Φάθι ἢ μή. ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιέναι. ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἱματίων; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτό- E μον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν. ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ γῆν. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ

Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
491 ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρειττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν, οὐ σκυτοτό-
B μους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν, ὁντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν ψυχῆς.

Cap. XLVI. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταὐτὰ σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῂς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγειν, καὶ μέμφει μοι· ἐγὼ δε σοῦ τοὐναντίον, ὅτι οὐ-
C δέποτε ταὐτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὡρίζου, αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἥκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ' ὦ 'γαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅ τι. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους
D εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ

τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὦ ἑταῖρε; [ἢ τί ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;] ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. E
ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ! τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη, ὅτι οὕτω λέγω. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε ἀφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παῤῥησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' 492
ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσι τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν· ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσι τὴν σωφροσύνην B
καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.

ἐπεί γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἢ βασιλέων υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν, τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφροσύνης [καὶ δικαιοσύνης] τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδὼν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον
C καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες εἶησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὑτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῂς σὺ διώκειν, ὧδ' ἔχει· τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

D CAP. XLVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παῤῥησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. δέομαι οὖν ἐγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῂς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἁμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν; ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ
E ταῦτα ἐγώ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ

μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ὅπερ ἤδη του 493
ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἆρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους· τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων τοῦτο Β
τῆς ψυχῆς, οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τοὐναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται, ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου — τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων — οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ· τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἆρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κο- C
σκίνῳ ἀπείκασε τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἐστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οἷός τε ὦ, πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλή-

στως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἑλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε
D καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἂν καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσει; ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Cap. XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γάρ, εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἑκατέρου τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἑκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν, καὶ τῷ
E μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἑκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκπορίζοιτο· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, καὶ ἀναγκά-
494 ζοιτο ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας· ἆρα τοιούτου ἑκατέρῳ ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω; ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία,

ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιῤῥεῖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιῤῥέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν; ΚΑΛ. Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἁπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

Cap. XLIX. ΣΩ. Εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἤρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνεῖ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ, εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῇς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον. ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῷ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ, ἐάν τίς σε τὰ ἐχόμενα

τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καί, *τὸ* τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὁ τῶν κιναίδων βίος οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους; ΣΩ. Ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς
495 χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῂς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν; ΚΑΛ. Ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι. ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ
B δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νῦν δὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζει; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.
C ΚΑΡ. L. ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε. ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης; ΚΑΛ. Ἔλεγον γάρ. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν, ἢ D ἕτερον; ΚΑΛ. Ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη ὁ Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον. ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα· ἢ ὁμολογεῖ; ΣΩ. Οὐχ ὁμολο- E γεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγεῖ πάθος πεπονθέναι; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου. ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οἷον περὶ ὄτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει. 498 νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς; ΚΑΛ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἆρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται; ΚΑΛ. Ἥκιστά γε.

B ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται. ἦ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἑκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει, καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἑκατέρου; ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δήπου. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὕ-
C ρωμεν ἄρα ἅττα, ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; Καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

Cap. LI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδύ, ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν. ΚΑΛ.
D Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῂς εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις
E τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστί; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν

κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον ἔφης εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ γάρ. ΣΩ. Ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυ- 497
νατὸν ὡμολόγηκας. ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. καὶ πρόϊθί γε ἔτι εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς, ἵνα εἰδῇς ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθε- B
τεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅ τι λέγεις. ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν ἕνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται. ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ C
σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

Cap. LII. *ΣΩ. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾤμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος. ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν* D *ἅμα παύεται; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὡμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. τί οὖν δή; ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, ταγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταὐτὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς;* E *Ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκεψαι· οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. ἆθρει δέ· τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες. ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ἀλ-*
498 *λὰ τί τοῦτο; ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου. ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ.*

Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι, ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες; ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοί, ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε. B *ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσι δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικε. ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται, ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι. ΣΩ. Ἆρα ὁμοίως; ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί. ΣΩ. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φῂς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;* C *ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;*

Cap. LIII. *ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ'* D *ὅ τι λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῂς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ*

τὰς ἀνίας; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσι πάρεστι τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσι; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμέ-
E νοις οὐ πάρεστι τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι; ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστι. ΣΩ. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῂς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς. ἢ οὐκέτι φῄς; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἷ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οἱ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἧττον ἧττον, οἱ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φῂς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων· καὶ δὶς γάρ τοι καὶ τρὶς
499 φασι καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. Ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἢ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγα-
B θῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει, καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταὐ-

τὰ φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

Cap. LIV. *ΚΑΛ.* Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος, ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἅσμενος ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους. *ΣΩ.* Ἰοὺ ἰού, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ, καί μοι C ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῇ, τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἑκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστι δὲ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί. ἦ γάρ; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Ἆρ' D οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι; *ΚΑΛ.* Φημί. *ΣΩ.* Ἆρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς· εἰ ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ τἀναντία τούτων κακαί; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ E μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί; *ΚΑΛ.* Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ

ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστὶ καὶ πρακτέον; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δή. ΣΩ. Ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξε πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἆρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τἆλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἆρα ἕνεκα δεῖ καὶ τἆλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον; ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

Cap. LV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γάρ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι ὅ τι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅ τι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἷον δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος. ὁρᾷς γὰρ, ὅτι περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων

ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὄντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παραχαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων; ἴσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ D καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστι τούτῳ διττὼ τὼ βίω, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὔπω οἶσθα τί λέγω. ΚΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ — E αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι, ἢ μή· σύμφῃς; ΚΑΛ. Οὕτω φημί.

Cap. LVI. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀψοποιικὴ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ 501 δ' ἰατρική, λέγων, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὗ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἕκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρική· ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστιν ἅπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν,

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβὴ καὶ ἀπειρία, μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος
B γίγνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ' οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἱκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν οὔτε σκοπούμεναι, οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς
C ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσί τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο, ὅτου ἂν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφῃς; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γορ-
D γίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχήν ἐστι τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν; ΚΑΛ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλάς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον; ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

CAP. LVII. ΣΩ. Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; Μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἄν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μὴ φάθι. πρῶ-

σιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἵους σὺ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε B σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικήν· ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν, δι' ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος. ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θε- C μιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἔστι γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἦν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι αἳ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄν- D θρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἳ δὲ χείρω, μή· τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.

Cap. LIX. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῇς καλῶς,

τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ κολακείαν εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον
D οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι. ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική. ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη. ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις; ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς εὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον, οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτήν φαμεν εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

Cap. LVIII. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν
E Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δήμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστί; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὡρμημένοι, καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὑτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους
503 ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἳ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἃ λέγου-

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνο- C
μένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑ-
ρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα. ΚΑΛ.
Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ.
Ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. σὺ δέ, ἂν
μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ μή,
ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν
τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ
οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ
τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; ΚΑΛ. D
Ἔστι. ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσί τε καὶ
κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμι-
μοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιο-
σύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῄς, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ.
Ἔστω.

Cap. LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα αὖ βλέ-
πων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγα-
θός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς
ἂν λέγῃ καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαι-
ρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως E
ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ
σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλ-
λάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία
δὲ ἀπίῃ; συγχωρεῖς, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.
ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε
κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ
διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, ὃ
μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον, κα-

ἐρήσεις. ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶν ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι, εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονε. φέρε γάρ,
E ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων ἃ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρός τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἴδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο, ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὁντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ
505 πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα, καὶ οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὗς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω. ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας
B δὲ μοχθηρά; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός; ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ; ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνο- C
μένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑ-
ρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα. ΚΑΛ.
Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ.
Ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. σὺ δέ, ἂν
μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ μή,
ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν
τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ
οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ
τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; ΚΑΛ. D
Ἔστι. ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσί τε καὶ
κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμι-
μοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιο-
σύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῄς, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ.
Ἔστω.

Cap. LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα αὖ βλέ-
πων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγα-
θός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς
ἂν λέγῃ καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαι-
ρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως E
ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ
σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλ-
λάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία
δὲ ἀπίῃ; συγχωρεῖς, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.
ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε
κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ
διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, ὃ
μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε πλέον ἢ τοὐναντίον, κα-

505 τά γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον, καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦτα; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δέ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἐῶσιν ἐμπίπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε καὶ σύ; ΚΑΛ. Β Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχήν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται; φῄς, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἆρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ C ᾤου. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα. ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος. ΚΑΛ. Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν; ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνώσει. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' D οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ

κεφαλῆς περιίῃ. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

CAP. LXI. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἐάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαλέξει. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν λόγον καταλείπωμεν. ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν Ε ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ; ΣΩ. Ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονείκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστι περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὡς ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ 506 ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἄν τι φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῶμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν Β σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διιόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλ-

λικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπεραῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων
C ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγξῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι, ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψει. ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὦ 'γαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

Cap. LXII. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἆρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; Οὐ ταὐτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος; Τὸ ἡδὺ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺ
D δέ ἐστι τοῦτο, οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα; ἀγαθὸν δέ, οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν. ἆρα ἔστι ταῦτα; Ἐγὼ μὲν
E γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. Κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα

τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου; Ἀνάγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων; 507
Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε. ΚΑΛ. Λέγ', ὦ 'γαθέ. ΣΩ. Λέγω δή, ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθή ἐστιν, ἡ τοὐναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακή ἐστιν. ἦν δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε σώφρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους; οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα πράττων. Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα B
πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἃ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ C
ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον. οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπῄνεις. CAP. LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα

οὕτω τίθεμαι καί φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ
D ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέαν δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι, πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ αὑτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως
E δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἑῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, λῃστοῦ βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλὴς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν
508 καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, — καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, — οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέ σε, ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. Εἶεν. ἢ
B ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαίμονες

οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι· ἢ εἰ οὕτως ἀληθής ἐστι, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου, εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα, ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ υἱέος καὶ ἑταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον. καὶ ἃ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ᾠου συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ C ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅσῳπερ αἴσχιον, τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογῆσαι. Cap. LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἆρα καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ οὔ, ὡς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι D τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἄν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόῤῥης, ἐάν τε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμός, ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· οὐ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόῤῥης ἀδίκως E αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδρα-

ποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις
509 οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστι, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὑτωσίν, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε, ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω, καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός
B τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ ἔτι τούτου μεῖζον μεγίστου ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἆρ' οὐ ταύτην, ἥτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν μήτε ἑαυτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὑτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκεί-
C οις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως· ὡς ἑκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή. ἆρα ἄλλως, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; *ΚΑΛ.* Οὐκ ἄλλως.

Cap. LXV. *ΣΩ.* Λυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδι-

κεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὑτῷ, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελείας ταύτας ἔχειν, τήν D τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν, ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσηται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται; ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει —, ἢ καὶ E ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; Τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος, ἢ οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπεράνῃς 510 τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἕτοιμός εἰμι

B ἐπαινεῖν, ἄν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

CAP. LXVI. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί; ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ
C ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὗτος· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειε. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν, ὁμοήθης ὤν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύ-
D τῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται· τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, Τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοίη, αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ.
E οὐχ οὕτως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράξεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι, ὄντι ἀδίκῳ, καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὕτωσὶ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἷῳ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι 511
δίκην. ἢ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἑκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα; ΣΩ. Οἶδα, B
ὦ 'γαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν; ΣΩ. Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἴει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας, αἳ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σώζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν σὺ κε- C
λεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικήν, τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσαν; ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δι' ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

Cap. LXVII. ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἢ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Καὶ

μὴν σώζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν, οὗ δεῖ ταύτης
D τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶ-
ναι, ἐγώ σοι μείζονα ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητι-
κήν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ
σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύ-
νων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσε-
σταλμένη ἐστὶ καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται
ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη,
ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ διαπραξαμένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν
ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι, δύ' ὀβολοὺς ἐπρά-
E ξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν
πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσας'
ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρή-
ματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσας' εἰς τὸν λιμένα
δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέ-
χνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν
θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχή-
ματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι
ἄδηλόν ἐστιν οὕστινάς τε ὠφέλησε τῶν συμπλεόν-
των οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστινας
ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβί-
512 βασεν ἢ οἷοι ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς
ψυχάς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγά-
λοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνε-
χόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν, ὅτι
οὐκ ἀπέθανε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ
δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ
ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ
δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν, ἄν τε ἐκ

θαλάττης ἄν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἄν τε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστι B ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ ζῆν. CAP. LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σώζοντα ἡμᾶς. οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σώζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σώζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ πα- C ρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὡς οὐδὲν τἆλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ' ἂν αὐτὸς τῷ σαυτοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον; οἶδ' ὅτι D φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ σώζειν αὑτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχε, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἰατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, ὅσαι τοῦ σώζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾖ τοῦ σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὁποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς E

ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν, ὅτι τὴν εἱμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλει χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιώῃ, ἆρα ἐξομοιῶν αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ
513 ταύτῃ, ἐν ᾗ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἆρα δεῖ σὲ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει; τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἵρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἴει ὁντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύ-
B την, ἥτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πο-
C λιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται. εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὦ φίλη κεφαλή. *Λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;*

Cap. LXIX. *ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὁντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ*

τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.
ΣΩ. Ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν
τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλά- D
κις ἴσως καὶ βέλτιον ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα,
πεισθήσει. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δύ' ἔφαμεν
εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν
καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμι-
λεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ κατα-
χαριζόμενον, ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν
ἃ τότε ὡριζόμεθα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ-
οὖν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα. ἢ γάρ; E
ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως. ΣΩ. Ἡ
δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε
σῶμα τυγχάνει ὂν εἴτε ψυχή, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;
ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἡμῖν
ἐπιχειρητέον ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θε-
ραπεύειν ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποι-
οῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπρο-
σθεν εὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν 514
οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ κἀγαθὴ ἡ δι-
άνοια ᾖ τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβά-
νειν ἢ ἀρχήν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν.
θῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι
ἥδιον. ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ
Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν
πραγμάτων, ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρί-
ων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότε-
ρον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ B
ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην, ἢ

οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἄν, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα ᾠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἦ αἰσχρόν ἐστι. καὶ εἰ μὲν εὑρίσκομεν σκο-
C πούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ᾠκοδομημένα ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, νοῦν ἐχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἴχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους
D ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

CAP. LXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα, κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἐγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, Φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τίς ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; Κἂν
E ἐγώ, οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν. καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὑρίσκομεν δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἰς το-

σοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν; ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ, ὦ 515
βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκε τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὢν ἄδικός τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων διὰ Καλλικλέα καλός τε κἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἥ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; Λέγε B
μοι, ἐάν τίς σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; — Ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστι τοιόνδε τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Φιλόνεικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Cap. LXXI. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονεικίᾳ γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον οἴει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, εἰ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς C
πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν. ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὡμολογήκαμεν, ἢ οὔ; ἀποκρίνου. Ὡμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ

ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δο-
D κοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν; ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἴσως δή, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων,
E εἴπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης. ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δή; ΣΩ. Οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα. ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὐδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ
516 κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνεσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

CAP. LXXII. *ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν; τούτου ἕνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς; ΣΩ. Ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας μηδὲ κνρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὁστισοῦν ὁτουοῦν ζώου, ὃς* B *ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέλαβε; Δοκεῖ, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι. ΣΩ. Καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος, πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἓν τῶν ζώων ἐστίν, ἢ οὔ; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο* C *αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἥμεροι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φῄς; οὐχ οὕτως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο. ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω; ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους; ΚΑΛ.* D *Ἔστω. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ γε φῄς. ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὁμολογεῖς. Πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι, οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα*

αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσεζημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι
E εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; Καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φῄς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότ' ἐκπίπτουσιν. οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὔτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ΣΩ.
Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι
517 ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὡμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας. οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ ἐχρῶντο — οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον — οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

CAP. LXXIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ
B γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται, οἷα τούτων ὃς βούλει εἰργάσται. ΣΩ. Ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους, ὡς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος

εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον C
ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη
καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι
ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπο-
ρίζειν. Πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε
καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ,
ὃν διαλεγόμεθα, οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ
περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέ-
γομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὡμολογηκέναι
καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὡς ἄρα διττὴ αὖτη τις ἡ πραγμα- D
τεία ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν,
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονική ἐστιν, ἣ δυνατὸν εἶναι
ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία,
ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῷ, ἱμάτια, στρώμα-
τα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλα ὧν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπι-
θυμίαν. καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκό-
νων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾷον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ
πριστικὸν εἶναι ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ
δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ ὀψο- E
ποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ σκυτοδεψόν, οὐ-
δὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ
αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος,
παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι, ὅτι ἔστι τις παρὰ ταύτας
ἁπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ
τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶ σώματος θεραπεία, ἧνπερ καὶ προσή-
κει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆ-
σθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τι τὸ
χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἐστιν 518
εἰς ἀρετὴν σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας
ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε

καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας· τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστι καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς, ὅ τι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων, ὅτι [ἄνθρωποι]
B καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασι πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶ σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς τὴν Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν
C ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. Cap. LXXIV. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ, ὅτι, Ἄνθρωπε, ἐπαΐεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἵ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ' αὐ-
D τῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας. οἱ δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἑστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ ἡ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα

συχνῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσι καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἷοί τ' ὦσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιάσουσι. καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζει· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν, καί φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὑπουλός ἐστι δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν. ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσι, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων, ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστι. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, ἧς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν

εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τἄλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατηγοροῦσι τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς, τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. D καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὦ ἑταῖρε; Ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Cap. LXXV. ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' E εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο; ΣΩ. Ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδή μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ὦ 'γαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ, ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων 520 τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων; ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἳ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἶει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταὐτόν, ὦ μα-

κάρι', ἐστὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον. σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, B τὴν ῥητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστι σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς. μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι, ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὕς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. C Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους D λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ τῇ βραδυτῆτι, οἶμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικίᾳ. ἦ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως; ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

Cap. LXXVI. ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν. ΚΑΛ. Ἔοικέ E

γε. ΣΩ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὄντιν' ἄν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἦ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσε-
521 ται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα; ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως; διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; Ταληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἦρξω παῤῥησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέ-
Β γων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ. ΚΑΛ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα. ΣΩ. Κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς. ΚΑΛ. Εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις — ΣΩ. Μὴ εἴπῃς ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται, ἐάν
C τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἕξει ὅ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτω καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται· εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς· εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.

CAP. LXXVII. *ΚΑΛ. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἂν ἓν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου! ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὁντινοῦν ἄν, ὅ τι τύχοι, τοῦτο πάθεῖν. τόδε μέν-* D *τοι εὖ οἶδ', ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὧν σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς με ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον, εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἴπω, διότι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος,* E *ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἡδι-* E *στον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἕξω ὅ τι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος, ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγορουῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων, ὅτι Ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει, τέμνων τε καὶ κάων καὶ ἰσχναίνων* 522 *καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ*

ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ εὐώχουν ὑμᾶς. τί ἂν οἴει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα τὸν ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἶποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι Ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ὦ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς, ὁπόσον οἴει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα; ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως οἴεσθαί γε χρή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐ-
B τὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅ τι χρὴ εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

Cap. LXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδ' ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελείας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαίως
C πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν, ὥστε ἴσως, ὅ τι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι. ΚΑΛ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὑτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώ-
D πους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυ-

νοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτῴην ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα, ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἴδοις ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνα- E
τον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνανδρός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τἄλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

Cap. LXXIX. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δή, φασί, μάλα 523
καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπι- B
όντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες, ᾗ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν. κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὅ τε οὖν Πλούτων

καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες
C ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῷέν σφιν ἀνθρωποι ἑκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς, Ἀλλ' ἐγώ, ἔφη, παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες, ὡς δικαίως
D βεβιώκασιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὑτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, παυστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ προῖσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ
E αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς υἱεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω
524 τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν. οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικά-

σουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνῳ δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω, ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορῇτόν τι τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ᾖ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Cap. LXXX. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τού- B
των τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. Ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν. ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἆρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἧττον ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα C
φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας· καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχὺς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον. κατεαγότα τε εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταὐτὰ D
ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον.

ταὐτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ
E ἄνθρωπος. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστι-
525γωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἑκάστῳ ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν. ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἷ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη. Cap. LXXXI. Προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ
B ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵν' ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι, οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ

ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἳ δ' ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. ὧν ἐγὼ φημι ἕνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾖ. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν. Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκε μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι 526 οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ

πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ
B ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἑλλόγιμος γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου. οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν. Cap. LXXXII. Ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὔθ' ὅστις οὔθ' ὁντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός
C τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε ἰάσιμος ἐάν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς
D μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός. ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει. ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται μόνος, ἔχων χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὁμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν

χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ, ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν. χαίρειν οὖν

ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καί, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω, ἀποθνήσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾖ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν, ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσει καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως, καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.

Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ

τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

Cap. LXXXIII. Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. καὶ ἔασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου
D καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαῤῥῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾖς καλὸς κἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν. κἄπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἄν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλεύεσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντας, οἷς
E οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας! ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἑπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ, ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.

NOTES.

NOTES.

N. B. The references follow the marginal pages and letters of the text, which are those of the Paris edition of 1578, edited by H. Stephanus. Mt. stands for Matthiæ's Grammar, second edition; K., for Kühner's Middle Grammar, translated by Edwards and Taylor; Cr., for Crosby's, second edition; and Soph., for that of Sophocles, quoted according to the original sections: — in the new edition (1847) the earlier and present sections are collated at the beginning.

447 A. οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν, *so to take part in;* i. e. in the present instance, *to take no part in at all.* Callicles says, — "It were well to have such a share in a battle, as you have had in listening to Gorgias"; i. e. it were well to arrive too late for an unpleasant employment, but not for a feast such as we have had. For the selection of *war* in this proverbial phrase, comp. Phædr. 242, B, οὐ πόλεμον ἀγγέλλεις, *what you tell me is not at all disagreeable;* and so Laws, 702, D. —— τὸ λεγόμενον, *as the saying is.* Soph. § 167, N. 2. Cr. § 334. 8. The accusative may be explained by considering it as the object of the general notion of action contained in the verbs, = are we doing τὸ λεγόμενον, i. e. are we too late. —— ἐπεδείξατο. This verb in the middle, with an accus. (e. g. σοφίαν or a neuter adjective) or without, especially denotes that ostentatious display of their art, which the sophists and rhetoricians at this time were wont to make. —— τούτων refers to ἤκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν. As the verbs denote but one act, τούτου might be used equally well, and the plural is not unfrequently used in referring to a single verb. Comp. 492, C.

B. *ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι. καὶ, also,* refers to a suppressed clause. *No matter: for* if I did the harm, *I will also find the remedy.* According to Olympiod. and a Schol., the words are drawn from the Telephus of Euripides, being spoken by Achilles, who wounded that hero. —— *εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ.* The indic. implies belief that such is the view of Socrates; while in *ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ* the subjunctive expresses the wish as a mere possible contingency. —— *ἐσαῦθις, again, at another time, hereafter.* So *εἰσαῦθις ἀναβαλοῦ*, Sympos. 174, E; *εἰσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι*, Euthydem. 275, A. —— *τί δαί;* usually, where *δαὶ* is found, *δὲ* is in some MSS. as a various reading. The longer form, it is now admitted, is properly retained after *τί* and *πῶς*, where wonder or indignation is expressed. —— *οὐκοῦν . . . ὑμῖν.* Stallb., Ast, and others explain the construction by regarding *ἥκειν* as used imperatively (Soph. § 219, N. 6; Cr. § 625; K. § 306, R. 11), *ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου* being understood. I incline to regard *ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν* as the proper apodosis, which, owing to the intervention of the clause beginning with *γάρ*, deserts its own construction for that of the interposed clause. The sense is, *Well, then, whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me.* So, apparently, Heindorf. Comp. Soph. Œd. R. 227–229, where the clause *πείσεται γὰρ οὐδὲν* turns the apodosis following it, which would be naturally *γῆς ἀπίτω ἀβλαβής*, into *γῆς δ' ἄπεισιν ἀβλαβής.* —— *εὖ λέγεις*, i. e. you are very civil in inviting us to your house, and quite right in wishing to spare Gorgias further fatigue. But, etc.

C. *διαλεχθῆναι*, here, *to discourse by way of question and answer*, tacitly contrasted with an *ἐπίδειξις*, in which Gorgias would be the sole speaker. Hence, *to hold a discussion*, or *search for truth* in that way, as Socrates did. Socrates, in Xen. Mem. 4. 5. 12, defines it *κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα.* In the end, the

notion of question and answer faded away from the derivatives of this word; and that of logical reasoning, or that of the science of unchangeable, absolute truth, remained. —— *δύναμις, essence, nature.* —— *τοῦ ἀνδρὸς* pronominis fere partes agit, ut exprimi possit pronomine possessivo. Ast. *The art of the man* = his art, with perhaps something of contempt in *τοῦ ἀνδρός.* —— *τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, to ask him in person,* or *himself.* And so 481, B. *αὐτὸν* is taken with the object of *ἐρωτᾶν* not expressed.

D. *ἐρῶ,* second aor., not *ἔρον.* No present is used by the Attics. Soph. § 118, *sub voce;* K. § 166; Cr. § 298. —— *ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.* Cic. de Fin. 2, init.: "Quorum [sophistarum] e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quæstionem, id est, jubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire." This is spoken of at length by Philostr. Vit. Sophist., Procem.

448 A. *ἦ που . . . ἀποκρίνει, no doubt, then, you answer with ease, O Gorgias.* Ast translates *ῥᾳδίως, libenter,* but his power to answer, and not his willingness, is in question. —— *ἄν δέ γε βούλῃ, ἐμοῦ,* sc. *λάμβανε πεῖραν.* For *λ. πεῖραν* spoken of a person, comp. *εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πεῖραν,* Protag. 341, E, cited by Ast. —— *τί δὲ . . . ἱκανῶς; but what difference does that make, if I answer well enough for you?* To the common formula, *τί τοῦτο;* is sometimes added *διαφέρει,* which Stallb. here supplies. But *τί* can well be a nominative. *τί τοῦτο; what is that?* i. e. what of that?

B. *Ἡρόδικος,* a brother of Gorgias, of whom we know nothing besides his name and calling. He is not to be confounded, as the Scholiast well observes, with another man often mentioned by Plato, Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace, and originally of Megara; who first taught gymnastics, but on the failure of his health gave himself up to the attempt to recover it; and was among the earliest to

cure diseases by exercise. —— *τίνα ἄν ... ὠνομάζομεν.* The predicate-accusative with *καλεῖν, ὀνομάζειν,* may be *τίνα,* referring to any one by name or by some appellation taken from his art, business, etc.; or *τί,* which is neuter on account of *ὄνομα.* Here in *τίνα ἄν ... οὐχ ὅπερ* both forms occur together. —— *ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ.* Polygnotus of Thasos, the most celebrated of this family of painters. He painted upon the wall of the Stoa Pœcile at Athens gratuitously, and at Delphi. Of his pictures from epic subjects in a hall near the Delphian temple, Pausanias gives a minute account (10. 25. seq.), which has enabled two artists of the present day to reproduce his designs in the spirit of ancient art.

C. *νῦν δ' ἐπειδή.* In this sentence, both the main clause and that which furnishes the reason are interrogative, a usage which would be awkward in English, but is lively and favorable to brevity. A little below, 451, A, we have the interrogative included between the article and participle (*ἡ περὶ τί ... ἔχουσα*), as it often is found within a relative sentence. Comp. Cr. § 539. 2. —— *ὦ Χαιρεφῶν.* The words which follow are plainly not in the style of conversation. The juxtaposition of words from the same root (*ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως, ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, ἀρίστων ἄριστοι*), *αἰῶνα* for *βίον,* and the antithetical form of the clauses all show, that either the style of Polus is imitated by Plato, or that words from a treatise of his are here put into his mouth. They are quoted as his by Syrianus on Hermogenes. (4. 44. Walz.) See 462, B.

D. *σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστίν.* Soph. § 196, N. 2; Cr. § 408; K. 284. 10. c. —— *δῆλος γὰρ ... διαλέγεσθαι, for it is plain to me, even from what he has said, that Polus has studied the art of rhetoric, so called, rather than how to discourse* (logically) *by way of question and answer.* *δῆλος,* etc., for *δῆλόν ἐστι, ὅτι Πῶλος,* by attraction, as it is sometimes called. The

tendency to give prominence to the main word — here the subject — of the second clause caused it to be pushed forward into the leading clause. This made that clause personal instead of impersonal, and bound the two clauses together more closely.

E. *ἐρωτᾷ.* So all the MSS., but the editors give *ἠρώτα,** on account of *ποία τις εἴη.* But this is unnecessary, for the present may be rhetorically for the imperfect, or may include it. Nobody asks you = nobody asked you or now asks you. Comp. Xen. Anab. 1. 1. 3, *διαβάλλει . . . ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοι,* for *διέβαλλε.* In this sentence, *ποῖος* and *τίς,* which belong to direct inquiry, are found in company with *ὅστις,* by which indirect questions are introduced. Comp. *ποῖα* and *ὁποῖα* together, 500, A. Comp. also *οἷαν* for *ὁποίαν,* 450, C, *ὅσα* for *ὁπόσα,* 451, B, and other passages. —— *ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν.* For the asyndeton, comp. 450, B, note. For *τὰ ἔμπροσθεν,* comp. Soph. § 141, N. 1; Cr. § 478, *α.* The second clause begins at *καὶ νῦν οὕτως.*

449 A. *ὑποτείνεσθαι,* est *quæstionem ita proponere ut alteri subjicias quid respondendem sit,* et in universo *proponere quæstionem.* Ast. —— *ὡς τίνος . . . τέχνης.* Another form of compound interrogation, when one clause has the participial structure (*ἐπιστήμανα,* sc. *ὄντα*). —— *ἀγαθόν γε,* not *bene moratum,* as Routh translates it, but plainly *egregium certe.* —— *ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος.* Il. 6. 211, and elsewhere.

B. *οὐκοῦν.* See Preface. —— *ἄλλοθι.* See Introd. pp. xiii., xiv. —— *ἀλλ' ὅπερ,* etc., *but be not false to the promise you make.* Socrates takes for granted that he consents. Hence *ὅπερ,* which Ast would change into *εἴπερ,* is justly defended by Stallb. —— *εἰσὶ . . . ποιεῖσθαι,* = *ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἐνίας* (Heind.), or *ἐν ἐνίαις ποιεῖσθαι.* See 448, D. *In some of the answers it is necessary to discourse at length.*

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* Stallb. has *ἐρωτᾷ* in his second edition.

C, D. *ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων* = *ὡς βραχύτατα*, or *ὡς οἷόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων*, just below. — With this boast of Gorgias, comp. the ironical passages in Protag. 329, B, 334, D. The latter runs thus: — "O Protagoras, I happen to be an oblivious sort of person, and if I have a long speech made to me, I forget what is the topic of discourse; therefore, as, in case I were somewhat deaf, you would think that you ought to talk in a louder tone with me than with others, to carry on a conversation with me; so, seeing I am so forgetful, abridge your answers, and make them shorter, to enable me to follow you." —— *πάνυ . . . ἐπιεικῶς*, *quite sufficiently*, or *very well*.

E. *ποίους τούτους . . . ὑγιαίνοιεν; what kind of words? are they those which make known by what sort of regimen the sick can get well?* Understand *περὶ* with *ποίους τούτους;* as in 450, A, line 4. This is a condensed expression for *ποῖοί εἰσιν οὗτοι περὶ οὓς ἐστιν;* The subject of *ὑγιαίνοιεν* is attracted forwards to *δηλοῦσι* as its object. *ὡς* is *quomodo*, not *ut*, and to be taken with *διαιτώμενοι*. The two words have the same sense as *τίνι διαίτῃ*. Comp. 453, C. —— *οὐκοῦν περὶ ὥνπερ*, etc. = *οὐκοῦν ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς καὶ φρονεῖν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὥνπερ λέγειν δυνατοὺς ποιεῖ*.

B. *οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἑκάστη*. One of a number of the in- 450
stances of asyndeton which occur in this dialogue. Some are owing to earnestness of feeling (449, A, *ὥσπερ . . . ἀπεκρίνω*); some heighten the effect of contrast by bringing clauses closely together (503, E, *τοὺς ζωγράφους . . . τοὺς ἄλλους*), or making a word more emphatic (510, C); but in the greater number the second clause is added without a particle to explain the first, and, like a noun in apposition, would rather be separated than connected by a particle. Comp. K. § 325. —— *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*. This common phrase nearly always, in this work, moderates the force of some universal word, as *πᾶς*, *οὐδείς*. According to Lobeck (para-

lipom. Gram. Græc. 59), ἔπος εἰπεῖν occurs very often, εἰπεῖν ἔπος rarely. It denotes, 1. *ut ita dicam*, as here; 2. *speaking inaccurately*, the opposite of ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ. —— τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς. The sense is, *But there is no such manual operation pertaining to rhetoric, but all its activity and efficiency are exercised by means of words.* The Scholiast says, that χειρούργημα and κύρωσις are provincial words brought by Gorgias from his native town, Leontini. This is probably a mere random assertion, and unlikely in itself. But the use of these words, instead of χειρουργία and κῦρος, may be intended to show forth the artificial and elaborate style of Gorgias. Thucydides uses κύρωσις (Lib. 6. 103).

C. ἆρ' οὖν . . . καλεῖν; *Indeed, I perceive what sort of art you wish to call it.* So Ast. "Formula ἆρ' οὖν eodem modo ut οὐκ οὖν initio per interrogationem cum negatione junctam affirmat." Hermann on Soph. Antig. 628 (632). Or we need only say that ἆρα, as it often does, requires an affirmative answer. Stallb. retains the interrogative force of ἆρα, and supposes the question to require a negative answer. *Do I understand*, etc., i. e. *I do not understand.* But μανθάνω can denote a perception that is not yet clear. Prof. Crosby remarks on this passage as follows: — "Is there not a species of anacoluthon at the beginning of this chapter? 'Do I then understand what you would call it? However, I shall soon know.' He seems to me to be first intending to ask Gorgias directly, whether the idea he obtains from his answer is the true one; but then another mode of satisfying himself occurs, and he changes the discourse abruptly." —— For τῶν μὲν . . . ἔνιαι δὲ, comp. Soph. § 142, N. 3.

E. οὐχ ὅτι . . . εἶπες, *although in the expression which you make use of you so said.* οὕτως refers to the succeeding subordinate clause. οὐχ ὅτι is properly elliptical for οὐ λέγω, or οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι, and sometimes, followed by ἀλλά, means *not*

only, or *not only not*. Comp. Mt. § 624. 4. —— *δυσχεραίνειν, to be captious* in the discourse or discussion.

B. *εἴποιμ' ἄν . . . ὄντα*. Complete the sentence by *τις* 451
τῶν κύρος ἐχουσῶν, I would say that it is one of those arts that exert their power with regard to (whose efficiency consists in inquiring concerning) *the odd and even, how many there can be of each*, i. e. that it is an art, which asks *how many there are*, and whose elements are odd and even numbers. *γνῶσις* is due to a copyist, who thought the structure deficient. —— *ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, as those say who draw up written motions in the meetings of the people*, i. e. who offer amendments in the assembly. The clearest light has been thrown upon this phrase recently by Boeckh, in his Inscriptiones Græcæ, Vol. I. No. 84. The allusion is to the formula *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ*, sc. *ἔδοξεν*, which was used by those, who, in the assembly, made amendments to the decrees or *probouleumata* brought down from the council. They employed the phrase to avoid the trouble of reading over those parts of the decree which they left unaltered. *σύγγραμμα* is so used of a clause in a decree by Æschines c. Ctes. § 127 Bekker. The Scholiast, with less success, explains these words of cases where two or more bills proposed by the same person followed one another in succession. It was the custom to prefix the names of the citizen, of his father, his demus, and tribe, to his resolution. In such cases the herald, says he, to save time, would say *τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ ταὐτά, the same as before*. But this explanation is unfortunate for several obvious reasons. Still more so is Coray's, who understands *οἱ συγγραφόμενοι* of public contractors.

C. *διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον*, etc., *but it differs* (*ἡ λογιστική*) *thus much: that the art of calculating considers how the odd and the even are related to themselves* (i. e. odd to odd and even to even) *and to each other in respect to number*.

For *πῶς ἔχει πλήθους*, see Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, *β*; K. § 274. 3. This definition of *λογιστικὴ* is found again in Charmides, 166, A. Arithmetic seems in Plato's definition to be employed with number in general, and *λογιστικὴ* to be the vulgar art of reckoning, in which numbers are considered in their relations. A later distinction in the science of number was into Arithmetic, which inquired *περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καθ' ἑαυτό*, and Music *περὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἄλλο*, i. e. concerning the relations of numbers. Sometimes, as here, the former term included the whole science of number, but was used *ἰδιαίτερον περὶ τοῦ τοσοῦ καθ' αὑτό*, more especially of numbers in themselves considered.

D. The second *τί* is added by Stallbaum from a conjecture of Heindorf, and seems necessary to the text. The stars denote insertion. —— *ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις.* See Eurip. Alcest. 106, and p. 452, E, *τί . . . τοῦτο λέγεις*; also Cr. § 528.

E. *τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν.* This scolium, or *table-song*, is ascribed by the Scholiast to Simonides or to Epicharmus. It is often quoted, as by Athenæus at the end of his work. Comp. a fine passage, Laws 1. 631. The whole song is, —

> " *ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,*
> *δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φυὰν γενέσθαι,*
> *τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,*
> *καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.*"

Plato does not allude to the last line, because no trade or employment is concerned with it.

452 A. *ἰατρός τε . . . χρηματιστής.* They are named in the order suggested by the scolium. Heindorf wished to read *ὁ ἰατρός τε*, but Buttmann observes (the remark does not appear in the second ed. of Heind.), that the article so used would denote that one person had all the attributes mentioned: *ὅ τε ἰατρὸς καὶ χρηματιστής*, on the contrary, would

sufficiently discriminate the persons; or, in ambiguous cases, ὅ τε ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁ χρηματιστής. —— εἴποι ... ὅτι ... ἐξαπατᾷ. For oratio recta after ὅτι, comp. Cr. § 609, α.

B. θαυμάζοιμί γ' ἄν ... εἴ σοι ἔχει. The reason, according to Stallb., why there is here an indic. in the protasis with an opt. in the apodosis is, that what the pædotribe says, "interlocutoris mentem potius quam suam ipsius opinionem respiciat." As, however, ἔχει ἐπιδεῖξαι is, in *his own opinion*, only a possibility, he says θαυμάζοιμι ἄν. But perhaps θαυμάζοιμι ἄν may be considered the optative of politeness, which expresses, under the form of a possibility, something real and absolute. Comp. Kühner's largest Gr. § 817. 6. —— τέχνης depends on ἀγαθόν, *good* pertaining to his art.

C. πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἁπάντων is added in satire, to show the higher pretensions of the meanest of the three employments. Gorgias and the sophists held philosophy in like contempt, compared with the arts of show. One of the comic poets, Anaxandrides (Athenæus, 694, F), proposes to comply with these high claims so far as to change the place of the second and third lines of the scolium. He says, "when the author of it named making money as the third best thing," —

> "τοῦθ', ὁρᾷς, ἐμαίνετο,
> μετὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν γὰρ τὸ πλουτεῖν διαφέρει·
> καλὸς δὲ πεινῶν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν θηρίον."

—— καὶ μὴν ... ὅδε, *and yet you see Gorgias here maintains on the contrary.*

D. καὶ σὲ ... αὐτοῦ. There is here a change not unknown to our language from the relative to the demonstrative construction. —— αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, i. e. the cause why the men themselves who are possessed of the art are free. αὐτοῖς is used on account of the contrast with others whom they govern. There is here a certain rhetorical col-

oring, which may be intended as an imitation of the style of Gorgias.

E. *τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι, I certainly* pronounce it, or *mean by it the being able to persuade,* etc. —— *ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ,* facile intelligas *τοὺς συλλεγέντας.* Stallb. —— *ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει,* i. e. when *in* or *invested with* this power. —— *ἀλλὰ σοὶ* is added as if *ἄλλῳ* had not gone before. Comp. 521, D, *οὐ πρὸς χάριν . . . ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον.*

453 A. *τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ,* i. e. its sum and substance, its essential quality ends in this or tends to this as its result, *τοῦτο* referring to *πειθοῦς. τελευτᾶν,* meaning *to end,* takes the preposition *εἰς* and adverbs of motion to a place after it, as including the previous motion, together with the end itself; = *to come to an end.* So *ἄρχειν, to begin,* is joined with *ἀπὸ, ἐκ,* and adverbs of motion from a place, = *to start.* —— *ἢ ἔχεις . . . δύνασθαι.* Here *τι* seems to be taken with *δύνασθαι,* and *ἐπὶ πλέον* is *to a greater extent, plus.* Comp. *ταῦτα ἐπὶ πλέον εἰπεῖν,* Laws 697, C; *ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται,* Politicus 305, B. So also *ἔπ' ἔλαττον, ἐπὶ πολὺ, ἐπὶ σμικρὸν* (Soph. Electr. 414), are used.

B. *ἐγὼ γάρ . . . τούτων ἕνα, be assured that I, as I flatter myself, — if any other person engages in conversation with another, because he wishes to know the very nature of that about which the discourse is held, that I also, I say, — am a person of that description.* It is often the case, as here, that an infinitive and its subject are introduced after *ὅτι.* This happens, for the most part, when a clause intervening between *ὅτι* and the infinitive renders the change from the grammatical construction to its equivalent one less obvious. But here there is an anacoluthon also. Owing to the change just mentioned, *ἐγὼ* is left by itself, and *ἐμὲ* takes its place. —— *ἐγὼ . . . οὐκ οἶδα.* Here notice the emphatic position of *ἐγώ,* the attraction of *τὴν . . . πειθὼ* to the main

sentence, in which οἶδα is, and the interposition of εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι between the adverb and the verb.

C. οὐ σοῦ ἕνεκα . . . λέγεται, *not on your account* (to draw any thing further from you), *but on account of the discussion, that it may go on in the way in which it can make the subject discussed most clear to us.* Some authorities have ποιῇ, which arose from not perceiving that ὡς here is *quomodo*, and not *ut*. See 449, E. —— ὥσπερ ἄν. ἄν belongs to ἠρόμην, and is repeated on account of its distance from the verb, occasioned by the conditional clause. Comp. 447, D. —— Ζεῦξις. As this great painter painted for Archelaus, king of Macedon, who died in the same year with Socrates, there is here no anachronism, and Pliny's date for his entrance on his art (Olymp. 95. 4, after the death of Socrates), must be incorrect. —— καὶ ποῦ. These words have given no little trouble to the interpreters, because *the place where* a painter's works are, which is their natural meaning, has nothing to do with the definition of his art. Ast's explanation of ποῦ as meaning *where, in what thing, in regard to what* (i. e. what animals and what properties of them, etc.), and Cousin's, *where, on what*, as canvas or stone, are hardly deserving of mention. Others suppose the text corrupt. Heind. conjectures πόσου, *for how much*, and Coray, τοῦ, *whose son*. But how the compensation or the father of Zeuxis had any thing more to do with the definition of his art than the place where he painted, they do not inform us. Stallb., after Routh, would read πῶς, which makes good sense, though it departs too much from the letters of the actual text. I conjecture (that I likewise may contribute my mite) that the sentence originally ended at γράφων; which, indeed, may be argued from the fact, that Plato afterwards only alludes to τὰ ζῶα. To this τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων, and ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα point; and no other definition of the art of Zeuxis is hinted at. Next to γράφων

came ἦ οὔ, ΗΟΥ, which was corrupted into ΠΟΥ; and then καὶ was added to bring ποῦ into grammatical connection with the sentence. For the confusion of *H* and *Π* in the MSS., Bast's Epist. Palæograph. in Schæfer's Gregory Corinth., p. 716, may be consulted. A similar corruption of ἦ οὖ into που, in Repub. 437, D, is removed in modern editions.

D. καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο; *would your answer have been a good one?* This verb, like several other deponents, is used both actively and passively, — a usage almost confined to the perfect, pluperfect, and aorist. Comp. Soph. § 208, N. 2; K. § 252; Cr. § 564. —— οὐ δῆτα denies the latter part of the alternative, οὐ πείθει.

454 A. τὸν λέγοντα, *him who makes this assertion*, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion.

B, C. ταύτης ... τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, sc. τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην εἶναι. —— ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, etc. The form of this sentence changes a little as it proceeds. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω is written as if μὴ θαύμαζε had gone before. The proper apodosis of ἵνα ... θαυμάζῃς is τοῦ ἐξῆς ... ἐρωτῶ, but the connection is broken up by γὰρ in ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω. The sense of ὅπερ ... λέγω is, *for as I say* (i. e. as I was just saying, 453, C), *I put the inquiry that the discourse may be finished in due order, — not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of too soon catching up each other's words on mere suspicion* (of what they mean, and without giving one another time for explanation). With προαρπάζειν ... τὰ λεγόμενα, comp. Herodot. 9. 91, ὁ δὲ ὑπαρπάσας τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λόγον.

E. βούλει ... θῶμεν like *visne videamus, volo hoc contingat.* Soph. § 219. 3, last ed.; Cr. § 611. 3; K. § 259. 1. 6.

455 A. πιστευτικῆς, *productive of belief.* —— διδασκαλικῆς, *able to impart instruction or knowledge*, i. e. knowledge founded upon absolute, unchangeable principles. —— ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς

μόνον, able to cause belief and nothing more (aiming at conviction, and not at truth). This word has been altered into *πειστικὸς* by Stephens, Heindorf, Coray, and Buttmann; and some MSS. favor the change. Bekker, Stallb., and Ast, with reason, retain *πιστικός*. For, as is shown by Ast at great length, *πειστικὸς* denotes (*having relation to, having to do with*, i. e.) *able to produce πειθώ*, and is the more general word, and not necessarily opposed to *διδασκαλικός*; while *πιστικὸς* means *able to produce πίστιν*, which has just been contrasted with *ἐπιστήμην* (454, D). Again, as to the form of the word, — which, according to Buttmann, cannot analogically be derived from *πίστις*, — Ast observes that adjectives in *-ικός* are freely derived, not only from verbals, but also from nouns (*ἀρχή, ἀρχικός*), adjectives (*φίλος, φιλικός*), and imaginary forms (*νουθετικὸς* from *νουθέτης*). What objection, then, is there to regarding *πιστός*, or *πίστις* (comp. *φύσις, φυσικός, φθίσις, φθισικός*), as the source of *πιστικός*? However derived, such words may take a genitive. But here there is no necessity of supplying a genitive with *πιστικός*.

B. *ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν.* The force of *καὶ* in such a case, before a verb, seems to me to correspond with that of *even*. *Let us see what we are even saying*, where an emphasis is thrown on the verb; = *what we can mean*. A few MSS. have *λέγωμεν*, which gives the inapposite sense of *let us see what we shall say*. —— *περὶ ἰατρῶν αἱρέσεως.* "The ancient states maintained public physicians at a salary; and Hippocrates is said to have been so employed at Athens. Such physicians had assistants, especially slaves, who practised among the poorer sort of people. The famous Democedes of Croton, about Olymp. 60, although as yet little money was in circulation, received the large salary of thirty-six Æginetic minæ or an Attic talent of silver ($ 1,017). When he was called to Athens, he received one hundred minæ

($ 1,692), until Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, engaged his services for two talents ($ 2,034)." Boeckh's Civil Econ. of Athens, I. § 21. —— *ἄλλο τι ἢ* (literally, *is there any thing else than, is it not true*) is a very common formula in Plato, meaning no more than *nonne*. Very often *ἄλλο τι*, without *ἤ*, is found in the same sense at the beginning of a sentence; and Bekker always prefers it to *ἄλλο τι ἤ*. According to Hermann on Viger, note 110, when the latter is used, the interrogation extends to the end of the sentence; but when *ἄλλο τι*, it stops with those words. —— *αἱρεῖσθαι* is in the middle. —— After *ἤ νεωρίων*, supply *συμβουλεύσει ὁ ῥητορικός*. And, just below, a similar clause, which is to be supplied in thought before *ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοί*, is afterwards in part expressed. —— A passage precisely like this occurs in Protag. 319, B.

C. *τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν, tuis rebus studere.* See 458, B, note. —— *τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς. τινὲς* includes many and few, as the more generic word (Wyttenbach on Phædo, p. 116), and therefore *πολλοί, ὀλίγοι*, and similar words, often follow to define it. Here *καί*, on account of the position of *σχεδόν*, seems to me not to be *and*, but *even*. The sense is, *some, almost even many*, i. e. *some, indeed even quite a number.*

D. *αὐτὸς . . . καλῶς ὑφηγήσω*, for *you yourself have admirably led* the way, i. e. in speaking about the docks, etc., just now you suggested a good answer.

E. *τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους. τὰ δὲ* is used as if *τὰ μὲν* had preceded: *and partly through that of Pericles.* —— *ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν, through the advice of the artificers.* Heind. and Buttmann wish to read *τῆς δημιουργῶν*. But there is no need of this, because a man effects what his advice effects; and such brevity is common in Greek. Thus, in Alcibiad. I. 135, E, cited by Ast, we have *πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν διοίσει, my love then will not differ*

from a stork, i. e. from a stork's love; and in Repub. 375, A, we have *οἴει τι διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν* (in respect to keeping guard) *νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς;* Comp. Soph. § 186, N. 1. —— *τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.* According to Colonel Leake (Topography of Athens, 354–357), this expression denotes *both the long walls*, which, as he supposes, reached from Athens to Piræeus and Port Phalerum; so named as being between the city and the seaports, and also called *τεῖχος* in the singular, as forming a sort of fortification. Plutarch (Vita Pericl. § 13), alluding to this passage, interprets the words — perhaps carelessly — by *τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος*, and thus sanctions Leake's view. But Harpocration, s. v. *διὰ μέσου τείχους*, explains the phrase of the *southern* of the two long walls, so styled as being *between* the northern and the Phaleric wall; and this southern wall it is, says he, which Plato mentions in Gorgias. This is so confirmed by Thucyd. 2. 13, — who speaks of a Phaleric wall reaching to the city, and also of the long walls reaching, both of them, from the city to Piræeus, the outer or northern one of which was guarded, — that it is not easy to see how the opinion of Leake can stand. See the commentators on Thucyd. l. c., especially Dr. Arnold. Now this inner or southern leg of the long walls, *τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος τὸ νότιον* (Æschin. de Fals. Leg. § 174, Bekker), was built after the thirty years' peace with Sparta, i. e. after B. C. 445, when Pericles began to be at the head of affairs, and when Socrates was over twenty years old.

A. *οἳ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας*, Soph. § 164, N. 2; K. § 278. 456
2; Cr. § 433. —— *πάλαι ἐρωτῶ.* *πάλαι* is very often found with the present of an action begun in the past and still continued. —— Join *τὸ μέγεθος* with *δαιμονία*, as the accus. of specification. —— *εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης.* The apodosis must be something like *δαιμονία ἂν καταφαίνοιτο*, which is pointed at by *γε*.

B. *μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ.* See 448, B. —— *ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι*, etc., *to put himself into the physician's hands, to be cut or cauterized.* A heated iron was applied to the wound for the purpose of stanching blood by the *ἰατρός*, who, as Routh observes, exercised both the medical and the surgical arts. *παφασχεῖν*, sc. *ἑαυτόν*; comp. 475, D. For *τεμεῖν, καῦσαι*, see Soph. § 219. 2; Cr. § 621. *β*. An infinitive so used, if it have the direct object of the leading verb for its subject, is in the passive, but otherwise in the active.

C. *οὐδαμοῦ . . . φανῆναι, would be of no account.* Comp. Soph. Antig. 183, *τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω*; Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 52, *μηδαμοῦ εἶναι, to be nowhere*, in no estimation. —— *εἰ βούλοιτο* is elegantly added, says Stallb., to denote the arrogance and pretension of Gorgias, = if he chose to give himself the trouble.

D. *ἔμαθε*, sc. *τις*. Soph. § 157, N. 8; K. § 238, R. 3; Cr. § 546. This omission of the indefinite subject *τὶς* is common in this dialogue, as is also the transition from a singular verb to a plural, or the contrary, where the subject is an indefinite one. —— *ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι* dicuntur qui veris armis certare discunt. Nam vulgo juventus non veris armis se exercebat sed rudibus, aut pilis præpilatis, quæ dicuntur Græcis *ἐσφαιρωμένα ἀκόντια* [i. e. with a ball covering the point]. Quæ sunt verba Casauboni ad Theophrast. Charact. p. 79, ed. Fischer. Stallb.

E. *ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ*, etc., *for they intrusted* (them to their scholars) *for the purpose of using them aright against their foes, and those who wrong them, in defending themselves, not in beginning an assault.* *τούτοις* refers to the means of defence used in the arts just named. The subject of *χρῆσθαι* is to be gathered from the context, viz. such persons as learn to box, and beat their friends. The forms of *ὑπάρχειν*, and those of *ἀμύνομαι*, are often contrasted, in the senses of acting on the *offensive* and *defensive*. —— *μετα-*

στρέψαντες, turning round, i. e. *on the contrary*. Comp. μεταβαλών, 480, E.

A. ἐμβραχύ, *in short*, is taken with περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται, 457 to show that that phrase comprises all that can be said, or is used in its widest sense. Its force is like that of *omnino*.

B. καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ . . . ὥσπερ καί. For καί, in each member of the sentence, comp. the note on Electr. 1301, where it is said that καὶ often stands after words of comparison to show connection, without any force that can be given in English. See also 458, A, at the beginning. —— κἄτα. Post participia, καὶ εἶτα, καὶ ἔπειτα inferuntur, ubi εἶτα et ἔπειτα expectes. Stallb. A frequent idiom.

C. δύνανται, sc. οἱ λέγοντες, implied in τῶν λόγων; or, more exactly, the subject is indefinite, and plural, because the action of conversing requires more than one. —— οὕτω repeats and recalls the participles. Join διαλύεσθαι to δύνανται.

D. μὴ σαφῶς, i. e. μὴ φῇ (deny) τὸν ἕτερον σαφῶς λέγειν. —— καὶ κατὰ φθόνον, etc., *and they think that they are* (i. e. each thinks that the other is) *speaking out of envy*, or with ill feelings *towards each other, having a contentious spirit, and not seeking after that which was proposed in the discussion*. For ἑαυτῶν = ἀλλήλων, Soph. § 145, N. 2; K. § 302. 7; Cr. § 507. 7. —— τελευτῶντες, Cr. § 457. α; K. § 312, R. 3. —— οἷα καὶ, etc., *so that even the by-standers feel vexed for themselves, because they consented to be listeners to such people*. The infinitive follows οἷα here, as it so often does ὥστε.

E. διελέγχειν, *to go on*, or *through with a refutation of*. διὰ has the same force in διερωτῴην below. In the next words, the sense is, *Lest you should suppose that I speak with my zeal for debate not directed towards the subject, that it may become plain, but against you*. For τοῦ γενέσθαι, comp. Soph. § 187. 1; K. § 308. 2. (*b*); Cr. § 372.

With genitives in this relation of the motive, ἕνεκα is often found.

458 A. τῶν ἡδέως . . . ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων = τούτων οἳ ἡδέως ἂν ἐλεγχθεῖεν. K. § 260. 2. (5); Cr. § 615. 2. Comp. Euthyphro 3, D, where Socrates says, that he converses, not only without taking pay for it, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως, sc. μισθόν, but even *with a willingness to give pay*, if any one is disposed to hear him. Here προστιθεὶς without ἄν would mean, that he *actually paid* his listeners. —— Just below, for εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, we should expect εἴ τι . . . λέγοιεν, or, with the transition to the first person, λέγοιμι, parallel to the succeeding λέγοι. The reason for using λέγω seems to be that given by Stallb., which Ast opposes: that Socrates, in speaking of himself, denotes the *probability* of *his* being in an error by εἰ with an indicative; but only the *possibility* of error on the part of *another* by εἰ and an optative. —— αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι. Comp. for αὐτὸν emphatic (the word with which it agrees being omitted), 447, C, οὐδὲν οἷον αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.

B. ὅσον δόξα ψευδής. Græci in hujusmodi comparationibus modo casus præcedenti nomini accommodant, modo nominativum ponunt, intellecto verbo superiore. Stallb. Comp. Repub. 334, B, τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, where τὴν δικαιοσύνην would have been more common. See Cr. § 655. 4. —— τὸ τῶν παρόντων, *the interests* or *feelings of the present company*. And so τὸ τούτων, just below; τὸ σὸν σπεύδουσ' ἅμα, καὶ τοὐμὸν αὐτῆς, Soph. Electr. 251. Such formulæ are sometimes little more than circumlocutions for the pronoun. Comp. τό γ' ἐμόν, 458, D. —— The Schol. thinks that Gorgias is here finding an excuse to break off. But probably nothing more than polite attention to the wishes of the auditors is intended. Gorgias is uniformly polite to Socrates, and willing to continue the discourse. Comp. 497, B, 506, A.

C. *πόῤῥω ἀποτενοῦμεν, we shall extend too far, be too prolix.* The verb is here used without an object, or, if any thing is understood, it is *ἡμᾶς αὐτούς*, rather than *τὸν λόγον.* —— *ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν*, etc., *and as for that (οὖν), may I myself also never have so much business, that leaving a conversation such as this, and so carried on* (i. e. on a subject of such importance, and so interesting), *it may be of more importance for me to do any thing else.*

D. *τὸ ἐμὸν* is the subject of *κωλύει.* —— *τὸ λοιπόν, after this*, i. e. since all the others wish that the debate should continue. —— *καὶ ταῦτα*, etc., *and that too* (i. e. and especially) *when I myself announced, that whatever questions any one wishes to put he may do so.*

A. *ἔλεγές τοι νῦν δή, you were saying certainly just now.* 459
I have written *τοι νῦν δὴ* for *τοίνυν δή*, at Bekker's suggestion, on account of the sense. —— *τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτο, this expression ἐν ὄχλῳ.* This is the subject of *ἐστιν*, and the remaining words the predicate. —— *ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν.* Compare the negative *μὴ* here, and in *ὁ μὴ ἰατρός*, with *οὐ* in *ὁ οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐν τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσιν*, just below. In the first two cases, the negation is general and indefinite: "before such as do not know, whoever they are," "he who is no physician, supposing such a person to exist." In the other two cases, the negation being made concerning something definite and particular (the orator and the crowd), *οὐ* is properly used.

B. *ἐνταῦθα*, i. e. in the case of the art of medicine.

C. *ῥᾳστώνη, saving of trouble, convenience.* —— *ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ᾖ, if it come at all within the scope of our discourse. πρός*, (literally,) on the side of, in favor of, to the advantage of.

D. *οὕτως ἔχων.* This clause is afterwards defined by *αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς.*

A. *ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες.* See 455, D. —— *οἶμαι* is paren- 460

thetical: hence *μαθήσεται* follows, and not *μαθήσεσθαι*. —— *ἔχε δή*, as Ast says, is a formula of exhorting, like *ἄγε δή*; as Heindorf, a "formula subsistendi et inhibendi," = *ἔχε σεαυτόν*; as Stallb., after Hermann, one of admonishing another to remember something, and perceive its results, = *ἔχε τοῦτο*. Its use, here, at least, consists in drawing attention, in causing one to *stop* and consider something, especially some objection derived from what had been said.

B. *τἆλλα οὕτω*, sc. *ἔχει*. —— *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, after the same form of speech, after the same analogy.* The next words, being explicative of this clause, are without a connecting particle.

C. The words here inclosed in brackets are so injurious to the sense, that there can be little doubt, I think, of their being interpolations. The reasoning is this: He who has learned justice is just. The just does justly. Therefore he wills or prefers to do justly. Therefore he never will prefer to do unjustly. The orator, if taught justice by Gorgias, is just, and therefore will never will or prefer to do unjustly. For this passage, consult the Introduction. —— *ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, from what has been said; as follows from the argument.* These words show that Socrates begins here to apply what has been conceded to the case of the rhetorician, which is proof that the words in brackets are indefensible.

D. *ἐκβάλλειν*, sc. *αὐτούς*, and so with *ἐξελαύνειν*, just below. When the same noun follows two verbs, or a participle and a verb, in different cases, the Greeks content themselves usually with expressing it once. Comp. Mt. §. 428. 2. —— *ὡσαύτως οὕτω, in the selfsame way.* These adverbs answer, as Coray observes, to *ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος*.

E. *φαίνεται . . . οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας, appears incapable of ever doing injustice,* = *φαίνεται ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσειε*. F. A. Wolf, on Demosth. c. Leptin. (p. 468, ed. Reiske),

lays down the rule, that φαίνομαι with an infin. = *videor*, but with a particip. *palam sum.* —— ὃ γ' . . . ποιεῖται, *since it* is always discoursing. For the use of the relative, comp. note on 488, D. Here ὅ, which refers to ἡ ῥητορική, is put in the gender of the predicate πρᾶγμα, by attraction. Comp. 463, E.

A. εἶπον . . . ὅτι . . . ἄξιον εἴη. Here ἄν is not used, be- 461
cause the sense is, *I said that it was worth while.* With ἄν the sense would be, *I said that it would be worth while.* The first is a direct assertion, in *oratio obliqua;* the second a hypothetical one, in the same form. And so just above, 460, E, ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ . . . εἴη, *that rhetoric was,* but ὑπέλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἄν εἴη, *that it never could be.*

B. μὰ τὸν κύνα. A very common oath in the mouth of Socrates, concerning which much has been written. In 482, B, we have μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, i. e. "latrator Anubis," which is either a comic addition to the original formula, μὰ τὸν κύνα, or else shows the oath to be of Egyptian origin. Mr. Mitchell (Aristoph. Wasps, Appendix, Note D) is of the latter opinion. We refer those who wish to pursue this point further to the Commentt. and the Scholl. on that play, v. 83, Solanus on Lucian's Vit. Auct. (Vol. III. p. 520, ed. Lehm.), and Coray on this place. The ancients thought that such oaths were introduced by Rhadamanthus, to avoid swearing by a divinity on a common occasion. Zeno, the Stoic, in imitation of Socrates, swore by the caper-bush. —— οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας, *haud exigui est sermonis.* —— καὶ . . . δοξάζεις. According to Ast, καὶ affects δοξάζεις, being a little out of its place. Do you *even* or *really* think? —— ἢ οἴει . . . ἐρωτήματα. A passage of considerable difficulty, which seems to be best explained by regarding the sentence, with Schleierm., as a broken one; which is indicated in this edition by a dash after διδάξειν. Polus is so eager, that he cannot end his

sentence grammatically, but must make a rhetorical exhibition of his feelings. The sense is, *Or do you think, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit, both that the orator must understand the just, beautiful, and good; and that he himself would give instruction in these subjects, if one should come to him* (to study oratory) *ignorant of them; — then, perhaps, from this admission, an inconsistency arose in the discussion, to wit* (δῆ) *the very thing which you take satisfaction in, though you yourself led the way to such questions* (i. e. though you alone, by your artful questions, are to blame for the inconsistency). For the first sentence, Schleierm. supplies a close from τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, as if Polus had at first meant to say, "or do you think, because Gorgias," etc. . . . "to find your pleasure therein." But perhaps some other close of more emphasis may be gathered from the context, such as, ("do you think, because Gorgias, through shame, made certain admissions,) *that therefore his inconsistency is to be charged to rhetoric.*" The other attempts to explain this sentence which I have seen are, — 1. Ast's, who gives to οἴει the sense of νομίζεις, and supplies οὕτω. *Or do you think so because*, etc. 2. Stallb., in his first ed., translates thus: *an putas Gorgiam præ pudore negasse*, etc. But this perverts the sense. Comp. 482, C, D, where the passage is alluded to and in part explained. He also ends the sentence beginning with ἢ οἴει at ἔπειτα, — a strange and flat close to the period. 3. In his second edition, where he blames Ast for his "mira commenta," deserting his former view, he continues the sense in an unbroken period, and treats οἴει as though it did not affect the structure. The sense then becomes, *because Gorgias was ashamed to deny*, etc. . . . *did therefore, do you suppose, from this admission an inconsistency arise*, etc.? But an inconsistency did arise, for the very reason contained in the words ὅτι Γοργίας, etc. This is evident from

482, D. The words of Polus then become unmeaning. —— *μὴ προσομολογῆσαι . . . μὴ οὐχί. μὴ οὐ* sometimes, as here, follows a simply negative expression, = *quin* before a subjunctive. But more usually it follows a verb of negative import, when *οὐ* precedes such a verb. Thus *ἀπαρνοῦμαι μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, I deny that I know*, but *οὐκ ἀπαρνοῦμαι μὴ οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι, I do not deny that I know.* An analogous formula to this latter is found just below, 461, C, — *τίνα οἴει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι,* — where the interrog. implies a negative.

D. *ἐπανορθοῖτε.* Most of the MSS. have the opt. here in lieu of the subj. after a present in the principal clause. The reasons given for the opt. in the present case by Stallb. and Ast are scarcely sufficient. —— *δίκαιος δ' εἶ, and it is right for you so to do.* For *δίκαιος*, see Mt. § 297; K. § 307, R. 6; Cr. § 551. It is for *δίκαιόν ἐστί σε*, etc., owing to the cause explained in the note on 448, D. —— *ἀναθέσθαι, to retract*, properly, to put a piece over again, to change a move in playing draughts. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 2. 4. 4. Cicero, in a frag. of his Hortensius, says, — "Itaque tibi concedo, quod in duodecim scriptis solemus, ut calculum reducas, si te alicujus dicti pœnitet," borrowing his figure perhaps from Plato. The subject of *ἀναθέσθαι* Ast takes to be *σε* understood. "Quod fieri non posse manifestum est," says Stallb. But such cases are possible, and we believe Ast to be right. Here, *σοι δοκεῖ*, just before, and *ὅ τι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ*, just after, almost forbid us to supply *με*. A stronger case occurs Theætet. 151, C: "For many feel so towards me, as positively to be ready to bite me, when I strip them of some folly of theirs," — *καὶ οὐκ οἴονται εὐνοίᾳ τοῦτο ποιεῖν*, i. e. that *I* do this. (Such is the MS. reading.) —— *φυλάττῃς*, if you will only *observe* one thing. The middle, if you will *guard against*, might stand here.

E. *οὗ . . . λέγειν, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech,* Ἑλλάδος being a genitive partitive. —— *ἀντίθες, put over against it,* sc. this, viz. *σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος,* etc. For this latter passage, compare Aristoph. Acharn. 303, *σοῦ δ' ἐγὼ λόγους λέγοντος οὐκ ἀκούσομαι μακρούς.* —— *τοι, though.*

462 B. *νῦν δή, nunc igitur.* —— *ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι.* Aristotle (Metaphys. init.) refers to this treatise, or to the words of Polus of like import on 448, C, and approves of his opinion making experience the foundation of art.

C. *οὐκοῦν καλὸν . . . ἀνθρώποις; does not rhetoric, then, namely, to have the faculty of giving pleasure to men, seem to you to be a good thing?* The last clause of the sentence explains, and is in apposition with, *ἡ ῥητορική. οἷόν τ' εἶναι* = *τινα οἷόν τ' εἶναι.*

D. *βούλει οὖν,* etc., *are you willing, then, since you prize giving pleasure, to give me a little pleasure?* For the play on *χαρίζομαι* (which itself playfully alludes to *χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς,* just above), comp. 516, B. In this sentence, the present infinitive denotes the *habit* of Polus; *χαρίσασθαι,* that which Socrates wishes him to do *in this instance.*

E. *τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;* Comp. 449, E, note on *πολους τούτους.* —— *μὴ ἀγροικότερον ᾖ, I fear that it may seem too rude.* For *δέδοικα* omitted, comp. Soph. § 214, N. 4; Cr. § 602. 2. The comparative, which here denotes a lower degree of the quality than the positive, is usual in such apologies.

463 A. *δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι . . . ἀνθρώποις, it seems to me, then, to be a sort of study, that has not indeed the properties of an art, but which belongs to a mind dexterous in attaining its ends, and manly, and possessed of a natural talent to communicate with men.*

B. *ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος,* etc., *yet, as I maintain, is not an art but* experience, or *a routine and practice,* i. e. has

nothing to do with absolute truth and reason, but proceeds from accidental discovery that a certain end is gained by certain means. —— *κομμωτικὴ* differt a *κοσμητικῇ* quâ honestus ornatus quæritur. Stallb.

C. *τέτταρα . . . πράγμασιν, four divisions these* (of flattery or the art of show) *relating to four matters or subjects.* These four subjects, according to Coray and Stallb., are words, food, the ornamenting of the body, and philosophical disquisitions. —— *ἀποκεκριμένος.* Comp. 453, D, note. —— *πρὶν ἂν . . . ἀποκρίνωμαι.* With *πρὶν* "subjunctivum non usurpant tragici, nisi in priore membro adsit negandi aut prohibendi significatio." Elmsley on Medea, 215. In which case *ἄν* accompanies *πρίν*, with some exceptions almost confined to poetry, and the subjunctive aorist has the sense of the exact future of Latin; e. g. here *priusquam respondero.* For the reason why the subjunctive follows *πρίν*, see Mt. § 522, C.; K. § 337. 9. b.

D. *ἀποκρινομένου*, sc. *μου.* Comp. 461, D, note. —— *πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον, a* shadow or *semblance of a division of the political art,* "civilitatis particulæ simulacrum," as translated by Quintil. 2. 15. 25, where this passage is examined.

E. *Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε.* There is here, probably, an allusion to the meaning of the name *colt*, as Schleierm. remarks. For another pun on the name of Polus, comp. Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23: *ὡς Κόνων Θρασύβουλον "Θρασύβουλον" ἐκάλει, καὶ Ἡρόδικος* (of Selymbria, comp. 448, B, note) *Θρασύμαχον, "αἰεὶ Θρασύμαχος εἶ," καὶ Πῶλον, "αἰεὶ σὺ πῶλος εἶ," καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος.* —— In *τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦτο*, the predicate *τοῦτο* determines the gender of *ὄν* by attraction, instead of *ῥητορική*, to which it refers. Comp. 460, E.

A. *οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω, for instance I mean as follows*, lit- 464
erally, "of which sort I mention such a thing as this, viz."

This, with or without the article before *τοιόνδε*, is a common formula in Plato, when examples are adduced. —— *τὰ σώματα* is the accus. of specification.

B. *ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον*, i. e. *εὖ*. The subject of *ἔχει* is supplied by the preceding accusatives, *σῶμα* and *ψυχήν*. *But*, or, *while yet they* (soul and body) *are none the more in a good condition.* Another construction also is possible: *ὅτι ποιεῖ (τινα) δοκεῖν μὲν εὖ ἔχειν (κατὰ) τὸ σῶμα . . . ἔχει δέ, while he is none the more in a good condition.* —— *τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι*, etc., *but the art for the body I am not able to name to you off-hand by one name.* *σῶμα* and *ψυχὴ* freely take and lose the article (comp. 465, D). They lose it, perhaps, as approaching the nature of abstract nouns. In 463, E, they could not have it. *μίαν* is the predicate-accusative. *οὕτω*, *thus*, *in these present circumstances*, is often equivalent to *illico*. Comp. 509, A. —— *τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς*, etc. Here *λέγω* is to be supplied in thought, and *τῆς πολιτικῆς* depends on *τὴν νομοθετικήν*, its part. The sense is, *And of the political art I mention* (one branch) *the legislative as the counterpart to the gymnastic art, and* (the other) *justice as the counterpart to medicine.* The political art, or the general art of securing the public good, has two divisions, *first*, that which consists in securing the moral welfare by *law*, which prescribes what is right, and according to which the public health will be preserved; and, *secondly*, that which restores this health when once impaired, or *justice*, the judge's art. (See Introduction.) Analogous to these arts for the soul are, for the body, gymnastics, or the art of preserving, and medicine, or that of restoring health. Plato elsewhere insists on the analogy between the healing art and justice, e. g. in Repub. 444, C, — a fine passage, where, however, justice is taken in the higher sense of that controlling virtue, which brings all the parts of the soul, like those of a well-regulated state, into their due place and order.

C. *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, with a view to the greatest good.* —— *οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη.* As *αἰσθομένη* is a general word denoting mental perceptions, whencesoever derived, it is explained by this clause, *not guided by knowledge, I would have you understand, but by guess.* Comp. 463, A. —— *ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον, having slipped under,* or *by stealth put on the garb* of each of the four divisions.

D. *θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν,* hunts for, *seeks to captivate ignorance,* or the unwary. —— *τῷ ... ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ, by that which is at the time the most agreeable.*

A. *τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω* alludes to 463, D, where Po- 465
lus puts the question concerning the quality of rhetoric. Comp. 448, C – E. —— *ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἃ προσφέρει, because it cannot explain what sort of things those are in their nature, which it makes use of.* Here we see what Plato thought that a *τέχνη* must be. The MSS. give, almost unanimously, *ᾧ προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει,* and the editors, without MS. authority, *ὧν προσφέρει.* I have restored a part of the MS. reading, and have since observed that Stallb., in his second edition, has made the same change. —— *ὑποσχεῖν λόγον, to submit the reason,* or *rationale,* to explain and defend a position.

B. *ὑπόκειται, puts itself under, puts on the form* or mask of, = *ὑποδύνει* above. —— *ὥστε ποιεῖν ... ἀμελεῖν, so as to make men attach to themselves adventitious beauty, and neglect their own, obtained through the gymnastic art.*

C. *ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω.* In the ensuing words, down to *ὀψοποικῶν,* the thoughts seem to be only half expressed, as if Socrates, anxious to avoid a long speech, were hastening to an end. Some editors suppose that the text has sustained an injury, but, as I think, without reason. Such, says Socrates, are these arts in their nature; but in practice the Sophists' art and rhetoric are confounded together;

and the like would be true of cookery and medicine, if the body judged of them without a presiding mind. The thoughts are not essential to the argument, and are only thrown out *en passant*. ὅπερ . . . λέγω refers to what has just preceded; *but as I say*, or *was just saying*. —— διέστηκε. The subject of this verb, according to Buttmann in Heindorf's edition, is all the arts before mentioned, and ὄντων has the same subject, which is ταῦτα understood, referring to these arts. Stallb. restricts διέστηκε, with reason, I think, in his first edition, to σοφιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορική. ὄντων may be used instead of ὄντες, referring to σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, next following. A participle is sometimes found in the genitive absolute, when its subject is the same as that of the verb; the cause of which seems to be a desire of the writer to express the thought contained in the participle more distinctly. The grammatical construction is caused by Plato's passing in thought from the *arts* to those *who pursue them*. —— ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων, *but, inasmuch as they are conterminous arts, sophists and orators are* (mixed together in the same place and about the same things, i. e. are) *confounded together, and indiscriminately give themselves to the same pursuit, and they know not what to make of themselves, nor their fellow-men of them* (i. e. neither they nor others have any exact idea of their so-called arts). For the thought, comp. 520, A: ταὐτόν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐστὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον.

D. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, *what the well-known* (τοῦ) *Anaxagoras said* (his tenet) *would hold extensively* (in regard to these arts). For the uses of the article, see Soph. § 176, and § 139, N. 1; Cr. §§ 477. *a*, 479. Anaxagoras taught that all things were in a chaos at first; then came MIND, and arranged them. In other words, he ascribed to an intelligent author, not creation, nor motion and

quality, but only arrangement; which was, however, a step beyond the earlier Ionic philosophers, who accounted for all phenomena by the physical properties of matter. —— *σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος.* The Schol. of the Clarke MS. supposes these words to allude to the rhetorical figure called *παρίσωσις*, which takes place when similar words, as *φίλε Πῶλε* here, are brought together. Another Schol. explains them of the acquaintance of Polus with the philosophy of Anaxagoras, — to which sect, says he, Polus belonged, — a piece of information probably picked out of the text. Perhaps nothing more than ironical praise of Polus for great knowledge is intended. Comp. 462, A.

E. *ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι*, sc. *ἀντίστροφόν ἐστι τῆς ῥητορικῆς.* The clause might be removed without injury to the sense. *ἀντίστροφον* here governs a genitive, but a dative, 464, B. Some other compounds of *ἀντὶ* vary in the same way as to their regimen. *ἐκεῖνο*, referring to *ὀψοποιίας*, accommodates its gender to that of *ἀντίστροφον*.

A. Init. *If, therefore, I too, when you answer, shall not know what to make* (of it), *do you likewise prolong your discourse; but if I shall, let me make use of it.* The dative, which should follow *χρήσωμαι*, is contained in *ἀποκρινομένου.* 466

B. *οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι, not even to be thought of*, i. e. to be held in no estimation at all. This verb, which just above has a predicate, *φαῦλοι*, is here used absolutely. Our verbs *to regard, to consider*, and others, are capable of the same twofold use.

C. The colon, which most editors put after *κύνα*, ought, as it seems to me, to be erased. Comp. *μὰ τὸν Δία . . . ἀλλ'*, 463, D, *νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ'*, 481, C, where the formula of swearing unites in one clause with what follows. Socrates does not answer Polus by the phrase *νὴ τὸν κύνα*, but only begins his answer in the next chapter.

E. *οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν*, etc. Comp. Repub. 9. 577, E. "Is not the state that is enslaved and under a tyrant far from doing what it wishes? Very far. And the soul, accordingly, that is governed by a tyrant, will be very far from doing what it may wish (if we speak of the whole soul); and, drawn along forcibly by urgent lust, will be full of agitation and regret." For *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, qualifying *οὐδέν*, see 450, B. —— *ἐγὼ οὔ φημι; egone nego?* —— *μὰ τόν*. The Schol. on Aristoph. Frogs, 1421, thinks that the name of the divinity is omitted out of reverence. But the omission seems intended rather for comic effect, as though the right divinity did not readily occur to the mind. —— *καὶ τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικήν*. Supply *οὖσαν*. Comp. 495, C.

467 A. *ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας*. The aorist participle, which Heindorf declares to be used for the present, has its own force. Polus could come to his conclusion, *when he had refuted*, or *by refuting*. The argument may be considered as *the preliminary* to the conclusion, or as the *means* of reaching it. In the first case, the aorist is needed; the present, if used, would have the second sense. —— *οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται*. By *τοῦτο*, he means *τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς*. —— *ἐξελεγχθῇ . . . ὅτι*. The verb is here used *in sensu prægnanti*, unless Socrates *be refuted, and it be shown that*, thus answering nearly to our verb *convince*.

B. *οὗτος ἀνήρ*. An instance of aposiopesis or reticentia, a figure often caused by excited feelings, which cannot find the language to express themselves. "In hac formula recte omittitur articulus, quoniam dicitur *δεικτικῶς* de eo qui præsens est." Stallb. *οὗτος* contains a shade of contempt sometimes like *iste*. Comp. 489, B, 505, C. —— *καὶ γὰρ* non est *etenim*, sed *καὶ* pertinet ad *νῦν*. Stallb.; i. e. *καὶ* is *also*. —— *ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ, that I may address you in your own style*. This refers to *λῷστε Πῶλε*, and the artificial juxtaposition of words of equal length, or of similar form or sound. Comp. 448, C, 465, D.

C. *πίνοντες παρά*, i. e. *πίνοντες τὰ φάρμακα, λαβόντες αὐτὰ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν*, a *constructio prægnans.*

D. *οἱ πλέοντες*, i. e. who make voyages for commercial purposes. —— *ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο . . . πλουτεῖν*, when a demonstrative pronoun thus prepares the way for the infinitive, the latter often loses its article. Comp. *τοῦτο . . . ἐξεῖναι*, 469, C. But, just above, we have not only *τοῦτο, πίνειν*, but also *ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.* —— *ἄλλο τι . . . οὕτω.* Supply *ἔχει. Is it not so, then, in all cases?*

E. *πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.* The preceding question of Socrates is equivalent to a negative proposition, which is here to be supplied; sc. that there is nothing which is not either good or bad, etc.

A. *πράττουσι, on fait*, like *λέγουσι, on dit.* The same 468
indefinite subject appears just before in the first person plural, *βαδίζομεν*, etc.

C. *ἁπλῶς οὕτως, thus in themselves considered*, without respect to something further.

E. *ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ.* Not in this city, Athens, as Heindorf understood it, but *in this just-mentioned city*, i. e. in the supposed city. If Athens had been intended, Socrates, living there, would have said, as Stallb. after Boeckh on Pindar (Not. Crit. in Olymp. 6. 102) observes, *ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει.* Comp. this formula so used, 469, D, fin.; Leges 932, A. *ὅδε* seems to be the strongest, and, so to speak, most objective of the demonstratives, and to point especially at that which has a close outward relation (as that of place) to the speaker. —— *ἔστιν . . . δύνασθαι. ἔστιν = fieri potest.* —— *ὡς δή, as forsooth, just as though.* Stallb. translates these words by *quasi vero*, Ast by *nam revera.*

A. *περὶ ὧν . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων.* Comp. Soph. § 151. 3; 469
K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. *καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρός·* præpositioni *πρὸς* absolute posi-

tæ (*præterea*) adjungi solet particula γε. Ast. = *yes, and pitiable besides.* —— πῶς, *cur.* —— οὕτως, ὡς, *for this reason that.* And so, in English, we say *how is this?* nearly in the sense of *why is this?* the reason of which is, that the manner in which a thing is done often involves the cause why it is done.

C. ἐξεῖναι. Supply τινι, to which αὐτῷ refers, in the next line.

D. τῷ λόγῳ is added to explain the sense in which ἐπιλαβοῦ is used, *attack in your discourse, refute by argument.* δὴ seems to belong to the imperative, with the usual hortatory sense. —— ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ, *in the agora, when it is crowded,* which it was between early morning and mid-day. This phrase denotes place, — not time, as Stallb. says, to which ἐν is opposed. περὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν is a common phrase for time. ἀγορά, even when definitely used, is often without an article, like πόλις, πατήρ, and many other nouns. And this is particularly frequent after prepositions. Comp. 447, A. —— τεθνήξει, *he shall be dead,* the meaning of τέθνηκα put into a future. This appears to be the received form in old Attic, and τεθνήξεται came into use afterwards. See Elmsl. on Aristoph. Acharn. 590. —— τινα . . . τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι, *that any of them shall have his head broken,* like συντριβῆναι τῆς κεφαλῆς, Aristoph. Peace, 71. But the accusative may also follow this verb, as in 515, E. Yet the accusative of κεφαλή was disallowed by the Atticists, although used by Lysias and others of the best writers.

E. τριήρεις, desidero articulum. Stallb. αἱ, which may have been absorbed by καὶ (*KAI* for *KAIAI*), is added by Coray. But the article is unnecessary, being implied or contained in τά, as Ast observes. One article often suffices, even for two substantives of different genders, or for two words separated by disjunctive particles. Comp. Hermann on Eurip. Hec. 593 of his second edition.

A. *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι*, etc. The construction is anaco- 470
luthous; *καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι* being, for the sake of greater emphasis, in the place of *καὶ εἶναι μέγα δύνασθαι*. The sense is, *To have great power appears to you to be a good, if success follows a man while he acts as seems best to him; and this* (i. e. the use of great power when accompanied with success), *as it seems, is to have great power; but otherwise to have great power is a bad thing, and is to have little power.* Socrates shows the absurdities into which Polus, on his own ground, falls.

B. *εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζει. τίς* is here used like *ὅστις* in indirect inquiry. See 447, C, 448, E, etc.

C. *χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι.* These words are obviously spoken in irony.

D. *ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.* Routh and other editors since suppose that by this form of words Socrates conveys ridicule of *ὀρρᾷς*, just above, which is used quite rhetorically. This may be so, but *ἀκούω* is often thus used for *ἀκήκοα*. Comp. 515, E; Cr. § 579, ζ; K. § 255. 1. R. —— *οὐκ οἶδα.* The noble passage down to *ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ* is freely translated by Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. 5. 12. —— *αὐτόθεν, ex ipsa re.* Stallb., *from the nature of the case itself.*

E. *παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει.* See 451, C. —— *τὸν . . . ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα.* See 469, E, note.

A. Archelaus began his reign by the foul means men- 471
tioned in the text, in 413 B. C., and died by assassination in 399. He seems to have been an able prince, and he made, according to Thucyd. (2. 100) more internal improvements in Macedonia than all his predecessors. His desire of the society of men of letters is well known; besides Euripides, the poet Agathon and others resorted to his court. (Ælian. Var. Hist. 2. 21.) Socrates, also, is said to have been invited, and to have replied, *ὕβριν εἶναι μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς.* (Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23.)

He said, also, that Archelaus had spent 400 minæ in getting his palace painted by Zeuxis, but had spent nothing on himself. (Ælian. u. s. 14, 17.) Athenæus, in a bitter passage, filled with aspersions of Plato (Lib. 11. sub fin.), says that the philosopher was, according to the testimony of his nephew, Speusippus, on very good terms with the man whem he here speaks so ill of. But as Plato was scarcely thirty when Archelaus died, and until that time a man of little distinction, the story is probably distorted and exaggerated. —— *ἐδούλευεν ἄν.* Some few MSS. give *ἐδούλευσεν.* Heindorf condemns Routh for adopting *ἐδούλευεν*, saying that the latter, with *ἄν*, is *serviret*; the former, *servisset.* But this is not so. The imperfect indicative with *ἄν*, "plerumque refertur ad præsens. Sæpe vero etiam ad præteritum, ejusmodi quidem, quod diuturnitatem aliquam vel repetitionem facti continet." Hermann de partic. *ἄν*, II. 10.

B. *θαυμασίως ὡς ἀθλιος.* See 477, D, note. —— *μεταπεμψάμενος*, etc. "Insignis est hic locus eo, quod plurima participia cumulantur, copula non intercedente." Stallb. In this, the style of rhetoric seems to be imitated. The circumstances are compressed into one sentence, and vibrated, so to speak, one after another with rapidity, for the sake of the greater effect.

C. *ἐμβαλὼν εἰς φρέαρ*, according to Ast and Stallb., denotes the manner in which the action of *ἀποπνίξας* took place, *having drowned him by throwing him into the well.* Perhaps it may suit the rhetorical style here better, if they are taken side by side, as if *καὶ* were in the text, *having thrown him into the well* (*and so*) *drowned him.* For *ἀποπνίξας*, comp. 512, A. —— *ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ σοῦ, tuque imprimis*, seu *interque eos tu primus.* Heindorf, who has adduced a number of examples of the phrase.

D. *τοῦ . . . ἠμελημένου.* This clause is brought, by

negligent freedom of style, under the influence of ὅτι, although Socrates of course did not praise Polus for ignorance of the art of conversation. δὲ has the force of *quamquam; although you seem to have neglected the art of discussing.* —— πόθεν. Comp. my note on Eurip. Alcest. 95.

A. δοκούντων εἶναί τι. Cr., § 450, regards τι as inde- 472
clinable, *eorum qui videntur esse aliquid;* not as predic. accus., *eorum qui se putant esse aliquid. Aliquis* and *aliquid* are both used by classical Roman writers in the same emphatic way. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. 5. 36. 104: an quidquam stultius, quam quos singulos contemnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos. And so τις, τίνες, as in the noted line of Pindar, τί δέ τις; τί δ' οὔ τις; σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος, Pyth. 8. 95; and in Demosth. c. Mid. § 213, πλούσιοι πολλοὶ . . . τὸ δοκεῖν τινὲς εἶναι δι' εὐπορίαν προσειληφότες, which favors Crosby's view. —— ὀλίγου. Soph. § 220 (223. 2); Cr. § 623. —— Νικίας. This well-known wealthy general perished in the Sicilian disaster, some seven years before the time when this dialogue is feigned to have been held. He is, however, without anachronism, selected as a witness, in the same way that the testimony of Homer might be appealed to. The men here named were not selected on account of their unjust actions, — for they were, perhaps, all of them, among the best Athenian public men, — but probably on account of their wealth, illustrious connections, and ancestry. Socrates means to say, that the spirit of all the great and opulent families in the city led them to prefer prosperous injustice before depressed goodness. —— οἱ τρίποδες. A favorite kind of votive offering. The tripods here spoken of were set up on the top of small temples in the inclosure of the temple of Bacchus, in commemoration of victories in which the dedicators were the *choragi* of their tribes. —— Ἀριστοκράτης, son of Scellias. This man, one of the more moderate aristocrats, after helping, in 411

B. C., to overturn the Athenian constitution, soon again united with Theramenes to put down the more violent revolutionists. His dislike of democracy is punned upon in Aristoph. Birds, 125. We find probably the same person acting as general with Alcibiades, 407 B. C., and one of the commanders in the great sea-fight of Arginusæ, 406 B. C. With five colleagues, he perished, the victim of the popular frenzy which succeeded that event. It would not, then, seem very apposite to cite him the next year as a witness of the tenets of Polus, which his own experience so sadly belied. Either Plato forgot the date of this transaction, or with concealed irony selects the case of this man as really disproving what it is intended to prove. And he may have adduced the others with the same feeling.

B. *ἐν Πυθίου*, sc. *ἱερῷ*, *in the temple of Apollo Pythius* at Athens. So I have no hesitation in reading, with Coray, after one MS., for the common *Πυθοῖ*, *Delphi*. For *τοῦτο* points at a votive offering well known and familiar to Athenians, and this temple (i. e. its sacred precinct) was the place where those who conquered in the cyclic choruses at the Thargelia deposited their tripods. Comp. Boeckh's Inscript., no. 213, and Thucyd. 6. 54. —— *τῶν ἐνθένδε* is for *τῶν ἐνθάδε*, by attraction or accommodation to *ἐκλέξασθαι*, which contains the notion of taking *from*. —— *ἐκβάλλειν . . . ἀληθοῦς*. In these words there is an elegant allusion to actions of ejectment. There is, also, according to Stallb., a play upon *οὐσία*, which means not only *substance, estate*, but *reality, truth*. *ἐκβάλλειν*, also, may allude to the tyrants before mentioned; as though Socrates had said, — "You mean to act the part of one of these tyrants, whom you admire so much, and expel me from my only substance, the truth, by getting a multitude of opinions in your favor."

C. *ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι.* Supply *τρόπον ἐλέγχου εἶναι*, and comp. 473, C, 508, B.

D. *σὺ ἦγεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι. οἷον* is neuter, and *εἶναι* is to be taken with *μακάριον ἄνδρα*; another *εἶναι* being understood, unless we say that the one in the text by brachylogy performs a double part. Comp. Repub. 486, A: *οἷόν τε οἵεσι τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.* —— *ἄλλο τι . . . διανοώμεθα; shall we not suppose that you think so?* For the genitive absolute with *ὡς*, after a verb of knowing, comp. Soph. § 192, N. 2; Mt. § 569. 5; K. § 312, R. 12; Cr. § 640. —— *ἆρα* interrogative is sometimes found out of its usual place at the beginning of the sentence, like other words of the same class. It is, however, before the most important clause. Comp. 476, A.

A. *ὑπὸ θεῶν. ὑπὸ* is used because *τυγχάνῃ δίκης* con- 473
tains a passive idea = *κολάζηται.*

B. *ἀληθῆ . . . ἴσως.* Hoc *ἴσως* cum irrisione dictum de re certa ut Lat. *fortasse.* Stallb. —— *ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' . . . χαλεπώτερον* alludes to 470, C, *χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι*, and is ironical.

C. *ἐκτέμνηται, exsecetur.* Ast. —— *τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδας.* Supply *λωβηθέντας. ἐπιδεῖν* (to look upon, to live to see), "ponitur semper in rebus gravioribus, et *ἐπὶ συμφορᾷς* ut ait Thomas Magister, p. 335." Wyttenbach on Plut. de sera num. vindict., p. 17, referred to by Heindorf and others. Not *semper*, but *sæpe.* We have, for instance, Eurip. Med. 1025, *πρὶν σφῷν ὄνασθαι κἀπιδεῖν εὐδαίμονας*; Plut. Pelopid. § 34, *Διαγόραν ἐπιδόντα υἱοὺς στεφανουμένους Ὀλυμπίασιν*, and so several times in Plutarch's lives. —— *καταπιττωθῇ, pice oblitus cremetur.* —— *οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται.* The compar. here has far less authority in its favor than the superl.; and quite a number of MSS. have *εὐδαίμων.* Stallb. inclines to the superl., but no sure example has been adduced of this degree used for the compara-

tive and followed by ἤ. —— *καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, and by strangers besides,* or *and by the rest of men,* viz. *strangers.* This seemingly pleonastic use of ἄλλος is quite common. Comp. 480, D; Phædo, 110, E, *γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις*; Leg. 7. 789, D, *κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ῥώμην*; Xen. Cyrop. 7. 3, *βοῦς καὶ ἵππους . . . καὶ ἄλλα πρόβατα πολλά.*

D. *μορμολύττει αὖ*, etc., *you are this time bringing up bugbears, and not attempting a refutation; and just now you were bringing up witnesses.* Socrates is making game of the rhetorical substitutes for philosophical proof used by Polus. For *ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου*, comp. 470, D, 472, A, to which places there is a reference. —— *δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλοιν.* Supply *οὐδέτερος.*

E. *ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου.* This may allude to a rhetorical precept of Gorgias mentioned by Aristot. Rhet. 3. 18, that the "impression produced by the serious discourse of the adverse party must be destroyed by mirth; and that of his mirth by seriousness." —— *καὶ πέρυσι βουλεύειν λαχὼν . . . οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.* Socrates, in his ironical way, attributes to ignorance a proceeding which sprang from a conscientious regard to law, and crowned him with the highest honor. It is narrated by Xenophon, in his Hellenics, 1. 7, and mentioned by him (Memorab. 1. 1. 18, and 4. 4. 2) and Plato (Apol. Socr. 32, A), and in the dialogue Axiochus, § 12. Socrates happened to be the Epistates or president of the Prytanes, and as such the presiding officer in the assembly, on the day when the generals who had conquered at Arginusæ (comp. 472, A, note) were brought before the people on a charge of having neglected to pick up the bodies of the citizens that were floating in the water. It was proposed, contrary to the laws, to try them all at once by a summary process. Some of the Prytanes, who declared that they would not put the vote contrary to the laws, were frightened from their pur-

pose by the rage of the people, " and all promised that they would put the vote, except Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who only said that he would do every thing according to the laws." (Xen. Hellen. u. s.) Whether Socrates was overruled by his colleagues it does not appear. One is tempted to conjecture that they took the affair out of his hands, and pretended that his delay in allowing the assembly to vote proceeded from ignorance; and that to this he playfully alludes. His conduct, however, was viewed by all in its true light. There is some reason to believe, however, that for that day he stayed proceedings upon the proposition. " But on the next day, Theramenes and Callixenus, with their party, by suborning fraudulently chosen proedri, procured the condemnation of the generals without a trial." (Axiochus, u. s.) This passage from a work ascribed to a disciple of Socrates, but commonly regarded as spurious, is important, not only for this item of information, but also for the statement, which may have some historical basis, that the foul plot against the generals was consummated by means of the *proedri non-contribules*, as they are called, who were drawn according to a pretended lot, on the day of the assembly, by the Epistates for the day, who was the successor of Socrates.

A. ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον is to be taken with ἐμοὶ . . . 474 παράδος, *as I was saying just now, hand over the proof to me in my turn.* He refers to 472, C.

B. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. These words with some bitterness silently contrast the philosopher with the orator, who aims to persuade the many. —— διδόναι ἔλεγχον, *to give an opportunity of refutation, to let* (another) *take up the argument.* —— πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. In this formula, καὶ is often added before δεῖ in the sense of *even.*

D. τί δὲ τόδε; intellige λέγεις. Stallb. —— εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων, etc. *Do you call beautiful things in general*

(*τὰ καλὰ πάντα*) *beautiful in each instance without having reference to any thing further?* i. e. do you consider beauty a fundamental quality, or resolve it into something else? —— *πρὸς ὃ ἄν.* These words down to *τοῦτο* are epexegetical of the preceding clause.

E. *καὶ μὴν τά γε . . . ἀμφότερα.* In this sentence, Ast wishes to write *καλὰ* without the article, thus making it a predicate. *τὰ καλὰ* is added by way of explanation. *τὰ κατὰ . . . νόμους = οἱ νόμοι.* The sense is, *And, moreover, laws and studies — those that are beautiful, that is — are not removed from* (are not without) *these properties,* viz. the useful or pleasant, or both.

475 A. *τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως.* Supply *ἔχει.* —— *καλῶς . . . ὁρίζει.* This conveys a bitter satire of Polus, who by pleasure and the good meant the same thing. —— *οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ,* i. e. *οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὁρίζομαι, τῷ ἐναντίῳ ὁριζόμενος τὸ αἰσχρόν.*

B. *οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;* frequens apud Plat. dictio pro quâ quis expectet *οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον;* infra, p. 499, B, *οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη.* Stallb.

C. *οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται,* sc. *ὑπερβάλλειν αὐτό.*

D. *ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον,* sc. *κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ.*

E. For *παρέχων,* see 456, B. —— *ὁ ἔλεγχος . . . οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, my mode of proof when put by the side of your mode of proof is quite unlike it.*

476 A. *σκεψώμεθα, σκοπώμεθα.* The present imperative, and the subjunctive used for it, seem sometimes to have a closer reference to the present time than the aorist; and therefore to be more urgent. Comp. *let us be going,* and *let us go,* in English. It has been remarked (first, I believe, by Elmsley), that in the present and imperfect the Attics say *σκοπῶ, ἐσκόπουν,* or *σκοποῦμαι, ἐσκοπούμην,* but not *σκέπτομαι, ἐσκεπτόμην.* There is only one instance of *σκέπτομαι* in Plato to very many of *σκοπῶ.* On the con-

trary, they never use *σκοπῶ* in the future, aorist, or perfect.

B. *διασκεψάμενος, after careful consideration.* —— *ἆρα τοῦτο πάσχον*, sc. *ἐστί*, or better, *ἀνάγκη τοῦτο πάσχον εἶναι* (i. e. *πάσχειν*), *τοῦτο* being the object. The participle is used to continue the form of the preceding discourse.

C. The Attic form *κάω* is justly preferred by all modern editors to *καίω*, having, as it does, the support of several MSS.

D. *τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων.* The participle is properly in the present, as the clause may be resolved into *ἐπειδὴ ταῦθ' ὁμολογοῦμεν.*

A. *ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν;* Supply 477 *ὠφελεῖται*, to be taken with its cognate noun, and for the place of *ὠφέλειαν* in the sentence, comp. Soph. § 151, Rem. 7; K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. *ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου, in the condition of a man's property.* So Schleierm. Comp. Repub. 544, E, *αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς*, and 449, A, *περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν.* Ast, in his translation, joins *ἀνθρώπου* with *κακίαν.*

C. *ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον*, etc. *In every case, that which is most ugly is most ugly, from what has been admitted before, either as occasioning pain in the greatest degree, or harm, or both.* The student will have observed that *καλός, αἰσχρός*, preserve the same sense throughout the discussion, and there seems to be no fit word except *ugly* by which to translate the latter of the two. And yet *ugly* will not bear to be used in as wide an extent as *αἰσχρός. ἀγαθός, κακός*, denote the relation of any thing to our well-being, especially to future and ultimate well-being as opposed to pleasure in the present time.

D. *οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν*, etc. *Therefore it is either most unpleasant, and the ugliest of them because it exceeds*

(*them*) *in unpleasantness, or* (*it is so because it exceeds them*) *in hurtfulness, or in both.* τούτων refers to the two πονηρίαι of soul and body. —— ὑπερφυεῖ τινι . . . ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ, *by some extraordinarily great harm.* This may be explained as a *confusio duarum locutionum,* ὑπερφυές ἐστιν ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ, *it is astonishing by how great a harm,* and ὑπερφυεῖ τινι βλάβῃ, *by some astonishing harm.* The common formula ὑπερφυῶς ὡς, θαυμαστῶς ὡς, with an adjective, can be explained in the same way, or by an attraction by which the adjectives ὑπερφυές, θαυμαστόν (ἐστιν) are changed in their form by the relative adverb.

E. ἀπαλλάττει. This means no more than "has a tendency to free." Some are beyond the reach of cure by punishment (525, C). Nor does Socrates teach here that the ultimate object of punishment is to free the bad man from his badness, as that of medicine is to cure the sick The comparison is not to be pressed in all respects.

478 A. εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, *if on this view of the subject you are not prepared to answer.*

C. ἀπαλλάττεται. The subject is to be found in οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι, *such as are under cure,* which, being indefinite, readily gives place to a singular. —— ἰατρευόμενος is added to explain οὕτως. —— ἀρχήν, *omnino,* used chiefly with negatives. Comp. Soph. Antig. 92. —— τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις, *the not even possessing it at all.*

D. ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. Hoc dictum multorum imitatione celebratum esse docuit Wyttenbach. ad Plutarch. de sera numinis vindicta, p. 23. Stallb.

E. οὗτος δ' ἦν, *but this was,* i. e. *this is, as we proved, he who,* etc.

479 A. διαπράξηται ὥστε. This verb and ἐκπράσσω are often followed by ὥστε before an infinitive. Comp. Soph. Antig. 303. Eurip. Alcest. 298. —— ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις. In phrases like this, an apodosis to which ἄν belongs is to be supplied :

here διαπράξαιτο is to be repeated. A little below ὥσπερανεὶ παῖς = ὥσπερ φοβοῖτο ἂν εἰ παῖς εἴη.

B. τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν is added to explain τοιοῦτόν τι. αὐτοῦ refers to δίκην διδόναι, implied in δίκην, just above. —— μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος stands, with a brevity which is not uncommon in comparisons, for τοῦ συνοικεῖν μὴ ὑγιεῖ σώματι, in order to prevent the repetition of συνοικεῖν. Comp. 455, E, note; Soph. Antig. 75; and Soph. § 186, N. 1; K. § 323, R. 6; Cr. § 461, R. 2.

C. παρασκευαζόμενοι. This verb can be followed by an accusative, and by a clause beginning with ὅπως. The two constructions are here united. —— ὅπως ἂν ὦσιν, *the means whereby they may be.* —— συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακόν. This verb may be united with the participle or infinitive of εἰμί, or with a simple predicate, as here. Comp. Soph. Electr. 261, note in my ed.

E. τὸν ἀδικοῦντα . . . διδόντα, *the one who, though he commits the greatest wrongs, suffers no punishment for them.* —— φαίνεται, sc. ἀποδεδεῖχθαι.

A. αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν . . . φυλάττειν, etc. *For one needs to keep* 480
guard especially over himself, lest he act unjustly, on the ground that (if he so act) *he will be possessed of a serious evil.* The subject of φυλάττειν is τινά, with which αὐτὸν is to be joined; and the same omission of the indefinite subject occurs a few lines below. —— ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ. One MS. has ἀδικήσει, and one other ποιήσει, just below. The old doctrine of Dawes, that ὅπως μὴ cannot be followed by a *first* aorist subjunctive, but requires either a *second* aorist subjunctive or future indicative, is now exploded by all respectable scholars.

B. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν. λέγωμεν, which Bekker prefers, would be equally good here. Comp. τί φῶμεν, just below. The difference is, that πῶς λέγομεν = *what is our opinion?* πῶς λέγωμεν, *what shall we say?* what ought to be our opinion? what have we good reason to believe?

C. *εἰ μὴ εἰ.* "Sometimes a second *εἰ* follows *εἰ μή*, as in Latin *nisi si.*" Mt. § 617. d; K. § 340, R. 5; Cr. § 667. 2. Stallb., on Sympos. 205, E, says: "Alterum *εἰ* rem magis etiam reddit incertam, ut quod exceptioni conditionem adjiciat." —— *ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον.* According to Stallb., *χρήσιμον εἶναι* is here to be supplied, and the clause *κατηγορεῖν δεῖν*, being explanatory of *τοὐναντίον*, follows without a copula. But this view of the construction overlooks *δεῖν*. It may be explained by supplying *οὐ χρήσιμος ... ἡμῖν* again in thought with *εἰ μή τις*, etc., or in other words, Plato, studious of brevity, proceeds as if he had forgotten all of the sentence preceding *οὐ χρήσιμος.* ***For making a defence,*** etc., ... ***rhetoric is of no use at all to us*** (nor is it of any use), ***unless one should suppose, on the contrary, that he ought to be an accuser first of all of himself,*** etc. —— *ὃς ἂν ἀεί.* Here *ἀεὶ* = ***at any time.*** —— *ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα,* etc., ***but to give himself up, with his eyes closed and manfully, as to a physician,*** etc. *μύσαντα* expresses endurance of calamity with determination, the impressions concerning pain derived from the sense of sight, and their effects in weakening resolution, being thus prevented by the will of him who shuts his eyes. Comp. Soph. Antig. 421.

E. *σοι ὁμολογεῖται.* Heindorf and Coray would exclude *σοι* from the text. If it be the pleonastic dative, as it is called, the sense is ***for you,*** i. e. ***I am willing to own to you that*** they agree with what was said before. —— *τοὐναντίον,* etc. If, on the other hand, says Socrates, one would do evil to another, he must save him by the use of rhetoric from punishment. Thus the rhetoricians, who place the value of their art in doing good to a friend, and harming an enemy, do just the contrary; they harm their friends by saving them from justice, and do good to their enemies by the opposite. All this proceeds upon the principles with regard to justice and injustice which Polus has been com-

pelled to admit. The parenthesis *ἐὰν μόνον . . . εὐλαβητέον*, as understood by Buttmann, amounts to this: that this method of doing evil to an enemy is only applicable in case the enemy wrongs a third person; for when the enemy wrongs the orator himself, to do evil to him thus, namely, to save him from justice, would be but exposing the orator to fresh injuries from him. By rhetoric, then, he cannot gain the point he desires, namely, to do evil to his adversary without injuring himself. —— *μεταβαλόντα, mutata ratione, vicissim.* Comp. *μεταστρέψας*, 456, E. It agrees with the subject of *ποιεῖν*. The abundance of words to denote opposition is worthy of notice: *τοὐναντίον, αὖ*, and this participle. —— *ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον*, etc. *δὲ* often resumes the subject after a parenthesis. The sense of the first part of this sentence is as follows: — *But on the other hand, again, if, reversing the case, one has need to do harm to any person, whether enemy or any one whomsoever, — provided only one be not himself wronged by his enemy; for that must be guarded against, — if, I say, an enemy wrong another, he* (that other) *must procure in every way, by deed and word, that he* (the enemy) *suffer not punishment nor come before the judge.*

A. *ἀναλίσκηται.* This, according to Coray, is an iso- 481
lated instance of the middle of *ἀναλίσκω* used as the active, and to be altered into *ἀναλίσκῃ*. This word and *ἀποδιδῷ* are in a different tense from the aorists preceding, as containing the signification of continuance, which, however, rather belongs to *μὴ ἀποδιδῷ* taken together than to the verb in itself.

C. *νὴ τοὺς θεούς ἀλλά.* Comp. 466, C, note. —— *πότερόν σε φῶμεν . . . σπουδάζοντα.* For verbs meaning to speak construed with a participle, see Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. —— *εἰ μή τι ἦν*, etc. *If men had not the same state of mind, some of them some one, and others some other* (i. e. if classes or portions of mankind did not agree in one or another state

of mind), *but each of us had a peculiar state of mind different from what the rest of mankind had, it would not be easy to manifest your own state of mind to another.*

D. ἴδιον ἤ. This construction with ἤ, which belongs to ἄλλος, ἐναντίος, and similar words, is adopted here by ἴδιος, on account of the notion of *difference* implied in it. —— πεπονθότες. Soph. § 137, N. 6; Cr. § 337. α; K. § 241, R. 8. Then follows ἐρῶντε, because δύο renders the *duality* of the persons more striking. —— Ἀλκιβιάδου. At the time when Plato would have us suppose this dialogue to be spoken, Alcibiades, then a man of forty and upwards, had retired for the last time from Athens, and long before that the intimacy between him and Socrates had ceased. That intimacy was of the purest kind on the part of Socrates. He saw in the young Alcibiades high natural endowments, and hoped to win him over to the love of wisdom and virtue. But political ambition and his passions were more attractive. —— τοῦ Πυριλάμπους, *the son of Pyrilampes*, whose name was Demus. Pyrilampes was a wealthy Athenian, and a friend of Pericles. He reared peacocks (see Plutarch. Pericl. § 13; Athenæus, p. 397, C), as did his son Demus; and this being then a new bird in Greece, attracted visitors from so far off as Sparta and Thessaly. On the first day of the month, and at no other time, this living picture-gallery was open to all. Demus was as much admired for his beauty as one of his peacocks. Hence the parody in Aristoph. Wasps, 97 (acted seventeen years before the date of this dialogue): καὶ νὴ Δί' ἦν ἴδῃ γέ που γεγραμμένον | τὸν Πυριλάμπους ἐν θύρᾳ Δῆμον καλόν, | ἰὼν παρέγραψε πλησίον, "Κημὸς καλός," i. e. where he finds written Δῆμος καλός, "Demus is beautiful," he writes close by it, "Κημὸς" —the top-piece of the judge's ballot-box — "is beautiful." Pyrilampes also was considered as handsome and as large a man as any in Asia, whither he went on embassies to the great king and

others. (Charmides, 158, A, if another person of the name be not meant.) We find Demus commanding a galley at Cyprus, before the battle of Cnidus, which happened in 394 B. C. (Lysias de Bonis Aristoph. § 25, Bekker.) The object of Socrates here is to teach Callicles, in a playful way, that he feels constrained to follow his object of attachment, philosophy, wherever it leads him; just as Callicles obeys the whims of the people. I know not why Alcibiades is brought in, unless it be for the reason which Ast has given: that, though aside from his main object, it serves to put Socrates in contrast with the politicians and orators. "I love beauty of mind," he says, "in Alcibiades, truth and justice in philosophy; but you love external beauty in Demus, and an ignorant, unjust Athenian people." —— ὅτι . . . οὐ δυναμένου. There is here a confusion of two expressions, ὅτι . . . δύνασαι, and δυναμένου, without ὅτι, construed with σου. ὅτι thus becomes idle.

A. τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν. The latter word could have an 482
honest sense. —— ἔμπληκτος, *fickle.* It has this sense in Lysis, 214, C (where it is joined to ἀστάθμητος), Soph. Ajax, 1358, and elsewhere.

B. ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον . . . ὡς, *refute her* (philosophy) *and show that.* See 467, A.

C. ὦ Σώκρατες. The sense is, *O Socrates, you seem to take airs upon yourself in your discourses, being in very truth nothing but an haranguer; and in the present instance you make this harangue because the same thing has befallen Polus, which, he said, befell Gorgias in respect to you.* The first clause relates to the general habit of Socrates, which, as Callicles, judging him falsely, says, was that of bringing a man into perplexity by sophistical arguments, and then of crowing over him, as from a loftier moral ground. The second clause asserts this to be true in the instance of Polus. δημηγόρος (comp. δημηγορικά, 482, E)

means one who, like a popular speaker, gains his ends by sophistry and pretence of honesty. —— *ταὐτὸν παθόντος* furnishes the ground or else the occasion why Socrates indulged in this spirit.

D. *ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἄν, εἴ τις μὴ φαίη, because they would be displeased if any one were to refuse.* Without *ἄν* the sense would be, *they were displeased.* With *ἄν*, the verb, if put into *oratio recta*, would be in the *optative;* without *ἄν*, in the *indicative.* Comp. 461, A.

E. *σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες,* etc. *For, O Socrates, while you profess to be in pursuit of the truth, you in reality turn (the conversation) to such vulgar and popular things as these, which are not beautiful by nature, but by law.* For *φορτικά*, comp. Mitchell on Aristoph. Wasps, 66. It may be translated, also, *disagreeable, disgusting.* Schol. *φορτικά ἐστι τὰ βάρος ἐμποιοῦντα,* and so Ast, Stallb. It is joined with *δικανικά, in the style of pleadings,* in Plat. Apol. Socr. 32, A. *δημηγορικά*, Schol. *τὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν βλέποντα δόξαν*, i. e. in the style of a *δημηγόρος.* —— *ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δέ. δὲ* is rarely found after the third word of the clause. Here, however, *ὡς τ. π.* are in a manner one word. See Poppo's note on *ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δέ*, Thucyd. 1. 6.

483 A. *τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν* is in apposition with its relative, being added to explain it. —— *κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, you deal unfairly in your discussions.* —— *ὑπερωτῶν, asking slyly.* He says, that if a person speaks of any thing as *according to law,* Socrates changes the ground cunningly, and asks about it *according to nature,* and the contrary. —— *Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον,* etc., literally, *when Polus spoke of that which was more ugly according to law, you followed up the law according to nature,* i. e. in your argument you followed out law, as if it were nature. Ast, with some reason, wishes to erase *τὸ κατὰ νόμον* and *κατὰ φύσιν,* which last words are wanting in some books. The sense would then

be, When Polus spoke of that which was more ugly, you urged the law, i. e. you spoke of that which was by law more ugly. For the phrase, *διωκ. κατὰ νόμον*, comp. Repub. 5. 454, B, *κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν, to pursue an inquiry according to the letter*, and not the idea. For *ἐδιώκαθες* (which Elmsley on Medea, 186, regards as an aorist, but which here seems to be an imperfect, and its infinitive, Euthyphron 15, D, a present), I beg leave to refer to my note on Antigone, 1096, second edition. —— *τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. οἷον*, though in no MS., is added before *τὸ* by several editors, and assists the sense; though without it *ἀδικεῖσθαι* (a part), may be regarded as added in apposition, to explain *πᾶν* (the general idea). Being pronounced by the scribes like the ending *ιον* of *κάκιον, οἷον* might easily be absorbed by that word.

B. *οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους.* See 488, D.

C. *ἐκφοβοῦντες.* After this word, *τε* stands in a few MSS. It seems to have been added to do away with the asyndeton; which, however, is allowable here, as what follows is an illustration of the foregoing. —— *ἀγαπῶσι γάρ*, etc. *For they are contented if they are put on an equality when they are inferior.* —— *ἢ . . . φύσις.* Stallb. observes, that *οἷμαι* is sometimes interposed between a noun and its article or preposition.

D. *δηλοῖ.* Not *φύσις δηλοῖ*, but *ταῦτα δηλοῖ, these things show* that they are so. But Stallb. and Ast give the verb an intransitive sense here. *These things are evident* that they are so, i. e. it is evident.

E. *κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου.* The three last words, though in all the MSS., are looked on by several editors as interpolated. Ast retains them, translating *φύσιν δικαίου* not *the nature of justice*, but *natural justice.* He remarks, that a noun governing a genitive may sometimes be resolved into an adjective qualifying that genitive; and cites,

in his support, Aristoph. Plut. 268, ὦ χρυσὸν ἀγγελίας ἐπῶν, i. e. *golden words;* Phædrus, 275, A, σοφίας ... ἀληθειαν πορίζεις, *true wisdom.* —— ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες, etc. The primary idea, as Heindorf observes, is expressed by the participle. The sense is, *Not however, perhaps, according to that law which we enact,* (thereby) *moulding those among us who have the best gifts and most strength; — taking them in their youth, by our incantations and juggleries, we tame them as we would lions,* etc. The asyndeton at ἐκ νέων is like a number already noticed: the clause is epexegetical of the foregoing. See 450, B. ἴσως is used sarcastically, the thing being regarded as certain by Callicles.

484 A. ἀνὴρ, according to Stallb. and Ast, is here used unemphatically as *a man, a person.* If contempt were expressed, ἄνθρωπος would have been chosen, as in 518, C. —— ἀποσεισάμενος contains a figure drawn from a horse *throwing* his rider. —— γράμματα, *written ordinances.* —— ἐπαναστὰς, etc. *He rises upon us and turns out our master, — this slave* that was, i. e. this one whose spirit we had curbed by laws against nature. The aorists ἀνεφάνη, ἐξέλαμψε, denote an action wholly indefinite in regard to time, and thus answer to ἐὰν γένηται in the protasis, instead of presents or futures. The aorist, in such cases, represents a general truth as a matter of experience; the present, as something oft occurring in the existing state of things; the future, as something sure to happen, as the effect of existing causes.

B. νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς. This fragment of an uncertain poem of Pindar's is often referred to, especially by Plato. It is treated of at large by Boeckh, Pind. Vol. III. 640. Boeckh makes it probable that the words κατὰ φύσιν, or something equivalent, belong to the passage; φησὶν, having the same sound, and almost the same letters, as φύσιν,

may have caused that word to be omitted. *οὗτος δὲ δὴ* are interposed by Callicles. Something like this followed in Pindar: *ἐπεὶ Ἠρυόνα βόας Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέος ἀναιτήτας* (?) *τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἤλασεν.* Coray supposes that Callicles perverted the sense of Pindar, but the same turn is given to the words in Leges, 10. 890, A, and Aristides (2. 69, Dindorf) knows no other. The sense of *ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον*, according to Boeckh, is *affert vim maximam, justam eam efficiens;* i. e. *law* (the law of nature) *makes use of might, and calls it right.* *ἄγει* and *δικαιῶν* have the same object. Socrates interprets *ἄγει*, below (488, B), in the sense of *carrying off, plundering*, which is suited to the action of Hercules. Hence Ast derives his translation, *lex abigit* s. *rapit, ex suo jure agens, violentissime;* where *τὸ β.* is treated as an adverbial phrase. But Aristides, by using the opposite phrase, *ἄγει τὰ δίκαια πρεσβεύων*, shows that *τὸ βιαιότατον* is at least the object of *δικαιῶν.* —— *τούτου* refers forward to *καὶ βοῦς . . . εἶναι.*

C. The changes of number here are worthy of notice: *τις . . . ἅψηται, . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων, . . . εὐφυὴς ᾖ, . . . γίγνονται.* —— *ἡλικίᾳ* de *ætate juvenili* intelligendum. Itaque *πόῤῥω τῆς ἡλικίας* est *ultra juventutem.* Stallb. *πόῤῥω* can take a genitive in two relations. 1. That of the thing *from which* one is far off; as, Phædrus, 238, D, *οὐκέτι πόῤῥω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, my words are not far from the style of dithyrambs.* 2. That *in respect of which* one is far advanced; as Symposium, 217, D, *διελεγόμην πόῤῥω τῶν νυκτῶν, I conversed to a late hour of the night; infra* 486, A, *πόῤῥω ἀεὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας, always pushing forwards in philosophy;* and in the text the sense can be, *to too late a period of his youth.*

D. *καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ*, in the mouth of Callicles, means quite another thing from what the same words would intend if used by Socrates. In earlier times the *optimates* were

so called, i. e. the name was given to men of a certain birth. By the standard of Callicles, it would belong to a man of the highest rank in public estimation. The moral character of the individual gave him a right to this title, in the estimation of Socrates. Comp. Welcker, Præf. to Theognis, p. 25. —— *ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις, in stipulations,* or *business transactions* in general. The word denotes both private and public contracts, and treaties of commerce. —— *ἠθῶν, characters.*

E. *τὸ τοῦ E.* See 465, D. The following lines are from the Antiope, and, as the Schol. says, from a speech of Zethus to Amphion. Valckenaer, in his Diatribe on the frag. of Eurip. (the seventh and eighth chapters of which are devoted to this play), gives these words to Amphion. —— *ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ,* etc., *where,* i. e. in whatsoever, *he happens to do his best,* whereinsoever he most excels. One MS. only has *τυγχάνει,* a reading which the editors before Stallb. generally preferred. But it is now admitted on all hands, that in the poets relative words occasionally are joined to the subjunctive without *ἄν.* Cousin translates this line, "afin de se surpasser lui-même." It is strange that he did not see that in the very next line Plato interprets the ancient and poetical *ἵνα, where* (which the Attic prose-writers did not entirely give up), by *ὅπου ἄν.* —— For *αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ,* see Soph. § 144, N. 4, and § 232; and for *βέλτιστος αὑτοῦ,* § 177, N. 5; Cr. § 464. The comparative with the reflexive pronoun in the genitive denotes the having gone beyond a previous or usual state; the superlative with the same, the possession of the quality in the highest degree to which the person spoken of attains.

485 A. *εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, out of regard to himself, through self-love.* The genitive is objective, as is the possessive pronoun, 486, A, *εὐνοίᾳ τῇ σῇ.* —— *ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, just for the sake of education.* —— *ὁμοιότατον πάσχω, I feel very*

much the same thing. To ὅμοιος, in the second clause, ὥσπερ succeeds, instead of ὅπερ or οἷον. Comp. Xen. Symposium, 4. 37, ὅμοιά μοι δοκοῦσι πάσχειν ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολλὰ ἐσθίων μηδέποτε ἐμπίπλαιτο, and 518, B.

D. ἔφη ὁ ποιητής, in Iliad, 9. 441.

E. ἱκανόν, *satisfactory*, answerable to his powers, or to the expectations formed of him. —— μηδέποτε. Heusdius μηδὲν excidisse suspicabatur. Sed vere monuit Boeckhius (in Plat. Minoem et Leges Comment. p. 112) sæpius ita τι et μηδὲν omitti. Stallb. —— ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς, *am quite friendly.*

A. In the Antiope of Euripides, a dialogue between the 486
brothers Zethus and Amphion was contained, in which the former, who was a shepherd, exhorts the other to give up the art of music, to which he had devoted himself. The dialogue, as the remains show, involved a brilliant comparison between the life of the practical man and of one devoted to the arts. See Appendix, No. 3. —— μειρακιώδει . . . μορφώματι, *you strive to ornament a soul so nobly endowed by a puerile form*, or outside. μορφώματι denotes external decoration; here, the musical and poetical pursuits of Amphion. —— οὔτ' ἂν δίκης, etc., *nor in the counsels of justice couldst thou put forth thy words, nor take hold of any thing probable and persuasive*; i. e. Zethus denies to his brother the power to defend himself in suits at law, and to use the arts of persuasion. —— ἀπαγάγοι. The word points at the ἀπαγωγὴ of Attic law, a summary process by which the accused could be dragged before the proper magistrate, and locked in prison, without previous citation. One of the crimes to which this process was applicable was ἀσέβεια, the offence for which Socrates, though by another process, was actually tried. There is an allusion below, no doubt, to what actually happened; to the seeming helplessness and unskilfulness of Socrates at his trial; to his

accusers, who were men of little influence or repute; and especially to the leading one, Meletus, a bad poet and a bad man; as well as to the penalty of death, which they attached to their indictment. —— *ἀδικεῖν*, says Stallb., accipiendum pro *ἠδικηκέναι*. Heindorf on Protag. p. 310, D, makes the same remark, and brings a number of examples in proof of it. One is from Lysias, p. 678, Reiske: *οἱ δ' ἠδικηκότες ἐκφιάμενοι τοὺς κατηγόρους οὐδὲν ἔδοξαν ἀδικεῖν*. According to Ast, the present includes the past, = *to have done and to be still doing wrong*. This is often true, but it will not explain such a case as this from Lysias, p. 136, Reiske, cited by Heindorf: *ἀξιῶ δέ, ὦ βουλή, εἰ μὲν ἀδικῶ, μηδεμιᾶς συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν*, where one crime some time before committed is spoken of. The true explanation is, perhaps, that *ἀδικῶ* properly means, *I am a wrongdoer*, as well as *I am doing wrong*. But he is *a wrongdoer* who *has done wrong*.

B. *κατηγόρου ... μοχθηροῦ*, *a very common and paltry sort of accuser;* referring to the accuser's standing in general. —— *θανάτου ... τιμᾶσθαι*, *to lay his damages against you at death*, which happily is an expression we do not use, because our law, unlike that of Athens, never places human life in the power of a vile or revengeful accuser, and of a throng of unrestricted judges. *τιμᾶσθαι*, *to make his own estimate, set his price*, is the usual word for the plaintiff's claim of satisfaction, whether pecuniary or penal. The court were said *τιμᾶν*. The defendant was said *ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι*, *to estimate in his turn what ought to be the verdict*, or *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι*, *to give his reduced estimate*, in case he had been voted guilty by the judges. And all this was allowed only in certain suits called *ἀγῶνες τιμητοί*, or those in which the laws had not settled the penalty, but left it to the judges. One of these was *ἀσέβεια*, for which Socrates was tried. On being found guilty, his *ὑποτίμημα* was called

for; and instead of naming some small mulct which might have saved his life, he named support in the Prytaneum. This led the judges, who usually chose between the accuser's estimate and that of the accused, to sentence him to death. —— *περισυλᾶσθαι, ζῆν.* These infinitives, as Stallb. remarks, depend on *ἔθηκε*, which is followed at first by a participle, *δυνάμενον*, added as a paraphrase of the poet's *χείρονα*, and then by an infinitive. —— *ἀτεχνῶς.* See 491, A.

C. *εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον.* See 509, A, note. —— *ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτειν, to strike* a person *upon the side of the head* or *temples*, is spoken only of blows *with the flat hand*, and was the highest insult at Athens. See 527, D. —— *πραγμάτων . . . εὐμουσίαν.* This expression is from Eurip., and alludes to Amphion's pursuit. His brother says, No longer practise music, but musicalness of conduct, i. e. that which is in harmony with your nature and powers.

D. *ἀγαθά.* A. Gellius (10. 22) has quoted the passage from *φιλοσοφία γάρ*, 484, C, to this place, but misapprehends its import. —— *τὴν ἀρίστην* is in opposition to *τινα τῶν λίθων.* Just above we should expect *αἷς βασανίζουσι* for *ᾗ*, referring to *τούτων τῶν λίθων*; but *ᾗ* comes from Plato's having *τινα λίθον* in his mind. —— *προσαγαγών, admovens*, is used with allusion to gold, which was brought to the touchstone to be rubbed upon it, that a judgment might be formed by the color. The order here is, *πρὸς ἣν προσαγαγὼν αὐτὴν, ἔμελλον εὖ εἴσεσθαι εἰ.* Comp. Herodot. 7. 10: "pure gold we do not distinguish by itself, but when we rub it (viz. on the touchstone) by the side of other gold, then we distinguish the better."

E. *ἄν* = *ἃ ἄν.* —— *αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ, true in themselves*, or *the very truth.*

A. *ψυχῆς πέρι . . . μή, as to the soul's living rightly and* 487 *the opposite.*

B. *μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος.* *μᾶλλον* is often thus used with a comparative instead of a positive; and in the same way *πέρα*, just below, 487, D.

C. Andron is mentioned in Protag. 315, C. He was probably the father of Androtion, an orator and disciple of Isocrates, against whom an oration of Demosthenes was written. —— *ἐπήκουσα.* So Bekker, Ast, and others, with most MSS. Stallb. prefers *ὑπήκουσα, I overheard.* (This he retracts in his second edition.)

D. *εὐλαβεῖσθαι ... διαφθαρέντες.* Strikingly like Ecclesiastes vii. 16: "Neither make thyself overwise. Why shouldst thou destroy thyself?"

E. *δῆλον ὅτι* are often interposed in the middle of a sentence, without having an effect on the construction. And so *οἶσθ' ὅτι.* —— *τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας,* de *veritate perfecta et consummata* accipio. Heindorf. —— *τὸν ἄνδρα,* i. e. mankind. The article is used because *ἀνήρ* has its widest generic sense, and thus forms a definite whole.

488 A. *εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι. τοῦτο* traxerim ad *ἐξαμαρτάνω.* Nam Demostheni familiaris formula *εὖ ἴσθι τοῦθ' ὅτι,* Platoni, quod sciam, non item. Heindorf.

B. *ἄγειν.* See 484, B, note. If *ἄγειν* is there correctly explained by Boeckh, we must suppose that Socrates plays upon the word, without essentially injuring the sense of the passage from Pindar.

C. *ἀκροᾶσθαι, obedire,* like *ἀκούειν.* —— *τότε,* i. e. *antea,* quum de his rebus disputares. Sic *τότε* passim ponitur. Stallb. —— *τί ποτε λέγεις.* The present embraces the whole time of the present discussion. Hence it is here for *ἔλεγες.*

D. *οἱ δὴ καί,* etc. *Since, indeed, they even make laws for the one,* i. e. to control the one. The relative, as often elsewhere, renders a reason; i. e. = the demonstrative with *γάρ. τίθεμαι νόμον* is used of a people, or one empowered by them, making laws, the maker being one of the party

to be governed; *τίθημι νόμον*, of a sovereign or a divine lawgiver.

A. *ὅπως μὴ ἁλώσει.* See Soph. § 214, N. 3; Cr. § 602. 489 3; K. § 330, R. 4. —— *αἰσχυνόμενος.* Socrates refers with admirable irony to 482, C, D. —— *ἵνα . . . βεβαιώσωμαι*, etc., *that I may get confirmation* (for it) *from you, seeing that a man who is competent to decide has admitted it.*

B. *κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν, it seems that you were not speaking the truth*; for *λέγειν* is the infinitive of the imperfect. —— *ἃ . . . κακουργῶ.* He quotes what Callicles said, 483, A. —— *ὀνόματα θηρεύων, verba aucupans.* Comp. 490, A. The same metaphor is seen in our word *captious.* —— *ῥήματι ἁμαρτεῖν, to use a wrong expression.*

C. *ἢ οἴει με λέγειν*, etc. *Or do you think my opinion to be, that if a rabble should be collected of slaves and of all sorts of men, of no account except by reason of their bodily strength, and these persons should say* any thing, *that these very things* which they say *ought to have the force of law.* Join *τῷ ἰσχυρίσασθαι* together. This verb can mean *pollere, contendere, fidere.* For the first meaning, which is less common but seems to belong to it here, comp. Dio Cass. 44, p. 406, Reimar: *χαλεπὸν ἰσχυριζόμενόν τι τῷ σώματι φρονιμώτατον ἐκβῆναι, difficile est corpore esse valido, et animo prudenti.* *φῶσιν* must be taken absolutely, without an object, in the sense of *decreeing, determining,* but with contemptuous disparagement; unless we read, with Heindorf, *ἅττα* for *αὐτά.* And *αὐτὰ ταῦτα* refers to the edicts implied in *φῶσιν.*

D. *τοὺς δύο . . . τοῦ ἑνός.* As the numerals are opposed to one another, they have a certain definiteness. Hence the article. So *τὰ δύο μέρη*, sc. out of three, *two thirds.* Comp. Cr. § 483. —— *τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους* is as legitimate an expression as *τίνας ποτε*, which Routh wished to put into its place.

E. *προδίδασκε.* Schol. *περιττεύει ἡ πρόθεσις Ἀττικῶς.* I believe that in *προδιδάσκειν, προμανθάνειν* (Aristoph. Clouds, 476, 966), *πρὸ* means *forwards,* and that it is prefixed without adding much to the meaning of the verbs, because the idea of *advance* is involved in learning and teaching. This word alludes to a school, as is shown by *ἀποφοιτήσω.* —— *οὐ μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον.* Comp. 485, E. Most MSS. want *οὐ,* which, however, is necessary here, for although *μὰ* is almost confined to oaths expressly or impliedly negative, it is in itself merely affirmative, being connected, perhaps, in origin with *μήν, μέν.* —— *ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος,* etc., *whose words you used of me just now with much raillery.* —— *ὀνόματα λέγεις, you utter mere words.*

490 B. *πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι, multi simul.* Sæpenumero sic junguntur. Stallb.

C. *ἦ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων,* etc. *Must he then have more of these provisions than we, because he is better; or ought he, in virtue of his authority, to distribute them all,* etc. —— *εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, unless he intends to pay the penalty* (by making himself ill). —— *πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ.* Supply *ἐκτέον.*

D. *ποίων ἱματίων;* sc. *δεῖ αὐτὸν πλέον ἔχειν. ποῖος* is often used in questions conveying wonder, indignation, or contempt. Aristoph. Clouds, 366, *Ὁ Ζεὺς . . . οὐ θεός ἐστιν; | ποῖος Ζεύς; οὐ μὴ λῃρήσεις; οὐδ' ἔστι Ζεύς.* Just below we have *ποῖα ὑποδήματα . . . ἔχων; what shoes are you talking nonsense about?* *ἔχων* here takes an accusative, unless we write *ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.* Of this last phrase explanations, not quite satisfactory, are given by Hermann on Viger, note 228; Mt. § 567; Cr. § 632; K. § 668, R. 1 (largest Gr.). Comp. 497, A.

E. *ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.* Comp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 6, *ὃ δέ γε ταύτου δεινότερον, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν· σὺ δ' ἴσως, διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὴς εἶναι, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις.*

A. ἀτεχνῶς, *absolutely, positively. You never stop talk-* 491
ing always about cobblers and fullers and cooks, and positively nothing else. In the sense *without art*, the penult has the acute accent. —— ἀεὶ . . . λέγων . . . οὐδὲν παύει. ἀεὶ is joined thus redundantly with οὐδὲν παύομαι again, 517, C, and in Leges, 2. 662, E. Socrates was often thus reproached or derided for drawing his illustrations from homely sources. He was led to it by love of simplicity, contempt for pretension, the desire to find a general truth by means of familiar instances, and frequent conversations with artisans. See a fine passage in Sympos. 221, E. —— περὶ τίνων . . . πλέον ἔχων. Heind. remarks that περί τι, not περί τινος, is the usual formula with πλέον ἔχειν. —— τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν, etc., *by the better, namely, by who they are I do not mean*, etc. οἵ εἰσιν dictum est cum abundantia quadam qualem Callicles in hac oratione sectatur passim. Poterat enim omitti. Stallb.

B. For κατηγορεῖν with the genitive of the person, see Soph. § 183. 2 (§ 194, N. 3).

D. τί δέ; . . . ἀρχομένους; The reading and pointing here are quite uncertain. The passage in brackets is omitted by Bekker, after one MS. It has the look of an explanation of τί δέ. Nor does Socrates afterwards do any thing with ἀρχομένους, while ἄρχοντας is easily supplied with αὐτῶν. The sense without this passage is, *But what? Does justice consist in this, that those who rule themselves should have more than others.* Stallbaum's reading in his second ed. is αὐτῶν . . . τί [ἢ τί] ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους; where τί is *quatenus, qua in parte.* But how can ἀρχομένους be the subject of πλέον ἔχειν? or how could he say *quatenus sibimet ipsis imperantes* unless he had already spoken of governing one's self. —— ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ. δεῖ sometimes takes an accusative of the thing, when that is a pronoun.

E. ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ answers nearly to the French *comme vous êtes plaisant!* how ridiculous or foolish you are! γλυκὺς is used in the same way. —— τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας, *you mean those fools the temperate.* The one accusative is in apposition with the other; unless, with Stallb., we make τοὺς ἠλιθίους the predicate-accusative; in which case the sense is, *by the temperate you mean the silly.* The sophists struck a disastrous blow against morality by giving it this title. Comp. Repub. 348, D. "What!" says Socrates to the sophist Thrasymachus; "do you call justice (κακίαν) badness?" "No," said he, "but (πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν) very noble folly." —— πάνυ γε σφόδρα, sc. τοῦτο λέγεις.

492 B. οἷς . . . ὑπῆρξεν . . . υἱέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς . . . ἱκανοὺς. εἶναι belongs to both clauses. For the transition from the dat. dependent on the verb to the accus. construed with the infinitive, comp. 510, E, fin., and Soph. Electra, 962. —— τί . . . κάκιον εἴη, for τί ἂν . . . κάκιον εἴη. Comp. τίς . . . κατάσχοι, Soph. Antig. 605; Mt. § 515, Obs. ἂν may have dropped out here, as τί itself is wanting in ten MSS., both being absorbed, so to speak, by the last two syllables of δυναστείαν. —— οἷς ἐξὸν, etc. A contracted expression for οἷ, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς . . . αὐτοὶ ἐπαγάγοιντο, which is much the same as εἰ, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, etc., *if, when they had it in their power, . . . they were themselves to introduce.* Comp. Repub. 465, fin.: "Do you remember that some one reproved us, because we, in his opinion, made (ποιοῖμεν) our guards not happy, οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν, *who, when they could possess every thing belonging to the citizens, were to have nothing.*"

C. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή, etc. τοῦτο refers, not to the three nouns just preceding, but rather to ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, — to the condition of things when τρυφῇ, etc., are able to supply

their wants. —— τὰ δὲ ἄλλα. The predicate is φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

D. ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν, *undecunque*, from obsol. ἀμός, Attic ἁμός, = τις, whence μηδαμοῦ. This is Bekker's emendation of ἄλλοθέν ποθεν, which is evidently a false reading. —— ἑτοιμάζειν is for ἑτοιμαστέον, which the construction of the first clause would require. With this infin. supply δεῖν involved in κολαστέον.

E. ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις ... ὁ βίος, *such a life as you mention.* —— The lines here quoted are probably from the Polyidus of Eurip., and very similar to another fragment from his Phrixus. The second trimeter is completed by κάτω νομίζεται. The passage is parodied by Aristoph. in the Frogs, 1477.

A. The singular passage next following is introduced 493
by the way, and perhaps half in sport. At the beginning of an argument concerning the good and the pleasant, Socrates takes breath a moment, and changes reasoning for playful illustration. He first mentions an opinion concerning the true life, which was expressed by the Orphic and Pythagorean theologists; — that the body is the tomb of the soul, release from which will admit it into real existence. To this dogma Plato alludes in Cratylus, 400, C. He says (ironically throughout), upon the derivation of σῶμα, that it may come from σῆμα, because some call the body the σῆμα of the soul, as being that in which in this present it is buried; or because the soul σημαίνει by means of the body its thoughts and wishes. But he thinks that the name is due to the followers of Orpheus especially, who taught that the soul was inclosed and kept (σώζειν) in it to atone for its crimes in an earlier state. This derivation, he says, would require no change of letter. The Pythagorean Philolaus (Boeckh's Philolaus 181, Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 3, p. 518, Potter) says, that "the old theologers and diviners testify,

that the soul is joined to the body to suffer a certain penalty, and is buried in it *καθάπερ ἐν σάματι.*" To this, and to the comparison of the body to a prison, there is frequent allusion. Socrates now passes on to an allegorical explanation of the fable of the Danaides, which illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of devotion to animal desire. It was the doctrine of some Mysteries (the Orphic or Bacchic especially) that the initiated fared better in the world below than the uninitiated, and use was made of this fable to show the difference in their condition. The fable was afterwards spiritualized, as we see in the text, and applied to the soul and its parts. It may be doubted who is the author of this punning allegory. Boeckh contends that it was Philolaus, who was a native of Croton or Tarentum. But there is no evidence that this allegory, and the dogma first spoken of, are to be attributed to the same person. The Schol. refers it to Empedocles, and Olympiod. (apud Stallb.) does the same. But their assertions may be mere guesses. Ast regards it as Plato's own invention, playfully ascribed to an Italian or Sicilian, for the purpose of laughing at the countrymen of Polus and Gorgias. —— *τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς*, etc. *And that that part of the soul in which the desires lodge is capable of being persuaded, and of changing from one side to the other.* There may be a side-thrust at rhetoric, the object of which is *πείθειν*, when it is said that the part of the soul which contains the desires is moved this way and that by persuasion. —— *μυθολογῶν, expressing in the form of a fable.* —— The ensuing words, as Buttmann, in Heindorf's ed., observes, seem to be taken from a song of Timocreon of Rhodes, a lyric poet contemporary with the Persian war; of which song a few words in Ionic a minore dimeters preserved by Hephæstion (p. 71, Gaisford) are as follows: *Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ' ἔφα.* —— *κομψός.* On this word, Ruhnken (Timæus s. v.) says: *κομψὸν* dicitur

quicquid scitum et venustum est. Plerisque autem locis, apud Platonem vox habet aliquid ironiæ Socraticæ, ut non tam *de vera et naturali*, quam *de nimia et adscititia venustate* capienda videtur. Gorg. 521, E. Pro *splendidis nugis* sumendum est Gorg. 486, C. Neque tamen desunt loci ubi simpliciter et sine ironia ad laudem referatur: which he considers to be the case here. It answers to nice, fine, refined, and witty. I cannot help thinking that it here contains something of irony. —— *παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι, making a change in the word*, altering its sound a little.

B. *τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων*, etc., *and that that part of the soul of the uninitiated, where the desires reside, — its incontinent and irretentive part, — he said that this was a cask with holes in it; making the comparison on account of its ἀπληστία. ἀμυήτους*, besides its similarity to *ἀνοήτους*, seems to have a double sense, uninitiated (*ἀ, μυεῖν*) and *not closing*, unable to contain, as if from *ἀ, μύειν*. The construction is completed by supplying *ἔφη*, suggested by *ὠνόμασε*. *αὐτοῦ* seems to refer to *ψυχῆς*, although no reason appears why the neuter should here be chosen. Heindorf wished to read *διὰ τὸ ἀκύλαστον*, in which case *αὐτοῦ* would refer to *τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς*. —— *τουναντίον* and *σοὶ* are to be joined, *the opposite of what you have expressed.* —— *τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων, meaning of course the invisible*, i. e. the intellectual, as opposed to the material. Comp. Phædo 80, D, *ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἕτερον τόπον οἰχόμενον.* —— *οὗτοι . . . κοσκίνῳ, that these uninitiated persons are, as it would seem (εἶεν ἄν), the most wretched, and carry water into the cask with holes in a sieve likewise perforated.* The early mysteries seem to have consisted of purifications, the effect of which was to remove guilt. Hence the initiated escaped the punishment in the future world which was to fall on others. This was denoted by making use of certain fables of the poets, which exhibited the popular view of the punishment of great offenders, and applying them to the uninitiated.

C. ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην, etc., *on account, namely, of its inability to retain, through unbelief and forgetfulness.* ἀπιστίαν alludes to πίθον. —— ἐπιεικῶς. Non explicuerim cum Heindorfio *satis, admodum*, sed habet vim affirmandi atque concedendi, ut Latinorum *utique, sane quidem*. Stallb. *Ut candide loquar*. Routh. —— ὑπό τι, *aliquatenus, quodammodo*. Stallb. —— δηλοῖ μὴν, etc. *Yet they make that clear, by the exhibition of which I wish to persuade you — if in any wise I can — to change your mind.* —— μεταθέσθαι, sc. γνώμην or ψῆφον. The next words explain μεταθέσθαι, and therefore have no need of καί, which is in some editions. Just below, μετατίθεσαι is used in what is called the *constructio prægnans* like ἐξελέγχω, p. 482, B. The sense is, *And do you change your opinion, and say that*, etc.

D. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν, *from the same school with that just now*, from some allegorizing sophist. For ὁ αὐτός followed by the dative, in brief phrases, see Soph. § 195, N. 3. —— After οἷον supply λέγοις ἄν.

E. νάματα . . . ἑκάστου τούτων, *liquors belonging to*, or put into, *each of these tubs.*

494 B. χαραδριοῦ. A bird, so called from the ravines and beds of torrents where it lives, of a yellowish color, and very voracious. ἅμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει, says the Schol. The Schol. on this place and many others mention that these birds were reputed to cure the jaundice by being looked at; whence those who brought them into town for sale kept them covered, lest they should effect a cure for nothing. More about the bird will be found in Schneider on Aristot. Hist. Animal., Vol. IV. 80, seq. He thinks it to be the charadrius œdicnemus or c. hiaticula of Linnæus. —— τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἷον, *do you allow that there is such a thing as.*

C. λέγω, καὶ, etc. λέγω, to be repeated after καὶ in the

sense of *speaking of*, takes a personal object with which the participles agree. The sense is, *Yes*, and *I speak of* (allow that there is such a thing as) *a man having all the other desires, and able to live happily by taking pleasure in feeding them.* —— ὅπως μή, i. e. σκόπει ὅπως μή, as usual. ἀπαισχυνεῖ is used with allusion to what Callicles has said of the modesty of Gorgias and Polus, as in 489, A. —— κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον explains the preceding clause. Hence the asyndeton. —— δημηγόρος, *coarse, vulgar.*

D. ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ. This alludes ironically to his definition of the βέλτιστοι as being the ἀνδρεῖοι (491, C).

E. τὸ . . . κεφάλαιον, *id quod rerum hujus generis* (i. e. turpissimarum) *caput est.* Ast. κεφάλαιον is in apposition with ὁ βίος. —— ἀνέδην, *freely* or *openly.*

A. ἀνομολογούμενος, *inconsistent, disagreeing;* from ὁμο- 495
λογούμενος, used as an adjective, and ἀ priv. —— διαφθείρεις . . . λόγους, *you make what we have said before good for nothing.*

B. καὶ γὰρ σύ. *Well, what of that? For you do too,* i. e. παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ λέγεις.

C. διελοῦ τάδε, etc. *Explain the following. You mean something probably by* ἐπιστήμη (certain knowledge), *do you not?* —— ἄλλο τι οὖν, etc. *Did you not accordingly, on the ground that knowledge was a different thing from manliness, speak of these as two?* The allusion in this and the prior question is to 491, A, B. With τὴν ἀνδρείαν, οὖσαν is to be supplied. The accus. absol. is often found without the participle of εἰμί expressed. Bekker, without MS. authority, adds ὄν after ἕτερον, which is a very probable conjecture, as ὄν may easily have been swallowed up by ἕτερον. The participle ὄν would be attracted in gender to the predicate.

D. ὁ Ἀχαρνεύς. Socrates playfully but severely imitates the solemn style of covenants, in which the *demus* of the

parties was mentioned. Some of the *demi*, as that to which Socrates belonged, had no corresponding adjective forms. The want was in most cases supplied by an adverb in θεν taken with the article.

496 A. περὶ ὅτου . . . ἀπολαβών, *look* at this *with regard to any part of the body you please, taking it by itself*, or separately. —— ᾧ, *which disease*, refers to νοσεῖν implied in νοσεῖ.

C. ὑπερφυῶς ὡς. Comp. 447, D.

D. οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις, etc. *In that of which you are speaking, the one part, viz.* διψῶντα, *being thirsty, is then feeling pain, is it not?* He was speaking of διψῶντα πίνειν.

E. κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; *do you speak of taking pleasure so far forth as the act of drinking is concerned?* i. e. does the *pleasure go with the drinking?* —— λυπούμενον; *at the same time that the person feels pain?* —— εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος. Stallb. would read ψυχῆς πέρι. But there can be no objection to taking τόπον with the genitives; and χρόνον is excused by being in its company.

497 A. γίγνεται. See 525, E, note. —— ἀκκίζει. Olymp. apud Stallb. προσποιῇ μωρίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι. Mœris defines ἀκκισμὸς as the Attic expression for προσποίησις. From examples of the use of the word, its meaning evidently is, *to pretend that you do not*, particularly *to decline taking a thing* (as food at table) *when you want it*. Comp. Coray on Heliodor. 2. 64. θρύπτομαι has sometimes much the same sense, e. g. in Plut. Anton. § 12, where it is used of the feigned reluctance of Cæsar to wear the crown. —— ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς. Comp. 490, E, note. Stallb. (first ed.) and Ast suppose this to be a gloss. Stallb. (second ed.), after Winckelmann on Euthydem. 295, C (quite a parallel passage, οὐκ ἀποκρίνει, ἔφη, πρὸς ἃ ἄν ὑπολαμβάνῃς, ὅτι ἔχων φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἶ τοῦ δέοντος), gives καὶ πρόϊθί γε . . .

νουθετεῖς to Callicles, and οὐχ ἅμα . . . πίνειν to Socrates. On this passage we may remark, — 1. That ὅτι ἔχων λῃρεῖς, a choice Attic expression, has not the look of a gloss, and it is not easy to say what it is a gloss upon. 2. The phrase is not in dramatic keeping with the politeness of the Platonic Socrates. But then, 3. As Callicles wishes to break off the discourse, πρόϊθι εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν is not what *he* would say. 4. νουθετεῖς can only point at the advice given by Callicles to Socrates, on pp. 484 – 486, and not to any thing said by Socrates. Comp. 488, A, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, referring to Callicles. 5. There is no mark of a change of person at οὐχ ἅμα, and little at καὶ πρόϊθι. These last considerations induce me to reject Winckelmann's view, and to regard it even more probable that ὅτι ἔχων λῃρεῖς are words spoken by Socrates. But I can arrive at no sure affirmative conclusion respecting the passage.

B. οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, *this damage* or cost *is not yours*, i. e. this does you no harm.

C. ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι. There is an elegant allusion to the mysteries of Ceres; which were divided into the small, held in the city, and the great, held chiefly at Eleusis. The latter could not be witnessed until a year or more after initiation into the other. The sentiment is something like that in Artegall's words to the Giant : —

> "For how canst thou those greater secrets know,
> That dost not know the least thing of them all?
> Ill can he rule the great, that cannot reach the small."

—— ὅθεν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, *answer beginning where you left off*. The usual construction of ἄρχω with an adverb of motion is here adopted by ἀποκρίνομαι. —— πεινῶν is a participle; πάνεται here adopts two constructions.

D. ὁμολογεῖσθαι seems to mean *to agree with itself; σοι* being the ethical dative, and τὸν λόγον or ταῦτα understood the subject. But ὁμολ. σοι may also denote *to be consistent with your previous admissions*. Comp. 487, D.

E. *τοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ.* Supply *καλοὺς καλεῖς.* The article is here used as a demonstrative, — a usage not uncommon before a relative sentence introduced by *ὅς*, *ὅσος*, or *οἷος*.

498 A. *ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον*, i. e. *χαίρειν δοκοῦσι.* This is said in contempt, as if Socrates were not deserving of a sensible answer.

C. *ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον*, etc. If cowards, who, according to Callicles, are the bad, feel more pleasure and pain than brave men when enemies retire and advance, and if pleasure and pain are the same as good and evil, then the bad are both bad and good in a higher degree than the good, which is absurd. After *μᾶλλον ἀγαθοί*, the MSS. have *οἱ ἀγαθοί*, which Routh and succeeding editors have justly left out, as wholly perverting the sense.

E. *δὶς γάρ τοι*, etc. A proverb, imputed by the Schol. to Empedocles, a part of one of whose hexameters (v. 164 in Sturz's Emped.) is *καὶ δὶς γὰρ ὃ δεῖ καλόν ἐστιν ἐνισπεῖν. τοι*, *you know*, is often used in making familiar remarks or citing well-known passages. A little below, in 499, B, *πάλαι τοι*, it has, according to Stallb., "vim confirmandi cum quadam admiratione vel indignatione," = *really*, or *don't you know.*

499 B. *ὡς δή*, see 468, E. —— *ἰοὺ* sometimes expresses *grief*, sometimes *joy*, or, as here, *wonder.* It is oxytoned by all the editors of Plato. Others would write *ἰοῦ*, either always, or when it does not denote grief.

C. *αὖ*, *again*, refers to 491, C. He is again inconsistent with himself. —— *ἑκόντος εἶναι*, *if you could help it*, *if you had your way about it.* See Soph. § 221, N. 3; Cr. § 623, N.; K. § 306, R. 8. According to Hermann (Append. to Viger, de pleonasmo), it is not simply *sponte*, but *quantum quis sponte quid faciat*, and is used "de eo potissimum quod quis facere detrectat." Dr. Arnold (on Thu-

cyd. 2. 89), after Hermann, says that ἑκὼν εἶναι "is used generally in negative sentences where the speaker wishes to qualify his denial or refusal, by saying that he will not do it if he can help it, but that very possibly he may not be able to help it." He adds, that in Prometheus, 266 (ἑκὼν ἑκὼν ἥμαρτον), ἑκὼν εἶναι would make nonsense. —— τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν, *to do well what is in one's power, to make the best of what you have.* This proverb again occurs in Leges, 12. 959, C. —— ἡδοναί τινές . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δέ. The constant use of ὁ μέν, ὁ δέ, in antitheses, seems to be the reason why (by a kind of apposition, perhaps,) they follow τινες here. Instead of τινες μὲν . . . ἄλλαι δέ, *some, . . . others,* we have, as if the contrast needed to be made stronger, *some, these I say . . . those.* Comp. Eurip. Hec. 1185, πολλαὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν, αἱ μὲν εἴσ' ἐπίφθονοι | αἱ δ', etc. In Æschin. c. Ctes. (§ 11, Bekk.), οἱ μὲν follows τινες, and the second οἱ μὲν is suppressed, as is often the case with ὁ μέν, ὁ δὲ alone. The formula often occurs as in Plat. Repub. 8. 560, A.

D. εἰ ἄρα τούτων. Græci frequenter relativam orationis structuram permutant cum conditionali. Stallb. The relative structure would be αἳ μὲν ἄρα τούτων, etc.

E. τέλος, etc. Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 2. 5: Hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas, id esse, quo omnia, quæ recte fierent, referrentur, neque id ipsum usquam referretur.

A. ἐκ τρίτων, and ἐκ τρίτου, *in the third place, third.* 500
Eurip. Orest. 1173, σωτηρίαν σοι, τῷδέ τ', ἐκ τρίτου τ' ἐμοί. Sympos. 213, B, ὑπολύετε Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κατακέηται. —— Cap. 55. ὧν αὖ for αὖ ὧν. αὖ is out of its clause for the sake of rhythm.

B. See 464, B, seq. —— παρασκευαί, the Schol. observes, is a middle term, standing for τέχναι and ἐμπειρίαι both, like ἐπιτηδεύσεις. —— μέχρι ἡδονῆς, *terminating in pleasure.* This is explained by the next words, where

αὐτὸ τοῦτο refers to ἡδονήν, i. e. τὸ ἡδύ. —— καὶ ἐτίθην, etc., *and among those pursuits which relate to the pleasures, I set down cookery as a knack, and not an art; but of those which have to do with good* (I set down) *medicine as an art.* —— πρὸς φίλου, supply Διός. —— μήτε αὐτὸς οἷον, etc. In this sentence, the two main clauses begin with μήτε; and the clause beginning with μηδὲ is the second part of the first clause. Comp. K. largest Gr. § 743, R. 4. —— μηδ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃς, etc., *and do not, contrary to your opinion, answer whatever comes into your head, nor take what I say as though I were in sport.*

C. οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον ... ἢ τοῦτο. The last words are added to recall οὗ to mind, and τοῦτο takes the construction of τί rather than of περὶ τούτου οὗ. It often happens that ἤ and *quam* are so inserted after a genitive depending on a comparative. —— ἐπὶ ὅν, i. e. τοῦτον ἐφ' ὅν. —— τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, whether I ought to spend my life *in doing those deeds of the real man, forsooth,* that you spoke of. The reference is to 485, A – D. δή is ironical. —— ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον. We should expect τόνδε τὸν βίον, sc. ζῆν; but Plato forms this clause as though he had written πότερον ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτον, etc.

D. εἰ ἔστι ... τὼ βίω. A rare instance of a dual agreeing with a singular verb. As is usual in similar examples in Attic writers, where plurals not neuter are joined with a singular verb, the verb is ἐστί, and it precedes the noun.

E. Socrates breaks off in the middle of the sentence, to know whether Callicles is so far of the same opinion.

501 A. ἡ δ' ἰατρική, i. e. δοκεῖ μοι τέχνη εἶναι. Just below, ἡ ἰατρικὴ is added to explain ἡ μέν. Comp. ὃ μὲν ... ὃ κολαζόμενος, 476, E. —— ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς ... ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται. There is a striking change of construction here. The sentence begins with ἡδονῆς, as if Plato had in his mind the form of the preceding sentence, and were going

to say, *τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν φύσιν ἔσχεπται οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν.* But this thought, which afterwards appears in the participial form, is postponed, and the intervening clause, *πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία . . . ἅπασα*, determined him to say, *ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται*, accommodated to *πρὸς ἣν*, and to leave *ἡδονῆς* in the lurch, so to speak. It may be asked, why, when he read it over, he did not dismiss *ἡδονῆς* from its irregular position. The answer is, that the Greeks were governed in their style by nature, — a higher rule than grammar, and did not object to such irregularities of structure as arise from the nature of the mind, and are heard in good conversation. —— *ἀτίχνως*, and not *ἀτεχνῶς*. Comp. 491, A. —— *ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν, in a manner altogether irrational, making, I may say* (i. e. almost), *no estimates* (or discriminations), *a mere practice and experience.*

B. *ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται.* *ᾧ* refers to *τῷ μνήμην σώζεσθαι τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι.* —— *καὶ εἶναί τινες*, i. e. *καὶ εἰ δοκοῦσί σοι εἶναί τινες.* It might have been said equally well, *εἶναί τινας*, etc. —— *ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ*, i. e. as in the case of the body. —— *οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς*, etc., *nor having any concern about aught else but gratification* merely, no matter *whether it be for the better or the worse.* Here the structure changes to the impersonal participle, and the subject of the prior clause becomes *αὐταῖς.*

C. *ἐμοὶ . . . δοκοῦσι εἶναι, it seems to me that there are* such, or *they seem to me to exist.* The words refer to *εἶναί τινες πραγματεῖαι*, etc. It is strange that Stallb. and Ast, overlooking this plain sense, understand *κολακεία* as the predicate. —— *συγκατατίθεσαι.* The word means, properly, *to drop one's vote in the same vessel with another person*, as a judge in the court. *ἡμῖν* is ironical, as he had compelled Gorgias and Polus to agree with him.

D. *οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καί.* *οὐκ* denies the previous sentence taken as a whole. —— *χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι*, i. e. *ἔξεστι.*

E. *τοιαύτη τις . . . διώκειν.* The infinitive explains the demonstrative, and depends on *δοκεῖ* repeated. —— *ἄλλο οὐδὲν φροντίζειν.* This verb, in the sense of *caring about*, usually takes a genitive, or a genitive with *περὶ*, but sometimes a neuter accusative. Soph. § 182, N. 1. —— *ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι.* Plato condemned all music on the flute, as tending to render the young unmanly and fond of pleasure. He was, however, for retaining the lyre and harp in education, but disapproved of some of the occasions where they were used, such as the public contests of choruses, dramatic or dithyrambic, thinking that pleasure and not good was their object, and that they tended to agitate and not to calm the soul. Comp. Repub. 3. 398–403. —— *ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία, the exhibition of choruses*, so called because the *instruction* of the chorus was the principal preparative. The chorus in dithyrambic poetry is especially intended. —— *Κινησίας* of Thebes, so called, it is said, because *ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἐχρῆτο πολλῇ κινήσει.* He was much laughed at for his poetry by the comedians (Aristoph. Birds, 1377, and Schol.), and attacked by the orators on account of his character (Lysias in Athenæus, 551, 552).

502 A. *τί δὲ . . . Μέλης;* i. e. *ἐδόκει σοι*, as above *τί ἡ διδασκαλία καὶ ποίησις;* i. e. *καταφαίνεταί σοι.* A little below, *τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ*, etc., the construction is different, namely, *τί δὲ δή ἐστι τοῦτο ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε ἡ σεμνὴ*, etc. What is said here is a mere passing fling at Meles on account of the badness of his odes.

B. *ἡ . . . θαυμαστὴ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις.* The ordinary collocation, as Stallb. remarks, would be *ἡ θαυμαστὴ ποίησις, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας.* He cites Herodot. 7. 196, *ὁ ναυτικὸς ὁ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατὸς*; Repub. 565, D, *τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερόν*, and other examples. —— *διαμάχεσθαι . . . ὅπως μὴ ἐρεῖ.* Is its aim . . . *to insist upon it*

... *that it will not say*, etc. —— *εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδές*. For *ὄν* omitted, comp. Soph. Electr. 313. —— *ποτέρως ... παρεσκευάσθαι, utro modo tibi videtur comparata esse.* For Plato's view of tragedy, comp. Repub. 8. 568, C, 2. 378, seq., and a noble passage, Leges, 7. 817. Another admirable passage treats of the corruption of tragedy by popular influence. Leges, 2. 659.

C. *εἴ τις περιέλοιτο*. Aristides, in opposing this passage, and the Schol., have *περιέλοι*, which Coray and Stallb. prefer. Ast, in defending the text, says that *εἰ περιέλοι* denotes *if one were to strip off*, *εἰ περιέλοιτο*, *if one were to strip off for himself*, i. e. in his own mind to conceive of it as stripped off. —— *μέλος, musical accompaniment; ῥυθμόν, definite succession of arses and theses; μέτρον, definite succession of long and short syllables.* —— *ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται*. The verb is attracted in number to the predicate *λόγοι*.

D. *οὐκοῦν ... ἂν εἴη*, *It* (tragedy) *would be then a rhetorical species of popular speaking.* —— *δῆμον τοιοῦτον, οἷον παίδων*, i. e. to a people (or audience) composed of boys, etc. The grammatical construction, which would be *οἷός ἐστι* (*δῆμος*) *παίδων*, is forsaken through a singular kind of attraction, by which *οἷος, ὅσος, ἡλίκος*, with the noun or adjective they accompany, adopt the case of the antecedent. It has been inferred from this, and a few other passages of Plato, that women attended the theatre at Athens, at least in tragic exhibitions. Comp. Leges, 2. 658, D, 7. 817, C, and Becker's Charicles, excursus to Scene 10.

A. *οὐχ ἁπλοῦν*, etc. = *τοῦτο ὃ ἐρωτᾷς οὐκέτι ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν*, 503
i. e. does not admit of a simple answer. —— *διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα, to persist in saying*, or *steadily to say.*

B. *τί οὐχὶ ... αὐτὸν ἔφρασας*. Mt. § 503, c, says, "After *τί οὐ* an aorist often follows, where we should have looked for a present." A degree of urgency is contained

in this mode of speaking. It may be explained by the practice of expressing a wish by means of an interrogative sentence. "Why did you not tell me?" = "I wish you had already told me," and by implication, "Tell me at once." —— *αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, have it ascribed to them,* is here used in a good sense.

C. *οὐκ ἀκούεις.* Præsens hujus verbi de durante fama, — perpetuo ponitur. Stallb.; i. e. it is used of something which is said and may be heard until now. Comp. the editor's note on Prometh. 683 (ed. sec.). —— *νεωστί,* i. e. about twenty-three years before. —— *οὗ καὶ ἀκήκοας.* See 455, E. For Plato's opinion of Pericles, see the Introduction. —— *εἰ ἔστι γε . . . ἣν σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής.* Comp. for *ἀρετήν,* Soph. § 151, Rem. 6. The apodosis of this sentence, which might be "they are good men," is omitted. "When a proposition with *εἰ μέν,* or *ἢν μέν,* has another with *εἰ δὲ* opposed to it, the apodosis is often suppressed in one of the two." Mt. § 617. In the ensuing clause, the predicate, *ἐστὶν ἀληθές,* is left out, and *ὅτι* before the infinitive is redundant. Examples are given by Heindorf, on Phædo, 63, C. Comp. 453, B, above. *ὅτι* was used as though *δεῖ ἀποτελεῖν* was to follow; but when Plato came to that part of the sentence, he accommodated *ἀποτελεῖν* to *εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο*: "if this, viz. *ἀποπιμπλάναι,* is not virtue, but this, viz. *ἀποτελεῖν,* etc., is so."

D. *τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι.* The nominative here is used by anacoluthon, as if, instead of *ἠναγκάσθημεν ὁμολογεῖν,* Plato had written *ὡμολογήθη.* —— *οὑτωσὶν ἀτρέμα, quite calmly,* or *pretty calmly.* *οὕτως,* like *sic* in Latin, throws into the adverb before which it stands a certain modification of its meaning, which cannot be easily expressed. Comp. Eurip. Alcest. 680, for an analogous use of *οὕτως* with verbs.

E. *ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι,* etc. *ἄλλοι* is used here as in 473,

C. The verb προσφέρει leaves the number required by δημιουργοί, through the influence of ἕκαστος, added in apposition to that noun. Comp. Mt. § 302, Obs. —— οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν. In this sentence the apodosis is omitted. One can supply in thought ῥᾳδίως τοῦτο ὄψει. But the true account of the sentence is, that the apodosis should have begun at ὡς εἰς τάξιν ("if you wish to look at painters, etc., — you will see that, etc."); but by a change of style the clause ὡς εἰς τάξιν is made to depend on ἰδεῖν, and the apodosis loses its proper form under the impression that an imperative, ἴδε εἰ βούλει, instead of εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν, had commenced the sentence.

B. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν, i. e. τάξεως τυχόντα χρη- 504
στὰ εἶναι.

C. εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα, *to mention the name for it, as* you did *for that*. In the MSS., ἐκεῖνο stands, which, if genuine, is put briefly for ἐκείνου τὸ ὄνομα.

E. ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, etc., *or any thing else which sometimes will not be of more use to it* (the body) *than the contrary* (i. e. abstinence from such gratifications will be) *according to a right view of the case; — nay, even of less.* So this clause must be rendered as it stands. But I am persuaded, notwithstanding what Stallb. says, that ἢ ought to be inserted before κατά, as Heindorf proposes, or γε turned into δέ. For since γε shows that the clause κατὰ . . . λόγον relates to the foregoing, καὶ ἔλαττον stands quite by itself; and the asyndeton (καὶ being *etiam*) is intolerable.

B. οὐκοῦν . . . κολάζειν; ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ belongs to εἴρ- 505
γειν. —— ὥσπερ . . . ᾧου relates to ἀκολασία. See Chap. 46, 48.

C. οὗτος ἀνήρ. See 467, B. —— κολαζόμενος is obviously in apposition with πάσχων; but we might have also had κολάζεσθαι in apposition with τοῦτο. According to Aristotle on Rhet. 1. 10. 17, cited by Stallb., κολάζειν (to chastise,

correct, lit. to cut off, prune) differs from τιμωρεῖσθαι (to take satisfaction from, punish) in this; that the former takes place for the sake of the sufferer, the latter for that of the doer. —— μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν; *are we ending the discourse in the middle?* Some inferior MSS. have καταλύσομεν, *are we going to end*, and some καταλύωμεν, which (or rather καταλύσωμεν, as the action is momentary) would be *shall we end*. The present denotes that they *are doing* that which is equivalent to stopping, that they *are beginning* to stop. —— αὐτὸς γνώσει, *you yourself must judge*, i. e. I wish to stop, but leave it to you.

D. θέμις. This word, being here an accusative, must be indeclinable. Of this use few will doubt, after reading what Elmsley and Hermann (Soph. Œd. Col. 1191), and Buttmann (largest Gram. 1. § 58, and 2. p. 405) have written. The other examples occur in Œd. Col. u. s., Xen. Œcon. 11. 11, and Æsch. Suppl. 331. In Æsch. Choeph. 632, it is a *neuter* nominative. No phrases are found besides θέμις ἐστί, θέμις εἶναι. This is a strange but not a solitary anomaly. Comp. χρέων, δεῖνα sometimes indeclinable, κρᾶτα in Sophocles nominative and accusative. —— περιὴ, sc. ὁ μῦθος. The style changes from the plural to the singular. Comp. for the expression, Leges, 6. 752, A, οὔκουν . . . ἂν μῦθον ἀκέφαλον καταλίποιμι, πλανώμενος γὰρ ἂν ἀπάντη τοιοῦτος ὢν ἄμορφος φαίνοιτο.

E. τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου. Athenæus (7. 308, C, and 8. 362, D) gives his words in a trochaic tetrameter, τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δύ' ἄνδρες ἔλεγον εἰς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω. —— ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. Supplent ποιεῖν ellipsi inaudita. Equidem οὕτως interpretor: *in hoc rerum statu, quum tu nolis amplius mecum colloqui.* Stallb. οὕτως seems to me to be loosely used for τοῦτο. Comp. Soph. Antig. 706, ὡς φῂς σὺ — τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, for ὃ φῂς σύ.

506 A. οὐδὲ γὰρ . . . εἰδὼς λέγω. Socrates often places him-

self in the attitude of a searcher after truth, unable of himself to find it, and hoping that others know where it is.

B. *ἕως ... ζήθου, till I had given him back the speech of Amphion for that of Zethus*, i. e. until I had defended philosophy from his attack. See 485, E. ἕως with an imperfect or aorist indicative accompanies another clause containing the same tenses with ἄν, when a *res non facta* is spoken of.

C. *ἀχθεσθήσομαι.* This form is condemned by Mœris as un-Attic, but is found several times in Attic writers, where, however, it may have come from the scribes. *ἀχθέσομαι* is the approved form. —— *εὐεργέτης ... ἀναγεγράψει.* An allusion to the honorary votes recorded on marbles, in favor of foreigners who had rendered Athens a service. —— *λέγε αὐτός. αὐτὸς* is *by yourself, without another speaker*, and so in *σοῦ αὐτοῦ διιόντος* above.

D. *οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ.* An elegant and certain emendation of Stallb. (ed. sec.) for *οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῇ.* —— *κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται.* One would expect *καλλίστη.* Coray wishes to strike out the word; Heindorf, to read *μάλιστα.* The sense is, *attends upon it*, or *is present most beautifully*, i. e. *is present in its greatest beauty*, or *highest perfection.*

A. *ἦν δὲ αὕτη*, i. e. now this we found to be. *ἦν* points 507
to the time when such a soul *was* (subjectively to them, i. e. appeared to be) *ἄφρων*, etc. Comp. 478, E, note.

B. *ἃ δεῖ ... φεύγειν καὶ διωκειν.* With the definition of the *σώφρων ἀνὴρ* here given, Routh compares Aristotle's in the Eth. Nicom. 3, sub fin.: *ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε.*

C. *τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα ... εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.* Plato passes in this same way from *εὖ πράττειν* to *εὐδαίμονα εἶναι* in Repub. 1. 353, E, Charmides 172, A, Alcibiad. 1. 116, B. As *εὖ πράττειν* has the two senses of *acting well*, and *being prosperous*, Plato may seem to have unfairly used this am-

biguity in his argument. So Heindorf and Stallb. view the passage. Routh, on the contrary, says, "Vult philosophus consequens esse necessario *ex antecedentibus* eum qui recte agit felicem esse. Vix enim potest credi ut Plato duplici sensu verborum *εὖ πράττειν* ad argumentum probandum abuti vellet." Finally, Ast, after Schleierm., correctly, as I think, observes, that Plato "in his conclusionem non ducit ex ambiguo, — sed usum loquendi cogitandus est in rem suam convertere, eumque quodammodo corrigere voluisse, ex ea enim quam posuit ratione, — nisi bonum quod est, nihil est prosperum ac beatum." With this Stallb., in his second edition, agrees.

D. *βουλόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι . . . διωκτέον.* The subject of the action of a verbal may be in the accusative or in the dative. —— *ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν* = *ὡς ἔχει τάχους*, Thucyd. 2. 92, = *ὡς τάχιστα*. Comp. Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, B. —— *παρασκευαστέον* is the verbal of the middle voice here, = *δεῖ παρασκευάσασθαι*. Mt. § 447. 2. —— *ἰδιώτης* (when opposed to the *state*), *an individual.* —— In the next sentence, *εἰς τοῦτο* refers to *ὅπως . . . ἔσεσθαι*, and *οὕτω πράττειν* to *συντείνοντα* and what follows it.

E. *ἀνήνυτον κακόν*, an *endless* or *cureless evil*, is in apposition with the participial clause preceding it, and in the accusative. Soph. § 167, N. 4; Cr. § 334. 8; K. § 266, R. 2. —— *φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί*, etc. The allusion is more particularly to Empedocles, who made *φιλία* and *νεῖκος* fundamental causes in his world of phenomena; the former, or the attracting principle, the cause of union among things unlike, of organization and of motion when *one* is made out of *many*, and the latter or the dissolving principle the cause of separation. He is the Agrigentine who taught in verse, that "quæ in rerum natura constarent, quæque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam." Cic. de Amicit. 7. His causes for the phenomena of t'

physical; and Socrates here gives playfully a moral turn to his doctrine.

A. *τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο . . . κόσμον καλοῦσιν.* The universe owed 508
the name *κόσμος*, order, *system*, to Pythagoras. Comp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 11, *ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος*, which shows that even then the appellation had not become very current. —— *ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρική.* Geometrical equality is that of *ratios*, arithmetical, of *numbers*. It exists figuratively in morals and politics, when the receipts of one are to his claims as those of another to his, i. e. when justice prevails and assigns to each according to his due, and not according to his power of receiving. But *πλεονεξία* or selfishness disturbs and destroys this kind of equality. In the state, this equality takes power from the bad, i. e. from the unjust and ignorant, and gives it to the wise and virtuous, because it is right that only they should govern who can govern well. There is a noble passage on the two equalities in the Leges, 6. 757, B, cited by Routh.

B. *ἐξελεγκτέος . . . ὡς.* See 467, A, note. —— *κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι.* The predicate *ἄθλιοι* is omitted. See K. § 852. 2, largest Gr. This is the more natural, because the preceding words, *εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες*, clearly indicate the construction. Stallb. has added *ἄθλιοι*, without authority or sufficient reason. —— *τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα.* This use of *τί* in the predicate with a plural subject is not uncommon. Comp. Æschin. c. Ctes., *ἀπόδειξιν ποιῆσαι τί ποτ' ἦν ἃ ἔπραξας, καὶ τί ποτ' ἦν ἃ ἔλεγες.* (§ 165, Bekker.) The same formula is repeated just below, *τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ . . . ὀνειδίζεις.*

D. *εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ*, etc. *And that I am in the power of any one who has the will, as those punished by civil infamy are in any one's hand who wishes it* (lit. belong to any one). There were three kinds of civil infamy at Athens, and they are particularly described by Andocides (p. 35, Reiske). The lowest consisted in a deprivation of

certain particular rights, as that of bringing an action as a public accuser. The next involved the taking away of all civil rights; and to this the highest added confiscation. As in the two latter kinds, the person affected with *ἀτιμία* could not appear in court as a prosecutor or a witness, or complain of his wrongs before the people, he was plainly in the power of his enemies. —— *νεανικὸν* denotes *high-spirited*, or rather *overbearing*. The clause is in apposition with *τύπτειν ἐπὶ κόῤῥης*. Comp. 507, E. The same is true of *τὸ ἔσχατον*, as it respects *ἀποκτεῖναι*. Socrates refers to 486, A – C.

E. *τέμνεσθαι*, when taken with *σῶμα*, is *in frusta dissecari*.

509 A. *καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν . . . ἐστι*. These words are used to excuse the confidence and want of deference to others which Socrates here displays. Comp. 462, E, 486, C. In the latter passage, we have *εἰ καὶ ἀ.*, and here *καὶ εἰ ἀ.* According to Herm. (on Viger, note 307), referred to by Stallb., *καὶ εἰ*, *etiam si*, is used concerning that which we only assume as true; *εἰ καί*, *quamquam*, concerning that which we declare to be true. Socrates, then, does not here admit that his expression is impolite; but in 486, C, Callicles acknowledges by *εἰ καὶ* his trespass against the rules of good-breeding. —— *οὕτωσὶν* ut Latinorum *sic* est *primo aspectu*. Ast.

B. *τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν*, etc. *By his inability to afford what kind of aid to himself would a man be in truth ridiculous?* This alludes to 486, B, *μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν*. —— *ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν* is for *αἴσχιστον εἶναι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν*, *that it is most disgraceful not to be able to render this assistance*, etc. (viz. this assistance which will avert the greatest evil). With this very strange instance of attraction, if it be such, we may compare the expression in

our own language which Routh adduces, *this is the most shameful thing to be without*, for *it is most shameful to be without this thing*.

C. *τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ*, sc. *βοήθειαν, and that the aid given to prevent the evil next in magnitude is second* (second in shame if inadequate, and in honor if adequate; for this latter is implied). *βοήθεια κακῶν* is like *ἀλκὴ κακῶν* in Euripides. —— *καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως*, sc. *ἔχειν*, not *ἔχει*, which Stallb. supplies.

D. *ἀδικήσεται*. See Soph. § 207, N. 6; Cr. § 554, *a*; K. § 251, R. 1. —— *τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; well, but what about doing wrong?* This genitive without a preposition may be compared with that which accompanies verbs of speaking. Comp. Soph. Electr. 317.

E. *τί οὐκ . . . ἀπεκρίνω*. See 503, B, note. The imperfect *ἀπεκρίνου* is in most MSS.; but in this formula that tense is not used. —— *μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν*. See 468, C, and the Introduction, p. xxiv.

A. *ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν*. See 480, A, note. 510

B. *φίλος μοι δοκεῖ*, etc. Here *ὅνπερ* refers forward to *ὁ ὅμοιος*, and *ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα* is taken with *φίλος*. *οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ* alludes especially to Hom. Odys. 17. 218, *ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον*. The thought is found also in Sympos. 195, B, *ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ὅμοιος ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει*, and in Lysis, 214, where it is said that the bad, being unlike themselves, that is, variable and unstable, cannot be friends. Comp. also Leges, 716, C, *τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δ' ἄμετρα οὔτ' ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις*.

C. *δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι*. Repentina subjecti mutatio, says Stallb., i. e. *τούτῳ* refers to *ὁ τύραννος*, and the subject of *δύναιτο* is *ὁ τοῦ τύραννου βελτίων*. This appears most probable, as Plato might easily return in his mind to the earlier subject of the clause, *εἴ τις . . . εἴη*; and as *οὐδ' ἂν*

οὗτος shows that the same subject was still in his mind. It is not, however, necessary, because either this person or the tyrant might be called a friend to the other. —— *ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει.* See 468, E, note.

D. *χαίρων, impune,* the opposite of *κλαίων,* passim apud dramaticos. And so *gaudens* is used in Latin. —— *αὕτη, . . . ὁδός ἐστιν. αὕτη,* the subject of *ἐστι,* refers to *ἐθίζειν,* but is attracted, as often happens, in gender, to the predicate *ὁδός.*

E. *ἔσται ἐπὶ τὸ οἷός τε εἶναι, will be in favor of,* or *will tend to his being able.* Here the construction of the dative with the infinitive is followed by that of the accusative. See 492, B.

511 B. *οὐκοῦν . . . ἀγαναχτητόν; Well, then, is not this just the thing to rouse indignation?*

D. *προσεσταλμένη, simple,* properly spoken of garments, *drawn close to the body,* in contrast to a garment which spreads out with numerous folds and plaits. —— *ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ διαπραξαμένη,* etc. *But when it has effected the same things with the forensic art, it charges, I presume, but two obols if it has brought a man safe from Ægina hither; and if from Egypt or the Pontus, — at the highest rate (ἐὰν πάμπολυ), when it has conveyed in safety what I just now spoke of, the man himself, and his children, and property, and women; having landed them in the port, it demands but two drachms.* Ast and Coray wish to change the order in this sentence. I see not why; for it is not more broken than often happens in earnest conversation. *ἐπράξατο* is the aorist of indefinite time. See 484, A. With *ἐὰν πάμπολυ,* supply *πράττηται.*

512 A. *λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ,* etc. Here *οὐκ* belongs to *βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ ὀνήσεσθαι,* which is the primary clause. But the sentence assumes an antithetical structure, the clauses *εἰ μέν τις, . . . εἰ δέ τις,* and *οὗτος μέν, τούτῳ δὲ* being paired off

against one another. On this form of sentences, Mt. § 622. 4, remarks, that "clauses are put in contrast with one another by means of *μὲν* and *δέ*, of which only the second clause suits the connection, while the first in other languages would be treated as a parenthesis." Preserving the Greek order and form nearly, we may translate, "*He reflects that it cannot be* (*οὐκ*), if a man afflicted with great and incurable diseases, whom he has saved from drowning, is miserable because he lost not his life, *that he* on the other hand *ought to live, who has many incurable maladies in* that which is more precious than the body, *the soul*, and that he (the person so reflecting) will do him good if he deliver him from the dangers of the sea, or the tribunal, or any other place. Nay, he knows," etc. The use of the optative *ὀνήσειεν* is to me at least perplexing. Stallb. renders it, with its attendant words, *neque a se ullo modo juvari posse*, and then in defence of it refers to Mt. § 529, on the *oratio obliqua*. But if I am not deceived, such a form as *λογίζεται* (being a present not equivalent to a historical tense, and not reducible to the form of *oratio obliqua*, as cases like *λέγεται ὡς τινά τις δέξαιτο* are) *ὅτι οὐκ ὀνήσειεν* would not be Greek, and if it were, must mean, not *can benefit*, but *probably benefits*. Heindorf conjectured *ὀνήσειεν ἄν*, *can* (not) *do him good*, which in some degree removes the difficulty. I beg leave to offer an opposite conjecture, *ὀνήσει*, on the supposition that the final syllable *εν* may owe its birth to *ἄν* wrongly repeated.

B. *οὐ νόμος ἐστί*, *it is not the custom.* —— *μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου*, i. e. *μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι*, *not to say*, or *to pass by the* pilot, who is not mentioned in order to select a stronger case, that of the general. Comp. *οὐχ ὅτι*, 450, E, note. —— *ἐλάττω σώζειν = ἐλάττονα σωτηρίαν ποριζειν*, or *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*. —— *μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι ; does he seem to you to be on a level with* (and not rather above) *the forensic man ?*

Comp. Repub. 466, B, *μὴ πῃ κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαίνεται βίον; does it seem to you to rank with the shoemaker's kind of life?*

C. *λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν.* Briefly for *λέγων δεῖν, καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν.* —— *ὡς οὐδὲν τἄλλά ἐστιν, on the ground that every thing else is of no value* (in comparison with engineering). —— *ἀποκαλέσαις.* This compound, of *καλέω*, as Stallb. remarks, is often used when a name is given in anger or contempt, = *to call by a nickname, to call contemptuously*, or *with a scornful air.* Examples may be found in Æschin. c. Ctes., and in Reiske's Index to Demosth. —— *ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς = ἐκ τῶν ἐπαίνων οὓς τὴν σαυτοῦ τέχνην ἐπαινεῖς.*

D. *μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο . . . ἐατέον ἐστί. μὴ* denoting *suspicion* that something is true, or *mild expression of opinion*, may be joined with an indicative; and the like may be said of *ὅρα μὴ* also. Comp. Soph. Electr. 581, 584 (where *τίθῃς*, and not *τιθῇς*, is supported by the MSS.); Alcibiad. 2. 139, D, *ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχει. μὴ* may here be translated by *perhaps*, or *I suspect.* The sense is, *I suspect that a man deserving the name ought to throw away the idea of living as long as ever he can, and not love his life too well; and yielding the disposal of all such things to the Deity, as well as believing what the women say, that no one, whosoever he be, can escape his destiny, that he ought to consider thereupon how he can best live during the life which he is probably about to live*, etc. A fine parallel passage occurs in Leges, 2, 661, C. *ἐπιτρέπειν*, in the sense of committing or referring to, and of giving up to, takes a dative of a person, often with a genitive with *περί.* Æschin. c. Ctes. § 83, *εἰ ἐπιτρέπειν ἐθέλοι πόλει τινὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, if he wished to refer the grounds of complaint to some impartial and disinterested state.* Alcibiad. 1. 117, D, *τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἔχοις; would you let the pilot have his*

own way, and be quiet? For οὐδ' εἶς, more emphatic than οὐδείς, comp. Eurip. Alcest. 671 (note in my ed.).

A. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ depends on ἀκεπτέον ἄρα. —— τὰς 513
τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας. The Thessalian sorceresses, who drew down the moon by their incantations, drew down mischief also upon themselves. They lost, it was thought, their eyes or their children, to which last τοῖς φιλτάτοις alludes. Even an astrologer, in predicting an eclipse of the moon, which was akin, in the minds of the vulgar, to magical arts, was supposed to incur calamity. Hence ἐπὶ σαυτῷ σελήνην καθαιρεῖς, or καθέλκεις, is used proverbially of those who draw down calamities upon themselves by their conduct. The next words, σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις, must mean *with the loss of what we hold most dear*, i. e., as Socrates estimates things, *of virtue and truth.* σὺν here properly denotes the means, and it is only by inference from the connection that the phrase can imply *the loss of*. The preposition, as Stallb. observes, seems to be chosen with allusion to Iliad, 4. 161, σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν | σὺν σφῇσιν κεφαλῇσι γυναιξί τε καὶ τεκέεσσι.

B. ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε, i. e. in Athens. See 469, D, and 468, E, note. —— ἀνόμοιον . . . χεῖρον, *so long as you are unlike the political institutions either on the better side or on the worse*, i. e. so long as you are not assimilated exactly to the democracy of Athens, but are either like the true philosopher, in favor of *better* institutions, under which knowledge and virtue, and not the popular will, shall govern, and resemble such institutions in your character; or, on the other hand, have the selfish spirit in the extreme, like the tyrant who first corrupts, and then destroys, popular liberty. Thus, I suppose, the politics of Plato, as set forth in the Republic and Laws, require us to understand these words. —— τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, etc., *to effect any genuine* or real *result in regard to obtaining the friendship*

of the Athenian people, i. e. to be on terms of true friendship with Athens. *δήμῳ* depends on *φιλίαν*. For *τῷ Πυριλάμπους*, see 481, D. —— *ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι*. Ast, after one MS., omits *πολιτικός*, but Stallb. justly says of it, *iteratur non sine vi et gravitate*. There is, as it seems to me, even something of scorn in the emphatical repetition of the word. *ὡς* is *since, seeing that*; not *as*, i. e. *according to* (your wishes).

D. *πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν*, i. e. *τό τινα πρὸς ἡδ. σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ ὁμιλεῖν*. With the indefinite subject of the infinitive agree the two subsequent participles.

E. *ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα, ὅπως*. Supply *ὁμιλεῖ*, as *ὁμιλοῦσα* is understood just above with *ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν*. —— *ἐπιχειρητέον . . . θεραπεύειν*. The infinitive is added epexegetically, and the datives depend on the verbal. Comp. Soph. Electr. 543, 1277. For the construction of *ποιοῦντας*, see 492, B, note. It is without a copula as explaining *οὕτως*, and *ὡς* is taken with *βελτίστους* only.

514 A. *εὑρίσκομεν*. The Atticists and MSS. vary in regard to the augment of verbs beginning with *ευ*. The earlier practice seems to have been, to leave the diphthong unchanged. Mt. § 167. 6. Below, 514, E, two of the best MSS. give *ηὑρίσκομεν*, and *ηὐδοκίμει*, 515, E. —— *ἐὰν μὴ . . . ἡντινοῦν* explains and defines *ἄνευ τούτου*. Comp. a similar apposition of a clause beginning with *ἐὰν μὴ* in Soph. Antig. 87. —— *δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, after we had engaged in a public capacity in any transactions of the state*. The genitive is taken partitively. The words *πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων* denote any employment in the state's service, as that of an *ἐργολάβος*, or *contractor*, like Phidias, and of an *ἀρχιτέκτων*, like Ictinus, the builder of the Parthenon.

B. *εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα*, and a little below, *εἰ ᾠκοδομήκαμεν*. After *would it be incumbent on us to examine*, we should add

in English, *whether we knew*, εἰ ἠπιστάμεθα, relative to ἔδει ἄν, and not εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα, which is absolute: and so *whether we had builded* (in the pluperfect), not *whether we have builded*. But the Greeks, in many kinds of dependent clauses, preferred the absolute to the relative form, as here. The cause of this lay in that liveliness of mind which made the past present and the possible real, and often led them to the use of *oratio recta* for *oratio obliqua*.

C. ἰδίᾳ . . . ἡμῶν. According to Ast, ἡμῶν depends on ἰδίᾳ, which would alone express the idea, were not ἡμῶν wanted for the contrast with μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων. Those who would reject such an expression as ἰδίᾳ ἡμῶν, which is destitute of the support of parallel examples, must read with Stallb., after one MS., ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἡμῶν. —— οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, etc. *It would be the part of prudent men, if so situated, to engage in public works.* Here ἦν has ἄν, but just below is without it. I think, with Ast, that although ἦν is often used without ἄν, (see Mt. § 508, Obs. 2,) yet here the influence of ἄν can extend to the second ἦν.

D. A very similar passage may be found in Laches, 186, B, C. In the first sentence, ἄν belongs to ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, which verb is taken with πάντα . . . ἄλλα, as well as with εἰ παρεκαλοῦμεν. The aorist, with ἄν following the imperfect, here denotes transitory action referable to present time (*if we were urging . . . we would examine:* see Hermann de partic. ἄν, l. 10), or possibly (since we have ἐσκόπουν just below), there may be an inaccuracy of style, like that of using our potential pluperfect for the imperfect, — *would have* for *would*. Comp. 447, D, for the opposite use of the imperfect (εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν . . . ἀπεχρίνατο), in speaking of something continuing in past time. Some would read ἐπιασκεπτόμεθα here, but it is scarcely Attic. See 476, A, note.

E. ἀνθρώπους . . . ἐτύχομεν. The style passes freely from

the first person plural, as a representative of a general truth, to the third, and then back again. There is no reason why we should suspect *ἀνθρώπους*, or read *ἔτυχον*. *ὥστε* goes with *ἐπιχειρεῖν*. —— *ὅπως ἐτύχομεν*, = *in an ordinary way, as we could, utcunque.* —— *τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο*. See 447, A. *δὴ* is *just* or *even*. —— *ἐν τῷ πλίνθῳ*, etc., *to try to learn the potter's art by beginning with the jar*, — the largest vessel, and therefore the hardest to make. This proverb occurs again in Laches, 187, B, in company with its opposite, *ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ἡμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος*, i. e. *to risk what you value least, attempt what you can best afford to fail in;* which refers to the Carian mercenaries in war, whose blood was less precious than their employer's.

515 B. *σὸν ἰδιωτεύοντος*. Soph. § 174; Cr. § 454; K. § 266. 2.

D. For what is here said of "the four," see the Introduction. —— *ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται* here is much the same as *ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά*, which is used as an equivalent, 516, C, 517, A.

E. *ἀκούω*. See 503, C. —— *εἰς μισθοφορίαν . . . καταστήσαντα, by being the first to bring them into the practice of taking pay for performing their political duties.* Pericles introduced the practice of paying the judges. The pay was one obolus per diem at first, and then three. After the death of Pericles, the people also drew pay for attending in the assembly. All this is explained at large in that admirable book, Boeckh's Civil Economy of Athens, Book II. §§ 14, 15. —— *τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων*. See 469, D. This phrase is explained fully by Protag. 342, B. "The Lacedæmonians," Socrates there says, "conceal their philosophy, and thus deceive those in other states who affect Spartan manners, and *who, in imitation of them, have their ears bruised by blows received in boxing*, (*ὦτα κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς*,) and bind the cæstus round their

hands and study gymnastics, and wear short tunics, just as though the Lacedæmonians surpassed the rest of Greece by such means." The phrase, then, denotes the partisans of Sparta, those who admire Spartan institutions, and are ill-affected towards Athens.

A. *γεγόνεσαν*. Comp. Soph. § 79 (91. 6, N. 4); Cr. § 194. 1; K. § 120, R. 2. —— *κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο*. Thucyd. merely says (2. 65) *χρήμασιν ἐζημίωσαν*. Plutarch mentions an accusation and a fine (Vit. Pericl. § 35), as does Diodorus also (12. 45); but the charge was no doubt false: he was *χρημάτων διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος* by the testimony of the most impartial of historians. See Appendix, No. II. —— *θανάτου ἐτίμησαν*. See 486, B, note: *δῆλον ὅτι*, 487, E, note. —— *ὅνων ἐπιμελητής*. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 32, for a similar passage. —— *ἀπέδειξε . . . ποιοῦντας*, *if he had caused them to do*. This verb and *ἀποφαίνω* are often used in the sense of causing something to appear, of *effecting*, *rendering*, and, like *φαίνω*, *δείκνυμι*, take their complement in the form of a participle. 516

B. *καὶ τόδε . . . χάρισαι*. There is a similar play upon *χαρίζομαι* in Repub. 1. 351, C, *σοὶ γάρ*, *ἔφη*, *χαρίζομαι*. *Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε*.

C. *ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος*. Nusquam disertis verbis hoc dictum in eo quem hodie habemus Homero, nisi quis huc trahere velit quod Routhius fecit Odyss. 6. 120, 9. 175, *ἦ ῥ' οἵγ' ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι*. Heindorf. Plato puts the *ἀγαθοὶ* and *ἥμεροι* together, in Repub. 5. 470, E, and makes *τὸ ἥμερον* a part of the philosophic nature in Repub. 3. 410, E. —— *ὃν ἥκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο*, i. e. *εἰς ὅν*.

D. What is here said of Cimon and Themistocles is well known. What is said of Miltiades rests on the authority of Plato, and of the Scholiast on Aristides 3. 677, Dindorf, whom Valck. on Herodot. 6. 136 first cited from a MS. The Scholiast says *ὅτε ἐκρίνετο ἐπὶ τῇ Πάρῳ* (i. e.

on account of his fruitless attack upon the island of Paros soon after the battle of Marathon), *ἠθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνῆσαι, ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἐξῃτήσατο αὐτόν.* Plato perhaps exaggerates a little in saying *ἐψηφίσαντο.* The Prytanis, being president of the assembly of the people which tried the case, was probably one of those friends of Miltiades of whose advocacy Herodot. speaks, and by his intercessions led the judges to lower the penalty from death to a heavy fine. But for that, death, by being thrown into the pit, would have been his portion. See Grote's Greece, Vol. IV. p. 491. —— *τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι, him who was at Marathon,* the general there. *ἐν* is used because the action was "in Marathonio agro." See Soph. Electr. 1. Thucyd. 2. 85, *τῆς ἐν Στράτῳ μάχης, at, near* Stratus. —— *τὸ βάραθρον* is defined by Timæus (Lex. Platon. s. v.), "a place like a well, where the condemned were thrown," and in Bekker's Anecdot. 1. 219, is said to be "an excavation in Keiriadæ, a demus of the Œneid tribe, where they threw down the capitally condemned, as the Lacedæmonians did into Kæadas." Herodot. 7. 133, says that the heralds of Darius were thrown by the Athenians into this place. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1450, and the Schol. on Aristoph. Plut. 431.

E. *εἰ μὴ διά, but for.* This not unfrequent formula has always the same sense as if some part of *κωλύω* were understood. The origin of the phrase is not clear. Ast accounts for it as a confusion or union of two forms of speaking; e. g., in this case, *εἰ μὴ ὁ Πρύτανις εἴη,* if the Prytanis had not existed, . . . *ἐνέπεσεν ἄν,* and *διὰ τὸν Π. . . . οὐκ ἐνέπεσεν.* —— *οὔκουν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι,* etc. This sentence is formed like that explained in the note on 512, A. The sense is, *It is not true that good drivers are not at first thrown from their chariots, but when they have improved their horses by care, and have become better drivers themselves, that they are then thrown out.* *Ζεῦγος* is often used of the vehicle, as well as of the yoke or pair of animals drawing it.

A. *τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν.* Here, by a kind of zeugma, ἔλε- 517
γες, readily suggested by *ὡμολόγεις*, is to be supplied, together with *τινάς*, which is contained in *οὐδένα*. Comp. Soph. Antig. 29. —— *οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον.* The metaphor is borrowed from charioteers, and is the more natural, as persons who lost their rank or authority were said *ἐκπεσεῖν*. Comp. Soph. Antig. 679. —— *οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.* If they had used the true art of rhetoric, that is, had been good politicians, they would have made the people better, and not have had to rue its ingratitude: if the flattering art of rhetoric, they would have escaped from dangers, because that art, according to the Sophists, *σώζει ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτόν.* Aristides triumphs in a supposed inconsistency of Plato, who had before called "the four" *κόλακας*, and now says that they did not use *τῇ κολακικῇ ῥητορικῇ*. But he does not see into the meaning. The words contain a sneer at the rhetoricians. They were *κόλακες*, inasmuch as they studied to gratify, not to benefit; and carrying such a motive into their public addresses, they imbued all their words with it. But if the false art of rhetoric can rescue from dangers, and makes that its first aim, they fell short of it. In other words, the art cannot gain its own dearest ends. They had the principles of the false rhetoric, but could not gain that for which the art was esteemed.

B. *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ . . . μὴ . . . ἐργάσηται. πολλοῦ δεῖ* is usually followed by an infinitive, and Stallb. says that he knows of no example like this. The reason for the construction seems to be, that *πολλοῦ δεῖ*, being in sense a negative, adopts the construction appropriate to *οὐ*. *οὐ μὴ ἐργάσηται* would be a familiar formula. —— *ὃς βούλει*, a singular expression for (*τις*) *ὃν βούλει*, to be referred to the rule of attraction of the relative. Comp. Cr. § 526. *γ*. The verb must be regarded as coalescing with *ὃς* to form one notion, like *quivis* in Latin. —— *ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, as to*

their being servants of the state, or *considering them merely as* (ὡς γε) *being servants of the state.* Stallb. thinks that the phrase arises, by a *confusio duarum locutionum,* out of ὡς ... διακόνους, and διακόνους εἶναι. But the infinitive with ὡς can be used in this relation to the main verb, as well as in others. —— καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, *and in regard to not letting them have their own way.* The infinitives limit διέφερον. —— τούτων, politicians of the present day.

C. οὐδὲν πανόμεθα ... ἀεί. Comp. 491, A. —— ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅ τι λέγομεν. ἀγνοέω takes a genitive, like μανθάνω and other verbs of learning or understanding. Soph. § 182; Cr. § 375. β; K. § 273. 5, f.

D. ἦ δυνατὸν εἶναι is for ἦ δ. ἐστι, by a change of style from direct to suspended discourse. Supply ὡμολογήκαμεν. —— ῥιγῷ is for ῥιγοῖ, subjunctive of ῥιγόω; and so ῥιγῶν for ῥιγοῦν infinitive, in Aristoph. Clouds, 442. This is quite analogous to the contraction of πεινάω, and a few others in αω, by η instead of α, but is usual with no other verb except ἰδρόω. Buttmann (largest Gr. 1. 506, and note in Heindorf) thinks that both contractions are relics of a general method prevailing in old Ionic. —— τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι, etc. This sentence changes its structure, and proceeds as if ὄντα, and not εἶναι, had stood here. The anacoluthon is caused by the explanatory clause ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ... σκυτοδιψόν, and by the difficulty of carrying out the original construction.

518 A. διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας ... εἶναι. The construction changes from ὅτι and a finite verb, εἰδότι ὅτι ἔστι τις, etc., to an infinitive with its subject accus. —— ταὐτὰ οὖν ταῦτα, etc. *Now at one time you seem to be aware that I say that the selfsame thing holds good of the soul also, and you agree to it, as if understanding what I mean.* τοτὲ μὲν answers to ὀλίγον δὲ ὕστερον, and δὲ is, in a sense, out of its place.

B. προτεινέσθαι, *to hold forward as a sample of what*

one has got, hence *to take*, or *select as a specimen.* —— *ὁμοιοτάτους . . . ὥσπερ.* See 485, A. —— *Θεαρίων* must have been the fashionable baker at Athens. He is thus spoken of in a fragment of the Gerytades of Aristophanes (Athenæus, 3. 112, E): *ἦκω Θεαρίωνος ἀρτοπώλιον | λιπών, ἵν' ἐστὶ πριβάτων ἐδώδια,* — which is a parody of the beginning of the Hecuba. And a longer fragment from the Omphale of Antiphanes, preserved in the same place, asks, (by way of parody on Soph. Electr. 257, perhaps,) how a man of noble birth could ever go out of the house where he saw the white loaves of bread . . . *οὓς δημόταις | Θεαρίων ἔδειξεν.* —— *ἀρτοκόπος.* In a number of MSS., *ἀρτοποιὸς* appears. Still another word for the same thing is *ἀρτοπόπος*, which has most commendation from the Atticists, and which has probably been without reason thrust out of its place by the other words in a number of instances. See Lobeck on Phrynichus, 222. —— *Μίθαικος*, etc. *Mithæcus, who wrote the treatise called "La Cuisine Sicilienne."* The Sicilians were in the gastronomic art to the Greeks what the French are now to the world, and Mithæcus was a Syracusan cook. Repub. 3. 404, D, *Συρακοσίαν τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψων, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς.* Athenæus, 12. 518, C, *διαβόητοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ τρυφῇ καὶ αἱ Σικελῶν τράπεζαι.* Comp. also Cicero de Fin. 2. 28. According to Maximus Tyrius (23. 1), cited by Routh, Mithæcus went to Sparta, but they, thinking that too many cooks would spoil their broth, drove him away. —— To Sarambus (or Sarabus, as Meineke, Com. Græc. frag. 4. 525, would write the name) many later writers allude, but they seem to have derived their knowledge of him from this passage. See the commentators on Suidas, sub voce.

C. *παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους.* *ἄνθρωπος* is often added in contempt, having something of the force of our *fellow.* *ἀνὴρ* is used on the contrary with an honorable sense. This

is shown at large in Valckenaer's Opusc. 2. 243, ed. Lips. —— *οἵ, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν*, etc. *Who, it may be, after they have filled and fattened the bodies of the men, and while they are praised by them, will cause the loss* (not only of this increase of flesh, but) *of their old flesh besides.*

D. *ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ, when now their former repletion shall have brought on disease a good while afterwards. ἥκω φέρων* is often nearly the same as *φέρω*, and can only be figuratively explained here of the repletion acting as a cause *bringing in its train* disease as the effect.

E. Nothing is truer than these remarks. The seeds of present national evil are sown in the past, and yet we blame the men of the present for what we suffer, and praise the men of the past, who are the true source of our calamities. It is thus that some, who look with alarm on the turn our affairs are taking, worship Jefferson as a political saint. —— *καὶ φασι ... αὐτοὺς* is for *καὶ οὕς φασι*, by a change of style from the relative to the demonstrative.

519 A. *καταβολή. περιοδικὴ λῆψις πυρετοῦ*, interprete Timæo Lex. p. 154 ubi v. Ruhnken. Heindorf. —— *Ἀλκιβιάδου.* As he had some time before left Athens for the last time, Plato is here forgetful of dates. See 481, D, note, and Appendix, No. I.

B. *ἀγανακτούντων*, sc. *αὐτῶν*, these politicians.

C. Comp. 460, C, and Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 7. —— *κινδυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι, (τούτοις,) ὅσοι, the same thing seems to hold good of those who*, etc. But Mt. § 632, has a different explanation of the form of the sentence.

D. *καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.* For *καί*, Heindorf, without authority, writes *καίτοι.* But *καί*, in the beginning of imperative and interrogative sentences, marks liveliness of transition (Mt. § 620), like our *and* in animated questions, particularly in those where objections are refuted. —— *δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας.* See 482, C, 494, D.

E. *συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων.* The construction seems to be *τινας τῶν λόγων συχνοὺς τείνω*, i. e. *ὥστε συχνοὺς εἶναι, some things which I have to say I dwell largely upon.* But if *λόγων* depends on *συχνοὺς*, as it well can (comp. Soph. § 177. 1), the sense must be, I think, *a good many of my discourses I extend in length.* —— *πρὸς φιλίου.* See 500, B.

A. *ὅταν τύχωσιν.* Comp. 514, E, 518, C. —— What is 520
said here refers to Protagoras, Prodicus, and other professed teachers of virtue, as Heindorf remarks; and it is amusing to see the contempt felt by the friend of Gorgias, a mere teacher of words (*λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς*, Meno, 95, C), for the Sophists, whose pretensions were as much higher as wisdom is higher than eloquence.

B. *ἢ . . . ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν.* Here supply *δεῖν* or *ἀνάγκην εἶναι*, which is readily suggested by *ἐγχωρεῖν*. Comp. 517, A.

C. *προέσθαι, to bestow freely, and in the first instance, without knowing what return the party receiving the favor will make.* Comp. Thucyd. 2. 43, *κάλλιστον ἔρανον αὐτῇ προϊέμενοι, bestowing upon their country a most precious contribution.* So *προεμένους εὐεργεσίαν*, Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 47, where Schneider adverts to this sense. —— *ἄνευ μισθοῦ.* Protagoras, who first openly called himself a Sophist and took pay (Protag. 349, A), says (328, B) that he had a price, which his student might give if he pleased; but if not, that the student went to a temple, and paid so much as he (the student) pronounced on oath the instructions to be worth. For the opinions of Socrates on this point, see, among the rest, Xen. Memorab. 1. 6. 13. —— *ἐνεχώρει.* The absolute form without *ἄν* is here used for the hypothetical with it. See Mt. § 508, Obs. 2; K. § 260, R. 3. —— *τὴν χάριν*, the favor due, *the compensation*, as a mark of a grateful mind. —— *καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος . . . τὸ ἀργύριον, and should not take the money in consequence of a bargain made*

with him (i. e. should not take it as the payment which was stipulated) *at the very time when he was imparting to him the power of swiftness.* ὅτι μάλιστα is joined with ἅμα to increase its preciseness.

E. ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ διδῷ. αὐτῷ refers to the indefinite subject of φάναι. —— ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν. There can be little doubt that Stallb. is right in separating these words, in opposition to Buttmann (2. 361, largest Gr.), who writes in one word ἀντευποιεῖν. εὖ and δυς are united only to derivative forms, except in the instance of the strange word δυσθνήσκων, used by Euripides. —— εἰ εὖ ποιήσας. Heindorf writes ὃ εὖ ποιήσας, "sed fallitur, loco qui repudiat articulum non recte explicato." Hermann on Eurip. Hecuba, 485, 2d ed. The indefinite subject is understood, and εὖ ποιήσας denotes *after conferring a favor.*

521 A. ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ ὁμιλήσοντα. Instead of writing τὴν τοῦ διακονεῖν καὶ ὁμιλεῖν, Plato deserts the construction of the nearest words, through the influence of ὡς ἰατρόν, and accommodates the participles to παρακαλεῖς. See Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. Just below, Heindorf, Coray, and Stallb. think that ὡς has fallen out before κολακεύσοντα.

B. εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν. The sense of this vexed passage seems to be that which Stallb. and Olympiod., whom he cites from the MSS., give to it, *if you like better to call* (such a man) *a Mysian,* call him so; i. e. "You may give the political man the most contemptible name that you can find. Do as you like about that, since if you will not act so as to gratify the Athenians (εἰ μὴ ... ποιήσεις) you will ——." The apodosis to εἰ ... καλεῖν is omitted, being readily suggested by the sense of the passage. It is οὕτως κάλει, or οὐδὲν κωλύει, or something equivalent. The apodosis which εἰ μὴ ... ποιήσεις would have had, if Socrates had not cut the sentence short, is to be found in his words. With καλεῖν must be understood τοῦ-

τον, *this political man*, whom in fact, though not in so many words, Socrates calls a κόλακα. But the connection with the foregoing must be owned to be rather loose. The Mysians stood low among the people of Asia Minor. Μυσῶν ἔσχατος (Theætet. 209, B) is a proverb for the vilest of the vile. Cicero, in his Or. pro Flacco, § 27, says, "Quid porro in Græco sermone, tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam, si quis despicatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse dicatur?"

C. οὐχ ἕξει ὅ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς. αὐτοῖς is *his property*, before spoken of in ἐάν τι ἔχω. In 465, C, the indicative, but in many places the subjunctive, follows ἔχω in this formula. The distinction seems to be, that with the future the action is viewed as simply future; with the subjunctive, as connected with and dependent on some contemplated cause and ground of action. Thus, in οὐκ ἔχει ὅ τι χρήσεται, the subject is in doubt about his future action; in οὐκ ἔ. ὅ. χρήσωμαι, about his rational future action. —— ὡς μοι δοκεῖς. ὡς is exclamatory. —— ὡς οἰκῶν . . . καὶ οὐκ ἄν εἰσαχθείς, *as though you were living aloof, and could not be brought* (on trial) *into court*. For εἰσαχθεὶς ἄν comp. 458, A, note.

D. ὅ τι τύχοι. Mireris Heindorfium ὅ τι ἄν τύχοι corrigentem. Nam optativus post relativa in obliqua oratione haudquaquam infrequens est. Addito ἄν hoc loco scribendum erat τύχῃ. Stallb. —— The dissatisfaction with the political institutions of Athens, which is here clearly implied, was felt by Socrates to some degree, but far more by Plato, whose ideal turn of mind was not fitted to find satisfaction in the present under any system, particularly under one where demagogues reigned, and philosophers had to drink poison. —— πονηρός. An allusion, no doubt, to the actual accusers. —— οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον, sc. εἴη.

E. τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα. An allusion to what Callicles says, 486, C. —— ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνήρ. ὅδε, like οὗτος, 489, B,

used of a person who is present and pointed at, has no article. —— *καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους.* *αὐτοὺς* is taken with *ὑμᾶς εἰργασται*, and serves to contrast the whole *ὑμᾶς* with the part *νεωτάτους.* *καὶ* = *and especially.* —— *νεωτάτους διαφθείρει.* An allusion to the actual charge against Socrates. Comp. 522, B.

522 A. For *εὐωχεῖν* governing two accusatives, see Mt. § 421, Obs. 1; Cr. § 430. This construction (which *γεύω* also sometimes takes) seems to be owing to this; that the verb means substantially *to make to eat*, and needs an object for each of these notions. —— The sentiment conveyed by this comparison of the cook and the physician is expressed in another way by Crates of Thebes, a Cynic philosopher who flourished at Athens in Alexander's time (Diog. Laert. 6. 86): *τίθει μαγείρῳ μνᾶς δέκ', ἰατρῷ δραχμήν · | κόλακι τάλαντα πέντε, συμβούλῳ κάπνον · | πόρνῃ τάλαντον, φιλοσόφῳ τριώβολον.*

B. *οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονάς.* To *οὔτε, ἐάν τε* answers. An affirmative and a negative proposition are often thus bound together by *οὔτε* and *τε*; but *οὔτε* must come first. *αὐτοῖς* the judges implied in *δικαστήριον.* —— *οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται*, i. e. *οὔτε τούτους, οἷς ταῦτα* (referring to *ἡδοναί*) *πορίζεται.* —— *ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα.* This was a frequent charge against Socrates. The doubt he threw upon their former opinions, and the unsettled state of mind which he produced, may have been unwelcome to a few, and regarded as dangerous by a few more; but probably nothing made him more unpopular than his provoking way of bringing men who argued with him to a stand, so that they did not know what to say. Meno says (79, D, cited by Heindorf), "O Socrates, I used to hear it said of you, before I became acquainted with you, that you do nothing else except *αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν.*"

C. *πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, and herein I am doing*

just (δή) *what is for your interest.* Ast takes πάντα ταῦτα with πράττω, as well as with λέγω, and ὑμέτερον . . . τοῦτο as added in apposition. —— οὕτως διακείμενος (not οὕτω). Videtur οὕτως, etiam sequente consona litera, usurpatum esse ubi vi et pondere suo pollet plurimum. Stallb. —— ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι. Heindorf wishes to erase ἐν, or write ἓν, with some reason, as ὑπάρχω takes with it a simple dative.

D. βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ. This noun with the dative denotes *help afforded to;* with the genitive, *against* (comp. βοήθεια πακοῦ, 509, C, βαρβάρων, Plat. Epist. 7. 332, E), or *to* any one. —— There is an allusion here to 486, B.

E. αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν. Comp. for the sentiment Plato's Apol. 28, B, et seq. —— φοβεῖται, sc. πᾶς τις, by brachylogy supplied from οὐδείς, just above. See my note on Soph. Antig. 29. —— ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει depends on λόγον λέξει, as if it were λόγῳ δείξει ὡς . . . ἔχει.

A. φασί, i. e. *as story-tellers say, when they begin a* 523 *story.* —— λόγον opposed to μῦθον is *a historical narrative, a true story,* as opposed to *a fictitious narrative.* —— Ὅμηρος λέγει. Iliad. 15. 187. —— καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, *et semper et nunc etiam.* Ast. ἔστιν includes a past tense.

B. νεωστί, *in modern times,* used relatively to the days of Saturn. —— οἱ ἐκ . . . νήσων. The preposition is accommodated to ἰόντες (see Soph. Electr. 137), because the officers set over the blessed islands came *from thence.* Comp. Cr. § 659; K. § 300. 4; and 472, B, note.

C. ἑκατέρωσε, *in each direction,* to the blessed islands, and to the prison of punishment.

D. προκεκαλυμμένοι = ἔχοντες προκεκαλυμμένον. See Æsch. Prometh. 362; Soph. Electr. 54. The sense is, *having eyes and ears, and the whole body, spread as a veil before the soul.* —— αὐτοῖς . . . ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεσθαι, *are in their way.* —— τοῦτ' αὐτῶν, *this property of theirs, this in them.*

E. ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος = εὐθὺς ἀποθανόντος, *the moment he is dead.* Soph. § 222, N. 4. —— By a constructio ad sensum, ἔρημον . . . καταλιπόντα are in the masculine, because τὴν ψυχὴν ἑκάστου is the same as *each person.* —— δύο ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας. Routh explains this by their being born of Europa, a Phœnician, and adds, that Minos was regarded by some as a stranger in Crete. "Sed Cretam insulam Asiæ assignasse videntur veteres sicut Libyam modo Europæ modo Asiæ contribuerunt; ut duas orbis terrarum partes posuerint, Asiam et Europam." Ast. But no proof has been found elsewhere, that Crete was assigned to Asia.

524 A. ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, etc. Virgil, Æneid, 6. 540: —

> "Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas:
> Dextera, quæ Ditis magni sub mœnia tendit,
> Hac iter Elysium nobis: at læva malorum
> Exercet pœnas, et ad impia Tartara mittit."

B. οὐ πολὺ ἧττον . . . ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη. A free and rather irregular construction, instead of οὐ πολὺ ἧττον . . . ἢ ὅτε ἔζη. ἥνπερ is brought in through the influence of τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὑτοῦ, and alters the ensuing words to suit itself.

D. οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, etc., *such as he had prepared himself to be while living in regard to his body*, i. e. such as were his ways of using his body. Just below, ἔνθηλα ταῦτα refer to the qualities of body implied in οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, as if οἷα ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ σώματι had been written.

E. κατεῖδεν . . . ψυχῆς. The aorist marks indefinite time (484, A, note): ψυχῆς depends on οὐδέν; *nothing belonging to*, or *in*, *the soul.* Comp. Repub. 376, A, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαύμασαι τοῦ θηρίου. —— ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην, etc. Tacit. Annal. 6. 6, "Neque frustra præstantissimus sapientiæ firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse adspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur."

B. *οἱ ὠφελούμενοι ... καὶ διδόντες*, i. e. those who, while 525
they suffer, are made better ... are such as, etc.

C. *τοῖς ἀεί.* See 464, D; Prometh. 937.

D. *τοὺς πολλοὺς ... παραδειγμάτων.* By a *constructio ad sensum*, *παραδειγμάτων* used of the persons who serve as examples, is joined to *πολλούς*, as if it were masculine. —— *Ὅμηρος.* Odys. 11. 575, seq.

E. *οὐ γὰρ ἐξὴν αὐτῷ*, sc. *συνέχεσθαι.* —— *ἐκ τῶν ... ἀνθρωποι, the men who prove to be even very wicked are of the class of the powerful.* Here, 497, A, 526, B, and elsewhere, *γίγνεσθαι* means *to become* subjectively, i. e. to become in the view of the mind, to be found out to be.

C. *ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε*, etc., *putting his mark upon* 526
him to show whether he thinks him curable or not. Comp. Repub. 10. 614, which I will give in English. "When, therefore, his soul went out of his body, he began a journey, with a number of others, and they came to a wonderful place, where there were two openings in the ground close by one another, and others opposite to them above in the sky. Between these judges sat, who, whenever they finished judging, bade the just take the road on the right and upwards through the sky, having first attached certificates (*σημεῖα*) to those who had been judged, in front; and ordered the unjust to take the road to the left and leading downward, with marks behind indicating all their conduct." —— *οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος, who has not been "a busybody in other men's matters,"* who has not gone out of his own sphere of duties, to perform a part belonging to another. In Repub. 4. 433, A, it is made a definition of justice, that a man *τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττει καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ.* Here the words especially point at taking an active part in politics, which, for a man who is not yet qualified for political life, is undertaking another's duty to the neglect of his own.

C, D. *ἑκάτερος ... νέκυσσιν.* This passage is considered to be spurious by Heindorf and Ast, for reasons which, as far as I can see, are altogether insufficient. The passage from Homer is in Odys. 11. 568.

E. *ἀντιπαρακαλῶ.* *ἀντὶ* denotes *in my turn*, in reply to the exhortations which you gave me to engage in politics. Just below, *ἀντὶ ... ἀγώνων* denotes *worth all the trials here*, i. e. to be set against, or equal in importance to all the trials before human tribunals, where rhetoric, as its advocates alleged, would save a man from condemnation. *ἐνθάδε, ἐκεῖ,* and *ἐκεῖσε* are often used of *this life*, and of *death* or *a future state;* the context of course suggesting the explanation. Comp. Soph. Antig. 76; Electr. 356; Eurip. Alcest. 363.

527 A. *τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν.* Æacus (son of Jupiter and Ægina), as being the judge for all from Europe. Olympiod. apud Stallb. says, "He adds Ægina because Callicles was from Ægina." But as that Platonic Scholiast can have known nothing about Callicles, I suspect that the last word, *Αἰγίνης,* is an error in transcribing for *Εὐρώπης,* occasioned by the similar word preceding it. —— *χασμήσει,* etc. This noble passage alludes to 486, B. —— *τυπτήσει.* The Attic form of the future of *τύπτω,* according to Thomas Magister and Mœris sub voce. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1379, 1443. The later writers used all the forms from *τυπτίω,* unless it be the present and imperfect.

B. *ἐκεῖσε ... συμφέρων, advantageous there.* See 526, E. The adverb of motion is used, because the journey from this world is thought of. It is the same as *when we go thither.* Comp. the opposite in Æschin. c. Ctes. § 97, Bekker: "He said that he wished to report to you *τὴν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πρεσβείαν ἣν ἐπρέσβευσε, his embassy into Peloponnesus,* strictly *the embassy into P. from which he had returned.* —— *ἠρεμεῖ, remains quiet, unshaken,* i. e. *unre-*

fated. —— *οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι.* Comp. the noble words in Repub. 2. 361, A, *ἐσχάτη ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι, μὴ ὄντα.* Æschylus was the source of the expression, Sept. c. Theb. 574, *οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει*, upon which words all the theatre turned and looked at Aristides, according to Plutarch in his life.

C. *οὕτω χρηστέον. οὕτω* is immediately explained by *ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί.* —— *ἐντανῦθα, to that kind of life. ἐντανῦθα* came perhaps to be used with a verb of motion, because with the motion its end, rest in the place, is often thought of. —— *ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, as the discourse shows.* Stallb. gives *ὡς ὁ νὸς λόγος*, with the best of the MSS., to which Ast very justly objects. The same false reading appears 511, B, 460, C, and Socrates could not call the argument, so far as it proved this point, the argument of Callicles, to whom he here speaks.

D. *πατάξαι.* The interpreters are divided between *πατάξαι*, with which *ἕκαστόν τινα* and *σε*, from *σου*, just above, are to be supplied, and *πάταξαι sine te verberari.* Buttmann even denies that the middle can have this sense, and, I incline to think, with reason. It may denote *strike yourself*, or *get yourself struck* (i. e. do something which shall cause the action of striking to come back upon yourself), but not *allow yourself to be struck*, i. e., in this place, "bear such an infliction without thinking it the greatest evil in the world." Stallb., in defence of the middle so used, cites from Aristoph. Clouds, 494, *φέρ' ἴδω τί δρᾷς, ἤν τίς σε τύπτῃ;* where Strepsiades replies, *τύπτομαι*: this word Stallb. takes in the sense of *ἐῶ ἐμαυτὸν τύπτεσθαι.* I apprehend that *τύπτομαι* is in the passive. "What do you do," says Socrates, "if a person beats you?" "I am beaten," is the reply; i. e. I do nothing but suffer, I get beaten. We need not be troubled by *σύ γε θαῤῥῶν*; for *σὺ* is occasionally repeated with *γε* in the second clause, with a certain increase of

force in the exhortation. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10, "I shall hear of you as being torn to pieces by dogs and birds, *ἢ κου ἐν γῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἢ σέ γε ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων;*" Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1101, *τίς σε ... ἔτικτε ... Πανὸς ... προσπέλασθεῖσ', ἢ σέ γε ... Λοξίου;* The same is true of *ὅ γε*, and *tu* in Latin. Nor do I see how *θαῤῥῶν* opposes this construction any more than *θαῤῥούντως* would. The sense, then, is, *Yes, indeed, and do you calmly let him give you this dishonorable blow.* —— Stallb., I find, has given up his defence of *πάταξαι*, imperative middle, in his second edition.

E. *οἷς οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ.* Comp. 491, B. He includes himself in the censure, to give it a milder form.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Where and when does Plato represent this Dialogue to have taken place?

1. *Where?* In the house of Callicles, say all with whose opinion I am acquainted, except Schleiermacher. He decides in favor of some public place, such as the Lyceum, where other conversations of Socrates were held. His reasons, given in a note on his translation of Gorgias (Vol. III. 473, of his Plato), are principally these. 1. Socrates (447, B) seems to be going into the place where Gorgias is. He meets Callicles without, who says, "Whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me." (See the note on that place.) The words, *whenever you wish to come*, must relate to some future time. What does Callicles do, then, if they are at his house, (Schl. leaves to be implied,) but shut the door in his visitors' faces. To tell a stranger just entering your house to call at any time, without asking him in, is to turn him away. 2. Schl. finds it strange, and not consistent with Athenian politeness, that Callicles should have deserted his guests, and be going away from his own house. To these reasons of Schleiermacher's may be added two others. 3. If Socrates and his friend were at the door of Callicles's house to hear Gorgias display his rhetorical powers, and if Chærephon knew Gorgias well, why should they need the information that Gorgias lodged there? 4. Perhaps it may be

regarded as a slight argument, that Socrates says (506, A), *ἰῶμεν χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν*: to which Gorgias replies, "It does not seem to me that we ought yet *ἀπιέναι*." For *ἀπιέναι* must have the same subject as the preceding *ἀπίωμεν*. Here, then, Socrates expects that the other parties to the conversation will go away from the place when the discourse is broken off; and Gorgias repeats what Socrates had said, including himself among those who would leave the place. But this could not be, if they were where Gorgias was staying.

No one within my knowledge has examined what Schleiermacher says on this point, or given reasons for choosing the house of Callicles as the scene of the Dialogue, except Cousin. His reasons, I must think, have little weight. 1. There would have been some allusion, direct or indirect, to the place, if a public one. The same might be said, with equal reason, I think, on the other side. 2. It was mainly in private houses, as Plato affirms in Hippias Major, that Gorgias spoke. Plato's expression is *ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος*, and *ἰδίᾳ*, contrasted with *ἐν τῷ δήμῳ* just preceding, means nothing more than *in other places besides the assembly*. 3. Of Callicles leaving his guests, and going out to talk with Socrates, he says, "Nothing is more natural than to go to meet persons who are visiting you, and whom you are to receive, at the entrance of your house." If I mistake not, the porter would have admitted the strangers, and the master of the house have been in a distant part of the building. 4. To Schleiermacher's main remark, he replies, that, as Gorgias was fatigued, Callicles could not ask him to repeat his exhibition, and therefore begged the visitors to call at another time. But need they be turned away? Might they not be invited in, without the necessity of a new exhibition on the part of Gorgias?

2. *When?* The passage 473, E, which is treated of at

large in the note, has been usually supposed to determine the time. But several scholars, as Boeckh (which I learn from C. F. Hermann's work, 1. 634) and Foss, have ascribed an earlier date to the Dialogue, and one so early even as the first visit of Gorgias to Athens. The arguments, so far as I know them, with a single exception, are of little importance. They are, — 1. Pericles is spoken of as *νεωστὶ τετελευτηκώς*, 503, C. But *νεωστὶ* may be widely used. Comp. 523, B. "Nuper, id est paucis ante sæculis." Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 50. It was twenty-four years before 405 B. C. And Pericles in this passage is contrasted tacitly with Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, whose deaths were considerably earlier. 2. Archelaus is said to have committed the crimes by which he gained the throne "yesterday and the day before." But this is very plainly a rhetorical contrast with the *παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν*, just before spoken of. See 470, D. 3. Demus, son of Pyrilampes, was a youth when the Wasps was written, seventeen years before 405 B. C. See 481, D. Suppose him thirty-two in 405, Plato, I imagine, if he had been aware, at the time of writing, of his exact age, would not have scrupled to say what he does. 4. The passage, 473, E, where Socrates speaks of his ignorance of the way to put the question when he was a presiding officer, is inconsistent with Apology 32, B, which refers to the famous occasion in 406 B. C. Socrates, therefore, must allude to something else. I can scarcely conceive how any one, used to the style of the Platonic Socrates, can take what he says 473, E, as sober earnest. 5. In 481, D, and 519, A, Alcibiades is spoken of as beloved by Socrates after their intimacy must long have ceased, and as likely to be punished by the Athenians, after his last departure from Athens, and a little before his death. This appears to me the most serious objection to the year 405. But I apprehend that this is by

no means the only instance in which Plato assigns the relations of one time to another, changing the more immaterial circumstances, as the tragic poets did those of the fables, to suit his design.

No. II.

On what is said of Pericles, 516, A, *and on the Character given to him in this Dialogue.*

An eminent historian (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, Vol. III., chap. 18, and Appendix, 2) has examined the passage above quoted, and thinks that Plato's charge of peculation at this time arose out of a confusion of dates and circumstances. This may be so, but there are two things which ought to be said on behalf of Plato, before we fully condemn him for injustice towards his great countryman. The first is, that he expresses no opinion as to the justice of the charge. If it is admitted to be unjust, his argument is so much the stronger, for it turns upon the *ingratitude* of a people towards its public servants. Indeed, taken in connection with the charges against Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, it wears the appearance of an unfounded accusation. The other is, that the fact may have been as Plato represents it: the people, in a sudden outburst of displeasure, may have at this time fined him, upon a charge of peculation so frivolous that Thucydides does not think it worthy of mention. The circumstances were these. Pericles was deposed from his office of general (Plut. Pericl. § 35, Diodor. 12. 45), — it may be at one of the *epicheirotoniæ*, or in consequence of a special process, an *eisangelia*. A suit was brought against him, — probably a γραφή, though Plutarch calls it a δίκη. Cleon, Simmias, or Lacratidas,

was his accuser, and he was fined in a sum variously estimated at fifteen, fifty (Plut.), and eighty (Diodor.) talents. The nature of the suit is not stated, but it certainly may have been κλοπὴ δημοσίων πραγμάτων, based upon some trifling circumstance, occurring at a time when moneys would be under his control, as commander of the forces. The general Timotheus, with no more reason, perhaps, was accused of treason, and then, at the rendering of his accounts (*euthynæ*), charged with bribery, and fined one hundred talents. To this it may be added, that Aristides, in his vindication of Pericles, nowhere, so far as I have observed, taxes Plato with inaccuracy, but follows his statement, as if he thought it true. And this he does in a work where he accuses Plato of anachronisms and misquotations. (Aristid. 2. 319, 327, de Quatuorv. ed. Dindorf. In the latter place the Sophist says: — "If one should ask Plato whether, supposing he had been one of Pericles's judges when he was tried for peculation, he would have been one to condemn him, and would have given more weight to the words of Cleon than to those of Pericles, or," etc.)

Plato, then, in this very serious and not at all ironical passage (see Thirlwall, III. 91), may have given no credit to the charge against Pericles, and, notwithstanding the silence of historians as to the nature of the suit, may be right in calling it one for peculation.

Upon another point, — Plato's consistency in the character which he gives to Pericles, — I will say but a word. There are three passages which concern us here; Gorg. 515, C – 517; Meno, 99, B – 100, B, compared with 94, B; and Phædrus, 269, A – 270, B. In Meno, εὐδοξία, or correct opinion, is ascribed to Pericles, without wisdom, and in Phædrus he has the credit of possessing consummate eloquence, derived from the discipline of Anaxagoras. In

Gorgias, he is denied to be a true orator, but in Phædrus is declared to be *πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικήν*. The seeming inconsistency can be explained by taking into consideration, that Plato judges of the orator in Gorgias by a moral standard, and in Phædrus looks at him as capable of producing a work of art; and perhaps by this consideration also, that while he would grant to Pericles all that knowledge of the mind which the physical instructions of Anaxagoras could furnish, he might still refuse to him the attributes of a truly philosophical artist.

No. III.

See 486, A, note.

The verses yet extant of this dialogue between the brothers have been collected and emended by Valckenaer, Matthiæ, and others. We here add the passage adjacent to the lines cited or alluded to by Plato, according to Hartung's arrangement in his Euripides Restitutus (Hamburg, 1843). Zethus invites his brother Amphion to go a hunting, and, on his refusal, reproaches him with effeminacy of mind, as giving himself up to the musical art and to indolence, while he neglects useful pursuits. To this scene Horace alludes (Epist. 1. 18. 39):—

> "Nec tua laudabis studia, aut aliena reprêndes,
> Nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.
> Gratia sic fratrum geminorum, Amphionis atque
> Zethi, dissiluit, donec suspecta severo
> Conticuit lyra; fraternis cessisse putatur
> Moribus Amphion.

Zethus first speaks: —

> *Ἄμφιον, ἀμελεῖς ὧν ἐπιμελεῖσθαί σε δεῖ·*
> *ψυχῆς δὲ ... ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν*

γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι·
οὔτ' ἐν δίκης βουλαῖσιν ὀρθῶς ἂν λόγον
προθεῖο πιθανόν, οὔτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
. . . . . ὁμιλήσειας, οὔτ' ἄλλων ὕπερ
νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο. . . .
κακῶν κατάρχεις τῆνδε Μοῦσαν εἰσάγων
ἀσύμφορόν τιν' ἄτοπον . . . . .
ἀργὸν φίλοινον χρημάτων ἀτημελῆ.
. . . . . .
πολλοὶ δὲ θνητῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν κακόν.
γνώμῃ φρονοῦντες οὐ θέλουσ' ὑπηρετεῖν
ψυχῇ, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς φίλων νικώμενοι.
. . . . . .
ἀνὴρ γὰρ ὅστις εὖ βίον κεκτημένος
τὰ μὲν κατ' οἴκους ἀμελίᾳ παρεὶς ἐᾷ,
μολπαῖσι δ' ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ' ἀεὶ θηρεύεται,
ἀργὸς μὲν οἴκοις καὶ πόλει γενήσεται,
φίλοισι δ' οὐδείς· ἡ φύσις γὰρ οἴχεται
ὅταν γλυκείας ἡδονῆς ἥσσων τις ᾖ·
καὶ πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, εἴ τις εὐφυῆ
λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα
μήτ' αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον προσάρκεσαι;
. . . . . .
. . . . . μισῶ . .
σοφὸν λόγοισι, ἐς δ' ὄνησιν οὐ σοφόν.
. . . . . ἀλλ' ἐμοῖ πιθοῦ,
παῦσαι δ' ἀοιδῶν, πολεμίων δ' εὐμουσίαν
ἄσκει, τοιαῦτ' ἄειδ' ἀφ' ὧν δόξεις φρονεῖν,
σκάπτων, ἀρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφεὶς σοφίσματα
ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

ΑΜΦΙΩΝ.

ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων

ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός

. . . . . .

. . . . . ὃς δ' εὐγλωσσίᾳ
νικᾷ, σοφὸς μέν, ἀλλά τοι τὰ πράγματα
κρείσσω νομίζω τῶν λόγων ἀεί ποτε.

. . . . . .

λαμπρὸς δ' ἕκαστος κἀπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνῃ κράτιστος ὤν.

κ. τ. λ.

THE END.

ERRATA.

Page 131,	line	20,	for	ἄν	read	ἂν
132,	"	34,	"	ἐστι	"	ἐστιν
139,	"	20,	"	ἔπ'	"	ἐπ'
163,	"	7,	"	whem	"	whom
164,	"	12,	"	τίνες	"	τινές
164,	"	13,	"	σκιᾷς	"	σκιᾶς
171,	"	16,	add a period at the end of the line.			
189,	"	14,	for	ἱκανοὺς	read	ἱκανούς
193,	"	18,	"	αὐτός	"	αὐτὸς
194,	"	28,	"	εἰμί	"	εἰμὶ
199,	"	19,	"	δή	"	δὴ
201,	"	4,	"	περὶ	"	περί
201,	"	32,	"	στρατὸς	"	στρατός
201,	"	33,	"	ἱερὸν	"	ἱερόν
219,	"	27,	"	εἶη	"	ἦν
226,	"	17,	"	χρήσωμαι	"	χρήσηται

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